

TRUSTING THE STOCK MARKET*

Luigi Guiso

University of Sassari, University of Chicago & CEPR

Paola Sapienza

Northwestern University, NBER, & CEPR

Luigi Zingales

Harvard University, NBER, & CEPR

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Abstract

We provide a new explanation to the limited stock market participation puzzle. In deciding whether to buy stocks, investors factor in the risk of being cheated. The perception of this risk is a function not only of the objective characteristics of the stock, but also of the subjective characteristics of the investor. Less trusting individuals are less likely to buy stock and, conditional on buying stock, they will buy less. The calibration of the model shows that this problem is sufficiently severe to account for the lack of participation of some of the richest investors in the United States as well as for differences in the rate of participation across countries. We also find evidence consistent with these propositions in Dutch and Italian micro data, as well as in cross country data. **JEL Classification: D1, D8**

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The decision to invest in stocks requires not only an assessment of the risk-return trade-off given the existing data, but also an act of faith (trust) that the data in our possession are reliable, that the overall system is fair. Episodes like the collapse of Enron may change not only the distribution of expected payoffs, but the fundamental trust in the system that delivers those payoffs. Most of us will not enter a three-card game played on the street, even after observing a lot of rounds (and thus getting an estimate of the “true” distribution of payoffs). The reason is that we do not trust the fairness of the game (and the person playing it). In this paper we claim that for many people (especially people unfamiliar with finance), the stock market is not intrinsically different from the three-card game. They need to have trust in the fairness of the game and in the reliability of the numbers to invest in it. We focus on trust to explain differences in stock market participation across individuals and across countries.

We define trust as the subjective probability individuals attribute to the possibility of being cheated. This subjective probability is partly based on objective characteristics of the financial system (the quality of investor protection, its enforcement, etc.) that determine the likelihood of frauds such as Enron and Parmalat. But trust reflects also the subjective characteristics of the person trusting. Differences in educational background rooted in past history (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (GSZ), 2004a) or in religious upbringing (GSZ, 2003) can create considerable differences in levels of trust across individuals, regions, and countries. This difference between subjective and objective beliefs can persist because learning about the true probability of a very rare event takes very long time.

These individual priors play a bigger role when investors are unfamiliar with the stock market or lack data to assess it. But they are unlikely to fade away even with experience and data. If trust is sufficiently low, very few will participate and accumulate enough information to update a (possibly wrong) prior. Furthermore, when mistrust is deeply rooted, people may be doubtful about any information they obtain and disregard it in revising their priors. For example, data from a 2002 Gallup poll show that roughly 80 percent of respondents from some Muslim countries (Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) do not believe that Arabs committed the September 11 attacks (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004).

To assess the explanatory power of a trust-based explanation we start by modelling the impact of trust on portfolio decisions. Not only does the model provide testable implications, but it also gives us a sense of the economic importance of this phenomenon. In the absence of any cost of participation, a low level of trust can explain why a large fraction of individuals do not invest in the stock market. In addition, the model shows that lack of trust amplifies the effect of costly participation. For example, if an investor thinks that there is a 3% probability that he will be cheated, the threshold level of wealth beyond which he invests in the stock market will increase five folds. The calibration of the model shows that the existing level of mistrust among investors is sufficiently severe to account for the lack of participation of some of the richest investors in the United States as well as for differences in the rate of participation across countries.

To test the model's predictions we use a sample of Dutch households. In the Fall of 2003 we included some specific questions on trust, attitudes towards risk, ambiguity aversion, and optimism to a sample of 1,943 Dutch households as part of the annual Dutch National Bank (DNB) Household survey. These data were then matched with the 2003 wave of the DNB Household Survey, which has detailed information on households' financial assets, income, and demographics. We measured the level of generalized trust by asking our sample the same question asked in the World Values Survey (a well-established cross country survey): "*Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?*".

We find that trusting individuals are significantly more likely to buy stocks and risky assets and, conditional on investing in stock, they invest a larger share of their wealth in it. This effect is economically very important: trusting others increases the probability of buying stock by 50% of the average sample probability and raises the share invested in stock by 3.4 percentage points (15.5% of the sample mean).

These results are robust to controlling for differences in risk aversion and ambiguity aversion. We capture these differences by asking people their willingness to pay for a purely risky lottery and an ambiguous lottery. We then use these responses to compute an Arrow-Pratt measure of individual risk aversion and a similar measure of ambiguity aversion.

Since these measures are not statistically significant, however, one can still wonder whether trust is not just a better measured proxy of risk tolerance. To dispel this possibility we look at the number of stocks people invest in. In the presence of a per-stock cost of investing, our model predicts that the optimal number of stocks is decreasing with an individual risk tolerance but increasing in the level of trust. When we look at the Dutch sample, we find that the number of stocks is increasing in trust, suggesting that trust is not just a proxy for low risk aversion.

Trust is also not just a proxy for loss aversion, which in Ang et al.'s (2004) framework can explain lack of participation. First, more loss-averse people should insure more, but we find that less trusting people insure themselves less. Second, Osili and Paulson (2005) shows that immigrants in the United States, facing the same objective distribution of returns, invest or not in stock as a function of the quality of institutions of the country they are coming from. This is consistent with the evidence (GSZ 2004a and 2005) that individuals tend to extrapolate the trust of the environment where they are born to the new environment in which they live. It is not clear why loss aversion should follow this pattern.

We also want to ascertain that trust is not a proxy for other determinants of stock market participation. For example, Puri and Robinson (2005) find that more optimistic individuals (individuals who expect to live more) invest more in stock, while Dominitz and Manski (2005) finds, consistent with Biais et al. (2004), that an individual's subjective expectations about stock market performance is also an important determinant.

We control for differences in optimism across individuals by using the answers to a general optimism question we borrowed from a standard Life Orientation Test (Scheier et al., 1994). We control for differences in expectations thanks to a specific question on this topic that was asked to a subsample of the households. When we insert these controls, the effect of trust is unchanged.

The measure of trust that we elicit in the DNB survey is a measure of generalized trust. But stock market participation can be discouraged not only by general mistrust, but also by a mistrust in the institutions that should facilitate stock market participation (brokerage houses, etc.). To assess the role of this specific trust we use a customer survey conducted by a large Italian bank, where people were asked their confidence towards the bank as a broker. Also in

this case we find that trust has a positive and large effect on stock market participation as well as on the share invested in stocks.

That lack of trust - either generalized or personalized – reduces the demand for equity implies that companies will find it more difficult to float their stock in countries characterized by low levels of trust. We test this proposition by using cross country differences in stock participation and ownership concentration. We find that trust has a positive and significant effect on the stock market participation and a negative effect on the dispersion of ownership. These effects are present even when we control for law enforcement, legal protection, and legal origin. Hence, cultural differences in trust appear to be a new additional explanation for cross country differences in stock market development.

We are obviously not the first ones to deal with limited stock market participation. Documented in several papers (e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Poterba and Samwick, 1995, for the US, and Guiso et. al., 2001, for various other countries), this phenomenon is generally explained with the presence of fixed participation costs (e.g. Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003). The finding that wealth is highly correlated with participation rates in cross-section data supports this explanation. But “participation costs are unlikely to be the explanation for nonparticipation among high-wealth households.” (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003 p. 188, see also Curcuru et al., 2004).

While independent from fixed costs, our trust-based explanation is not alternative to it. In fact, the two effects compound. The main advantage of the trust-based explanation is that it is able to explain the significant fraction of wealthy people who do not invest in stocks. Accounting for this phenomenon would require unrealistic level of entry costs. By contrast, since mistrust is pervasive even at high level of wealth (the percentage of people who do not trust others drops only from 66% in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution to 62% at the top), the trust-based explanation can easily account for lack of participation even among the wealthiest.

Furthermore, as Table 1 documents, the fraction of wealthy people who do not participate varies across countries. Explaining these differences only with the fixed cost of entry would require even more unrealistic differences in the level of entry costs. By contrast, we will show that trust varies widely across countries and in a way consistent with these differences.

Our trust-based explanation is also related to recent theories of limited stock market participation based on ambiguity aversion (e.g. Knox, 2003). When investors are ambiguity averse and have Gilboa-Schmeidler “max-min” utility, they may not participate even if there are no other market frictions, such as fixed adoption costs (Dow et al., 1992, and Routledge and Zin, 2001). The two explanations, however, differ both from a theoretical and a practical point of view.

From a theoretical point of view, the different nature of the two explanations can be appreciated from brain experiments (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2004; McCabe et al., 2001; Rustichini et. al., 2002). This evidence shows that when individuals are faced with a standard trust game, the part of the brain that is activated is the “Brodmann area 10”; while when they have to choose among ambiguous and unambiguous lotteries, the part activated is the “insula cortex.” The “Brodmann area 10” is the area of the brain related to people’s ability to make inferences from the actions of others about their underlying preferences and beliefs, and is thus the one that rests on culture. The “insula cortex” is a part of the brain that activates during experiences of negative emotions, like pain or disgust, and is mostly related to instinct.

At the practical level, our trust-based explanation has several advantages. First, if we are interested in predicting stock market participation, models based on ambiguity aversion are less promising. Ambiguity aversion is a parameter of the utility function, which is very hard to measure and hard to explain on the basis of other factors. Other interesting explanations of limited participation in the stock market share similar limits. For example, Ang et al. (2004) provide an explanation based on Disappointment Aversion Preferences. Unfortunately, measuring the degree of disappointment aversion in large samples is difficult. By contrast, an individual level of trust is a prior that has been measured for several decades in sociological surveys and has been linked to the individual personal history and the community the individual lives in.

Second, even if measures of ambiguity aversion or disappointment aversion could be obtained and used to explain differences in participation across individuals, in the literature there is no study showing that aversion to ambiguity or disappointment aversion differ systematically across countries. While it is possible that preferences are affected by cultural heritage (see GSZ, 2005),

evidence of differences across country of these preference parameters do not exist. To the contrary, trust, being partly determined by cultural differences, can vary systematically across countries (as it actually does) and can thus potentially explain international differences in stock market participation.

Third, since trust is the necessary act of faith we have to do when we are not properly informed or we do not understand what is going on, the need for trust is negatively correlated with information and education. More informed people rely less on trust and so do more educated people. There is not an analogous implication in the literature based on ambiguity aversion.

Last but not least, our model based on trust seems to capture in a simpler and more realistic way the reluctance some people show toward investing in the stock market.

Finally, our trust-based explanation provides a new way to interpret the growing evidence that familiarity breeds stock market investments. Empirically, there is evidence that investors have a bias to invest in stocks of companies they are more familiar with. For example, Huberman (2001) shows that shareholders of a Regional Bell Operating Company (RBOC) tend to live in the area served by the RBOC. Similarly, Cohen (2005) documents that employees bias the allocation of their 401-K plan in favor of their employer's stock, possibly because they view their employer's stock as safer than a diversified portfolio (Driscoll et al., 1995). Traditionally, these findings have been interpreted as evidence of Merton's (1987) model of investors with limited information. An alternative interpretation, consistent with our model and several papers in the literature (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001) is that there is a strong correlation between trust and local knowledge. This correlation can be the result of a causal link flowing both ways. On the one hand, more knowledge, as we show in this paper, overcomes the barrier created by lack of trust. Hence, mistrust will be less of an obstacle in investing in local stocks. On the other hand, trust facilitates the collection of information and dissemination of information, as the famous Paul Revere example demonstrates.¹ Accordingly, our model is consistent with Hong,

¹When Paul Revere took the midnight ride in 1775 to inform his fellow citizens that the British were coming, he mounted enough support to defeat them in Concord and begin the Revolutionary War. At the same moment another Bostonian, William Dawes tried to convey the same message but he was unsuccessful even though he met more people during his nocturnal ride (see Hackett Fisher, 1995). The difference between the Paul Revere and

Kubrick, and Stein (2004)'s findings that more social individuals (who go to church, visit their neighbors, etc.) are more likely to hold stocks, since social individuals exhibit more generalized trust (GSZ, 2003).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 shows the implications of introducing a problem of trust in a standard portfolio model. It also derives the different implications trust and risk aversion have when it comes to choosing the optimal number of stocks in a portfolio. Section 2 describes the various data sources we use and the measures of trust, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and optimism in the DNB survey. Section 3 presents the main results on the effect of generalized trust obtained using the DNB survey. Section 4 discriminates between trust and risk aversion, while Section 5 focuses on the effects of trust toward an intermediary. Cross country regressions are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.

1 The model

To illustrate the role of trust in portfolio choices, we start with a simple two-asset model. The first one is a safe asset, which yields a certain return r_f . The second asset, which we call stock, is risky along two dimensions. First, the money invested in the company has an uncertain return \tilde{r} , distributed with mean $\bar{r} > r_f$ and variance σ^2 . Second, there is a positive probability that the stock might become worthless for reasons that are orthogonal to the return of its real investment. We are purposefully vague on what this event might be: the possibility the company is just a scam, that the manager steal all the proceeds, or that the broker absconds with the money instead of investing it. For simplicity, we collectively refer to all these possible events as “the firm cheats” and we label with p the subjective perceived probability this might occur. Consequently, we identify the complementary probability $(1 - p)$ with the degree of trust an investor has in the stock. While p is clearly individual-specific, for simplicity in our notation we omit the reference to the individual. Finally, to highlight the role of trust we start by assuming zero costs of participation.

William Dawes was that Paul Revere was a well connected silversmith, known and trusted by all to be highly involved in his community. Thus, people trusted his message and followed him while ignored Dawes' message (see Gladwell, 2000).

Given an initial level of wealth W , an individual will choose the share α to invest in stocks to maximize his expected utility:

$$\text{Max}_\alpha (1-p)EU(\alpha\tilde{r}W + (1-\alpha)r_fW) + pU((1-\alpha)r_fW).$$

where the two terms reflect the investor's utility if respectively no cheating or cheating occurs. The first order condition for this problem is given by

$$(1-p)EU'(\alpha\tilde{r}W + (1-\alpha)r_fW)(\tilde{r} - r_f) \leq pU'((1-\alpha)r_fW)r_f. \quad (1)$$

The LHS is the expected marginal utility of investing an extra dollar in the risky asset, which yields an excess return $\tilde{r} - r_f$ with probability $(1-p)$. This must be less or equal to the cost of losing all the investment if cheating occurs. If at $\alpha = 0$ the cost exceeds the benefit, than it is optimal to stay out of the stock market. This will happen if $p > \bar{p}$ where \bar{p} , the threshold of p above which an individual does not invest in stocks, is defined as $\bar{p} = (\tilde{r} - r_f)/\tilde{r}$. It follows that

Proposition 1 Only investors with high enough trust ($(1-p) > (1-\bar{p})$) will invest in the stock market.

An interesting feature of this model is that the necessary condition for stock market participation does not directly depend on wealth. Hence, provided that trust is not highly correlated with wealth (a condition we will verify), this model can explain lack of participation even at high levels of wealth.

Suppose that p is below $\bar{p} = (\tilde{r} - r_f)/\tilde{r}$, then (1) will hold as an equality and will define the optimal share $\alpha^* > 0$. Lowering trust marginally (i.e., increasing p), will reduce the left hand side of (1) and increase the right-hand side. To re-establish optimality the optimal share invested in stocks should adjust. Since, given concavity of the utility function, the left-hand side of (1) is decreasing in α while the right-hand side is increasing, α has to decline. Hence, we have

Proposition 2 The more an investor trusts, the higher his optimal portfolio share invested in stocks conditional on participation.

This result can be seen more clearly if we assume investors have an exponential utility with coefficient of absolute risk aversion θ and $\tilde{r} \sim N(\bar{r}, \sigma^2)$. In this case, their optimal α would be

$$\alpha^* = \frac{(\bar{r} - r_f)}{\theta W \sigma^2} - \frac{p r_f}{(1 - p) A \theta W \sigma^2}$$

where $A = e^{-\theta(\alpha^* \bar{r} W - \theta(\alpha^* W)^2 \sigma^2)}$

Note that the first term of this equation is the optimal α when there is no fear of being cheated ($p = 0$). Since A is a strictly decreasing function of α^* , as p increases (trust decreases), the optimal level of investment in stock drops.

1.1 Calibration

The previous section shows that lack of trust can theoretically explain the lack of stock-market participation of many investors. But is this explanation realistic? To address this question we calibrate the model, first without any cost of participation and then with it.

Without any cost of participation, the condition for participation is provided by (1). If we plug the U.S. values of this parameters (the average rate of return on stocks in the post war period has been about 12% and that on government bonds about 5%) an individual will not participate if his subjective probability of being cheated is greater than $(\bar{r} - r_f)/\bar{r} = (1.12 - 1.05)/1.12$, about 6.25%.

Is this a realistic figure? Though we have no direct estimate of the perceived probability of being cheated, we can try to infer it from the trust they exhibit towards large companies. This information is available through the World Value Survey, where individuals are asked how much confidence they have in major companies. Survey participants can answer in one of four ways: “Great deal”, “Quite a lot”, “Not very much” and “Not at all”.

Column (1) in Table 2 reports the fraction of individuals who do not have confidence at all in major corporations. In the United States this proportion is 7.2% in Sweden only 6%, while in Italy 18.6%. These figures alone cannot account for all the people who do not invest in the stock market in these countries (34% in Sweden, 51% in the United States, and 92% in Italy). If we assume, however, that also the second group (i.e., people who state they do not have “very much” confidence in major corporations) attributes at least a 6.25% probability of being

cheated, then the magnitudes are much more comparable. In Sweden the fraction of people with limited trust is 46%, in the United States 49%, and in Italy 50%.

Alternatively, if we accept the view that the lack-of-participation puzzle exists only for the very wealthy people, we should focus on the top 5% of the wealth distribution. Here, the magnitudes are much more comparable. In Sweden only 2% of the more wealthy people do not trust “at all” major corporations and correspondingly only 4% of the rich does not invest in the stock market, similarly for the United States (respectively, 6% and 4%). But in Italy where 29% of the richest people do not trust major corporations, 35% of them does not invest in the stock market!

The above results suggest that mistrust alone can explain much of all the lack of participation puzzle. The combination of trust and fixed cost of participation, can do even better. As Table 2 shows these explanations are not mutually exclusive. While in most countries richer people tend to trust large companies a little more, even among the top income deciles there is a substantial proportion of individuals who do not trust at all large companies. In fact, in Italy the fraction of people who do not trust large corporations at all is even larger among the wealthy than among the poor.

To assess the impact of combining the two explanations, we introduce trust in a fixed cost of participation model à la Vissing-Jørgensen (2003). Hence, we assume that if an individual wants to invest in stocks he has to pay a fixed cost f and allocate between the two assets only the remaining wealth $W - f$. If p exceeds $\bar{p} = (\bar{r} - r_f)/\bar{r}$ the investor will not participate, whatever the value of the participation cost, but now the level of trust required to participate is higher the higher the participation costs because investing in stocks becomes relatively less attractive, as f increases.

Introducing trust in a model with cost of participation changes the wealth threshold for investing too. The perceived risk of being cheated decreases the return on the stock investment, making participation less attractive. To see this effect, suppose $0 < p < \bar{p}$ and let α^* be the optimal share invested in stocks if the investor decides to pay the fixed cost. It is worthwhile for an investor to pay f and invest in stock if participation yields a higher expected utility than

staying out of the stock market and investing the whole wealth in the safe asset, i.e. if

$$(1 - p)EU(\alpha^*\tilde{r}(W - f) + (1 - \alpha^*)r_f(W - f)) + pU((1 - \alpha^*)r_f(W - f)) > U(r_fW)$$

Let α_p^* denote the optimal portfolio share if the investor participates when the probability of being cheated is $p \in [0, 1]$ and \hat{r}_p the certainty equivalent return on equity defined implicitly by $EU(\alpha_p^*\tilde{r}(W - f) + (1 - \alpha_p^*)r_f(W - f)) = U(\alpha_p^*\hat{r}_p(W - f) + (1 - \alpha_p^*)r_f(W - f))$. Then, we have

Proposition 3 *For any probability of being cheated p , there exists a wealth threshold \overline{W}_p that triggers participation given by*

$$\overline{W}_p = f \frac{\alpha_p^*\hat{r}_p + (1 - \alpha_p^*)r_f}{\alpha_p^*(\hat{r}_p - r_f)}$$

and \overline{W}_p is increasing in p .

Proof: See Appendix.

The intuition behind Proposition 3 is very simple. When an investor perceives a probability of being cheated, the effect of a fixed cost increases because he has to pay the participation cost in advance, but expects a positive return only with probability $1 - p$. Hence, the actual participation cost becomes inflated by $\frac{1}{1-p}$.

Introducing trust, thus, amplifies the effect of participation costs. But how sensitive is the wealth threshold to (small) deviations from the full trust hypothesis? To answer this question in Table 3a we report how much the threshold level of wealth has to increase, when the perceived probability of being cheated changes. The calculations have been made by assuming an investor with exponential utility, an initial wealth level equal to 1, a relative risk aversion of 5, a fixed cost of participation equal to 0.1 percent of wealth and $\bar{r} = 1.12$ and $r_f = 1.05$.

Even a perceived probability of being cheated as small as 0.5 percent raises the wealth threshold by 25 percent of its value when trust is full. If the perceived probability of being cheated is 2 or 3 percent, the wealth threshold for participating is respectively 2.7 times and 5.2 times larger than if individuals perceived no risk of cheating.

To assess the practical impact on participation of an increase in the threshold level of wealth, in Table 3, Panel B, we report the ratio of the 75th and 90th percentile of the distribution of financial assets to its median in four countries for which we have micro data (United States,

France, Italy and the Netherlands). The way to use this information is as follows. Based on Table 2, it is plausible to assume that when $p = 0$ the costs of participation are such that every investor with wealth below the median never participate in the stock market. In a high-trust country such as the United States, roughly 50% of household invests in the stock market (Table 1). By contrast, in a low-trust country such as Italy only 8.2% of the population invests in stock. So to explain why more than 90% of the population in Italy does not invest in stock we need to argue that lack of trust increases the threshold of wealth to participate from the median (like in the States) to above the 90th percentile. By looking at Table 3B we know this implies almost a seven fold increase. Is this plausible? By looking at Table 3A we see that a seven fold increase requires an increase in the probability of being cheated going from zero to 4%. Given that the percentage of Italians who do not have any trust in major companies is almost 2.5 times bigger than in the States, this difference in the perceived probability of being cheated is very reasonable.

This result is very important and suggests that our model explains why people with a lot of wealth in the United States do not participate. Table 3a shows that the people who have 8.6 times the median wealth non-participation will occur if the probability of being cheated for these individuals is above 5%. The fraction of wealthy people in the United States that have no confidence in large companies (Table 2) is well in the range of 5%.

In summary, lack of trust always reduces stock market participation, but the strength of this effect depends upon the presence of participation costs. In the absence of any participation cost, lack of trust discourages stock investments only because it reduces their expected return. When participation is costly, lack of trust reduces the return on equity investments in two additional ways: it lowers the optimal share invested in stocks conditional on participation and it lowers the expected utility from participating because it reduces the expected return of stock investments. Thus, paying the fixed costs to enjoy the equity premium becomes less rewarding in the presence of mistrust.

1.2 Diversification, trust, and risk aversion

Given the difficulties in obtaining a reliable measure of individual risk aversion, it will be important to establish in the empirical analysis that trust is not just a proxy for risk tolerance. To do so, we need to devise some theoretical implications where the effect of trust differs from the effect of risk aversion. This is the case for the optimal number of stocks held.

1.2.1 The two stock case

Suppose there are just two risky stocks (1 and 2) in the economy (hence in this example for simplicity we assume away the risk free asset), which are equally and independently distributed with returns $\tilde{r}_1 \sim N(\bar{r}, \sigma^2)$ and $\tilde{r}_2 \sim N(\bar{r}, \sigma^2)$. Each stock also has a probability p of “cheating” and yielding a zero return. The probability of “cheating” is equal for the two stock but independent of each other.

To make the problem interesting, we assume that there is a cost c per stock that investors have to incur.² If an investor puts all his money in the first stock his expected utility will be

$$(1 - p)EU(\tilde{W}_1) + pU(0) - c \quad (2)$$

Since there is another stock, he can diversify by investing part of the money also in the second stock. Given that the two stocks are identically distributed, if he invests in both the optimal allocation is half of his wealth in each. The investor’s expected utility from investing in both assets is:

$$(1 - p)^2EU\left(\frac{1}{2}\tilde{W}_1 + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{W}_2\right) + p^2U(0) + p(1 - p)EU\left(\frac{1}{2}\tilde{W}_1\right) + p(1 - p)EU\left(\frac{1}{2}\tilde{W}_2\right) - 2c \quad (3)$$

Subtracting (2) from (3), the investor will buy the second stock if

$$(1 - p)[D + pV] > c \quad (4)$$

where

$$D = EU\left(\frac{1}{2}\tilde{W}_1 + \frac{1}{2}\tilde{W}_2\right) - EU(\tilde{W}_1)$$

²As Curcuro et al. (2004) argues the lack of diversification remains a puzzle. One way to explain this puzzle is to posit some per stock cost of diversification.

$$V = [EU(\frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_1) + EU(\frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_2)] - [EU(\frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_1 + \frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_2) + U(0)]$$

The term D measures the standard benefit of diversifying the idiosyncratic risk, which materializes regardless of any possibility of cheating. For a risk-averse investor this term is strictly positive and increasing with his degree of risk aversion. By contrast, the term V can be thought of as the benefit of diversifying away the risk of being cheated. Notice that in (4) V is multiplied by the probability of being cheated. Hence, V is the benefit of having invested in two stocks rather than one if cheating in at least one stock (but not both) occurs. The first term in squared brackets is the payoff an investor receives if he has diversified the risk of cheating across the two stocks. If cheating occurs only in stock 1 he gets $EU(\frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_1)$, while if it occurs only in stock 2 he gets $EU(\frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_2)$. By contrast, if an investor is diversified with respect to the idiosyncratic risk but not with respect to the risk of cheating (this could occur if the investor buys a mutual fund which is diversified and the risk of cheating is at the mutual fund level), then he gets $EU(\frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_1 + \frac{1}{2}\widetilde{W}_2)$ half of the times and $U(0)$ the remaining half.³

The investor will diversify into the second stock if the LHS of (4) exceeds the cost of buying the second stock (assuming that he has already invested in the first, so that (1) is positive). It is easy to see that an increase in risk aversion increases the term D and thus makes it more likely that the investor buys the second stock.

But we are also interested in how a change in trust affects the decision. Since $(1-p)(D+pV)$ represents the total expected benefits from diversification, when trust increases (the probability of being cheated p decreases) we have two effects. First, the importance of the total benefits from diversification increases (since all the benefit are multiplied by $(1-p)$), but the benefit of diversifying the risk of being cheated (V) becomes less important (because it is multiplied by p). Hence, we have

Proposition 4 *Diversification will always be non decreasing in trust if $D > V$.*

Proof: The derivative of the LHS of (4) is $-D + (1-2p)V$, which is always negative for $D > V$.

The intuition is straightforward. When we increase p (decrease trust) we lose some benefit

³In the event both stocks cheat, the payoff is $U(0)$ regardless of the diversification strategy.

of diversification (pD) and gain others ($(1-p)pV$). If $D > V$ the benefits of diversification are always decreasing in p and hence higher trust will always lead to more diversification.

Taking a second order approximation around $W = 0$, it is easy to show that $D \simeq -\frac{U''(0)\sigma^2}{4} > 0$ (from concavity) and $V \simeq 0$. Hence, while it is possible, in extreme situations, that diversification may decrease in trust, in general a higher level of trust makes it more likely to invest in the second stock.

Another sufficient condition for diversification being always increasing in trust is that the benefit from the standard diversification is bigger than the cost:

Proposition 5 *The incentives to diversify will always non decrease with trust if an investor would have diversified in the absence of any trust issue (i.e., $D > c$).*

Proof: If $D > c$, the LHS of (4) will be greater than c at $p = 0$. Since the LHS of (4) is a concave function, if it starts above c at $p = 0$, it will cross c at most once as p increases. Hence, the investor will go from diversifying (for low values of p) to not diversifying (for high values of p).

1.2.2 The general case

We can now extend this line of reasoning to the case where there are n stocks. Suppose utility is exponential as before. Each of the n stocks an investor can pick yields the same return which is *iid* with $\tilde{r}_i \sim N(\bar{r}, \sigma^2)$. As before there is a diversification cost: adding one stock costs c in utility terms, so that if an investor buys n stocks he pays a total diversification cost of nc .

Each stock will pay out only with probability $(1-p)$, where p is equal across stocks and independent from stock to stock. If the investor decides to invest in n stock he will put $1/n$ of his wealth W in each stock and solve the problem:

$$\text{Max}_n \sum_{g=0}^n C_n^g p^g (1-p)^{n-g} E \left[-e^{-\theta(W/n) \sum_{i=1}^g \tilde{r}_i} \right] - cn \quad (5)$$

where g is the number of stocks on which he has invested and that paid out and $C_n^g = \frac{n!}{g!(n-g)!}$ is the probability that g stocks pay out (where we adopt the convention that $\sum_{i=1}^{n-g} \tilde{r}_i = 0$ when

$g = n$),. The above expression already reflects the fact that if an investor is cheated on stock j , he loses all the money invested in that stock.

Since \tilde{r} is normally distributed, the above problem can be written as

$$\text{Max}_n \sum_{g=0}^n C_n^g p^g (1-p)^{n-g} \left[-e^{g\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}g^2\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2} \right] - cn.$$

The coefficient multiplying the square bracket term is the coefficient of a binomial term raised to the n power. Hence, we can rewrite this expression as

$$\text{Max}_n - \left[p + (1-p)e^{-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2} \right]^n - cn.$$

Let $Z = \left[p + (1-p)e^{-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2} \right]$, then the first order condition for (5) can be written as

$$-Z^n \left[\log Z + \frac{Z-p}{Z} \left(\theta \frac{W}{n} \bar{r} - \theta^2 \left(\frac{W}{n} \right)^2 \sigma^2 \right) \right] = c$$

As we show in Appendix, this equation has a solution, since the limit of the LHS tends to ∞ as $n \rightarrow 0$ and tends to 0 as $n \rightarrow \infty$. Since the function is continuous, the intermediate value theorem ensures that the first-order condition has at least one interior solution.

Unfortunately, this condition is sufficiently complex that it is not easy to do comparative static analytically. We can, however, resolve it numerically for different values of the parameters and plot the solution. This is what we did in Figure 1. The graph plots the optimal number of stocks as a function of the level of trust, measured by $1-p$, for different values of the risk aversion parameter. Not surprisingly, the optimal number of stocks increases for higher levels of risk aversion. More importantly, the optimal number of stocks also increases with trust. Trust and risk tolerance, thus, have the opposite prediction in terms of number of stocks. Hence, we can try to distinguish them empirically.

2 The main data

Our main data source is the 2003 wave of the DNB Household Survey, which collects information on a sample of 1,943 Dutch households (about 4,000 individuals). The survey, sponsored

by the Dutch National Bank, is administered and run by Center at Tilburg University. The purpose of this survey is to collect household level data to study the economic and psychological determinants of households savings behavior.⁴ All members of the households at least 16 years old are interviewed. Appendix B provides details about the survey design and contents, while Table 4 the main summary statistics.

The survey is particularly useful for our purpose as it has a rich description of the household assets, real and financial, including investment in stocks, distinctly for stocks of listed and unlisted companies and held directly or indirectly through mutual funds and investment accounts.

2.0.3 Measuring trust

In the Fall of 2003 we had the opportunity of submitting to the DNB panel a short questionnaire specifically designed to obtain individual measures of trust, attitudes towards risk and ambiguity as well as indicators of optimism. This questionnaire was submitted to about half the DNB panel and thus information is available for 1,990 individuals belonging to 1,444 households.

To elicit trust we use a question routinely asked in the World Values Survey questionnaires:

“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?”

Individuals could answer in one of three ways: (a) most people can be trusted; (b) one has to be very careful with other people; (c) I don't know.⁵ In our analysis we will define trust as

⁴Interviews are done via computer through the internet. If a household does not own a computer nor have access to the internet, Center provides a set-top box and if necessary a television set that can be used to fill in questionnaires. This feature allows Center to interview the panel occasionally after the main survey has been conducted and collect additional data on some topic of interest. In the main survey, participants are submitted seven questionnaires covering different areas: general information on household demographics; home and market work; housing and mortgages; health conditions and income; financial assets and liabilities; economic and psychological attitudes and work and home.

⁵To avoid that the answers to this question be driven by the order with which the possible answers are presented, half of the sample was randomly faced with a reverse ordering (that is option (b) was offered first and option (a) second). The average answers of the two samples are very similar, suggesting that there is no response order bias.

a dummy variable equal to 1 if individuals choose option (a). On average, 37.7 percent of the respondents answer this way.

For trust to be able to account for the puzzling lack of participation at high levels of wealth it must be the case that it does not increase too much with wealth. Table 4D shows the average level of the two measures of trust by quartile of financial assets. While trust increases with wealth, consistent with findings in other surveys (GSZ, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2003), the change is mild: in the bottom quartile, 2/3 of the individuals state that one has to be very careful when dealing with people, while in the top quartile this fraction drops to 61 percent. Thus, even among the wealthy a substantial fraction have a low level of trust.

2.0.4 Measuring risk and ambiguity aversion

To obtain a measure of risk and ambiguity aversion we asked individuals to report their willingness to pay for a lottery. First, we offer them the following unambiguous lottery:

Risky lottery: *“Consider the following hypothetical lottery. Imagine a large urn containing 100 balls. In this urn, there are exactly 50 red balls and the remaining 50 balls are black. One ball is randomly drawn from the urn. If the ball is red, you win 5000 euros; otherwise, you win nothing. What is the maximum price you are willing to pay for a ticket that allows you to participate in this lottery?”*

Then we offer them an ambiguous one:

Ambiguous lottery: *“Consider now a case where there are two urns, A and B. As before, each one has 100 balls, but urn A contains 20 red balls and 80 blacks, while urn B contains 80 reds and 20 blacks. One ball is drawn either from urn A or from urn B (the two events are equally likely). As before, if the ball is red you win 5000 euros; otherwise, you win nothing. What is the maximum price you are willing to pay for a ticket that allows you to participate in this lottery?”*

Clearly, risk aversion implies that the price they are willing to pay for the first lottery is lower than the expected value of the lottery, i.e. 2,500 euros. The good news is that only 4 individuals report a price higher than 2,500 euros. The bad news is that the sample average

is extremely low (112 euros). While extreme, this low willingness to pay is not unusual. It is a well-known phenomenon in experimental economics: individuals asked to price hypothetical lotteries (or risky assets) tend to offer very low prices (Kagel and Roth, 1995: 68-86). Given this downward bias in the reported willingness to pay, our risk aversion measures are likely to be biased upward. We have found no reference on whether the magnitude of the bias is correlated with observable individual characteristics. If the bias is constant across individuals, measured risk aversion is just a scaled up version of the true one.

To map these prices into a risk aversion measure we assume that individuals have a CARA utility with risk aversion parameter θ and infer the coefficient of risk aversion from the indifference condition between the price offered and the risky lottery.

To get a measure of ambiguity aversion, or more precisely in our context, of aversion to compounded lotteries, we use a similar approach based on the utility function developed by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2005). The details of these calculations are contained in Appendix C.

In some preference representations ambiguity aversion and pessimism are, to some extent, intertwined.⁶ To disentangle the two effects on portfolio decisions as well as distinguish trust from optimism we introduced in the questionnaire also a qualitative question meant to capture

⁶We have also computed an alternative measure of ambiguity aversion based on the preference specification of Ghirardato et. al (2004), who develop a general version of what is commonly called the Hurwicz (1954) α -maxmin criterion which mainly consists in weighting extreme pessimism and extreme optimism when making decisions under ambiguity. The general preference representation is of the form:

$$v(x) = a(x) \min_{\pi \in \Pi} E_{\pi} u(x) + (1 - a(x)) \max_{\pi \in \Pi} E_{\pi} u(x)$$

where $E_{\pi} u(x)$ is the expected utility of x under the probability distribution π . $a(x)$ is what Ghirardato et al. (2004) call the index of ambiguity aversion, which they allow possibly to depend on the choice variable x . The utility $v(x)$ here is a weighted average of the utility derived by a purely ambiguity averse agent ($\min_{\pi \in \Pi} E_{\pi} u(x)$) and that of a purely ambiguity lover agent ($\max_{\pi \in \Pi} E_{\pi} u(x)$). The weights being $a(x)$ and $(1 - a(x))$. Ambiguity aversion depicted by ($\min_{\pi \in \Pi} E_{\pi} u(x)$) reflects extreme pessimism, the agent acts according to the worst case probability measure π in Π . And likewise, ($\max_{\pi \in \Pi} E_{\pi} u(x)$) reflects extreme optimism. This is why, as Hurwicz (1954) himself describes it, the index $a(x)$ is closer in terms of interpretation to an index of pessimism rather than ambiguity aversion. But to the extent that pessimism and ambiguity aversion are intertwined, it may be also interpreted as an index of ambiguity aversion.

an individual’s degree of optimism. In doing so we follow the standard Life Orientation Test, very diffused in psychology (Scheier et al., 1994), and ask individuals the following question: *We now present you with the following statement. “I expect more good things to happen to me than bad things.”* Individuals have to rate their level of agreement/ disagreement with the content of the statement, where 1 means they strongly disagree and 5 strongly agree.

Table 4c shows the cross correlation between trust, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and optimism.

3 Results

3.1 The effect of generalized trust on stock market participation

We start by analyzing the impact of trust on the decision to invest in stock. Since portfolio decisions are likely to involve the entire household, we look at the effect of trust on households’ portfolio decisions. It is not obvious, however, how to aggregate individual measure of risk aversion and trust into a household measure. In the reported estimates, we use the attitudes reported by the household head as the attitude of the entire household. The results using household averages or using all individual level data are very similar.

Table 5 reports the probit estimates obtained using the DNB survey. The left-hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a household invests directly (i.e. not through a mutual fund) in stocks of listed or unlisted companies and zero otherwise. Here and in the subsequent definitions investment in stock does not include investment in equity of own business for those who have one.⁷ In this as well as the subsequent regressions we control for a number of variables. First, since the literature on fixed costs emphasizes the importance of wealth, we include both the value of household financial wealth and income. Then, we include various demographic characteristics to account for possible differences in participation costs. We insert a male dummy, the number of adults and the number of children in the household, two dummies for middle and high education, and a dummy for being an employee. We also control for the household head’s age (both linear and linear and squared), to capture changes over the life cycle. These variables

⁷Trust issues should obviously be irrelevant for equity investment in an individual own business.

may also capture differences across individuals that affect their attitude toward investment in stocks - such as variation in exposure to uninsurable risks (Kimball, 1993) - or that act as a barrier to participation in the stock market regardless of any participation cost, such as lack of awareness of stock as an asset (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005).

The first column reports the estimates of the basic specification, where we insert both trust and risk aversion. While risk aversion turns out to have little predictive power, the effect of trust is positive and highly statistically significant.⁸

Trusting others increases the probability of direct participation in the stock market by 6.5 percentage points. This is a remarkable effect as it corresponds to a 50% increase in the unconditional probability of participation.

The second column includes the measure of ambiguity aversion. In spite of the fact that ambiguity aversion and trust are - as shown in Table 4 - negatively correlated, the coefficient of trust is hardly affected while ambiguity aversion has the expected sign, but it is not statistically significant.

Of course, we cannot conclude from these regressions that trust is more economically important in explaining stock market participation than risk or ambiguity aversion. In fact, it is likely that trust is measured with less noise than both risk and ambiguity aversion and thus its coefficient estimates suffer less of the standard attenuation bias. What we can say, however, is that if we want to predict the level of stock market participation, using measures of trust seems more effective than using measures of risk and ambiguity aversion.

An alternative interpretation of our finding is that trust, rather than reflecting an individual fear of being cheated, captures investor's optimism. Optimistic investors may be induced to participate by their inflated expectations of returns. This possibility is strengthened by the results of Puri and Robinson (2005), who find that people who overestimates their life expectancy (and thus are optimistic) invest more in stock.

We address this concern in two ways. First, in column (3) we insert a dummy variable equal

⁸It is not surprising that risk aversion has limited power in explaining stock market participation in our regressions. In a standard model without participation costs, risk aversion should have no effect. When one takes into account costs of participation, risk aversion should have a negative effect on participation. However, given the costs are small (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003), the effect is likely to be trivial.

to one for all those individuals who answer that they normally expect more good things to happen to them than bad things (a measure of optimism). Consistent with Puri and Robinson (2005), this variable has a positive effect on stock market participation, albeit this effect is not statistically significant. More importantly from our point of view, controlling for optimism leaves the effect of trust nearly unchanged.

Second, in column (4) we control for the household's head expectations about the stock market for the following year. Unfortunately, this question was asked to only 495 individuals and when we merge them with our sample we are left with only 255 observations. Not surprisingly, the effect of trust loses precision. It is interesting to note, however, that it has the same magnitude (in fact, slightly bigger) than before, suggesting our results on trust are not driven by different expectations about the future performance of the stock market.

Finally, in the last column we show that the effect of trust does not fade away with wealth. When we restrict the sample to those with above median financial assets, the effect of trust is of the same order of magnitude and actually somewhat larger than in the overall sample. This implies that trust has a chance to explain why even the rich may choose to keep themselves out of the stock market, even if they can afford to pay the fixed participation cost.

Though it is reasonable to expect the effect of trust to be particularly important for direct participation in the stock market, it is neither limited to direct participation nor just to equity investment. An investor needs some trust even when he buys a stock indirectly, through a mutual fund, a broker, or a bank. While the presence of an intermediary reduces the need for information (and thus for trust), it also increases exposure to opportunistic behavior of the intermediary.⁹

Hence, the effect of trust should generalize to investments in all risky assets, which we define as the sum of directly and indirectly owned stocks, corporate bonds, and put and call options. Table 6 shows this to be the case. The pattern of the estimates is very similar to that in Table 5. While risk and ambiguity aversion have little predictive power on participation in risky assets,

⁹In Italy, for instance, there is anecdotal evidence that banks tend to re-balance their portfolio by advising customers to buy the securities they want to unload. After the Summer 2001 FIAT, the Italian car maker, experienced distress. When FIAT's distress was still unknown to the public, one of the authors was strongly advised by his bank to buy FIAT bonds, on the grounds that FIAT was the largest and most solid Italian firm.

trust has a positive and significant effect: people who trust others have a probability of investing in risky assets that is 8.5 percentage points higher, or about 20 percent of the sample mean. All the other results are the same.

3.2 The Effect of Generalized Trust on the Portfolio Share Invested in Stocks

According to the model in Section 1, not only does trust increase the likelihood an individual invests in stock, but it also increases the share of wealth invested in stocks, conditional on investing in them. We test this prediction in Table 7. Panel A presents the Tobit estimates when the dependent variable is the portfolio share invested in stock (computed as the value of stocks held directly divided by the value of financial assets). We control for the same variables as in the probit estimates reported in Table 6.

As in the participation estimates, the effect of risk is poorly measured, while trust has always a positive and statistically significant effect. Individuals who trust have a share in stocks 3.4 percentage points higher, or about 15.5% of the sample mean. Ambiguity aversion has a negative effect on the share in stocks, while optimism has a positive effect, but neither coefficient is statistically significant. Adding these controls leaves the effect of trust unchanged. Estimated effects and conclusions are similar if instead of the share directly invested in stocks we look at the share invested in all risky assets (Panel B).

In summary, the evidence thus far suggests that our measures of risk and ambiguity aversion have little predictive power, while generalized trust has considerable explanatory power both on direct and overall stockholding as well as on the fraction of the portfolio invested in stocks and risky assets.

3.3 Education, Market Knowledge and the Effect of Trust

If trust reflects individuals' priors, then more educated individuals should be less affected by these priors, because they possess more reliable information. This is consistent with GSZ (2004b), who find that the trusting decision of more educated individuals is less affected by cultural stereotypes. Hence, a direct implication of the trust-based model is that the effect of trust on the stockholding decision should decrease with an investor's level of education and with

his knowledge of the market.

Table 8 tests this implication by splitting the sample according to educational attainments (people with less than a secondary school degree and people with more). The results show a clear pattern: the effect of trust is stronger for people with less education. In fact, the coefficient for more highly educated individuals is never statistically different from zero. For instance, trust raises direct stockholding by 6 percentage points in the low education group and only by 1.4 percentage points in the high education sample. Similarly, the impact on the share invested in stocks or in risky financial assets is twice as large among the less educated.

4 Is Trust a Proxy for Risk Tolerance?

Given the noisiness of our measure of risk aversion, an obvious criticism to our results is that trust may be just a proxy for (poorly measured) attitude to risk. All the effects of trust we have seen so far are consistent with this interpretation: if trust was just a proxy for risk tolerance we would expect higher trust (risk tolerance) to be associated with a higher portfolio share invested in stocks and, in the presence of some fixed participation costs, with a higher probability of participating in the stock market.

To address this concern we exploit the differential implications of trust and risk tolerance on the number of stocks. As shown in Section 1, while the number of stocks unambiguously decreases with the investor's risk tolerance, it may increase with his degree of trust. Thus, if we find that trust has a positive effect on the number of stocks, we can reject it is just a proxy for (poorly measured) risk aversion.¹⁰

Table 9, Panel A, shows the results of an ordered probit estimate. The dependent variable is the number of stocks in a household's portfolio. The first four columns report ordered probit regressions for the whole sample.

Besides the male dummy and age, the only two variables that have predictive power on the number of stocks are the level of wealth and generalized trust: individuals who trust invest on

¹⁰Since the optimal number of stocks does not necessarily have to increase with trust (see section 1) this test can only reject that trust is a proxy for risk tolerance if the empirical relationship between number of stock and trust is positive.

average in 0.6 more stocks than those who do not trust. This is a non-negligible effect, given that the median number of stocks among stockholders is 3. In order to obtain a similar effect, we should move a household's wealth from its median value to about the 80th percentile. All the other controls - including measured risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and optimism have the expected signs, but lack statistical significance. To take into account the possibility that one can achieve diversification by investing in a mutual fund instead of buying single stocks, in column 4 we include a dummy for whether the investor owns a stock mutual fund and results are unchanged.

The last column restricts the sample to the equity holders (162 observations). Even in this very limited sample trust has a positive and statistically significant effect, which is very similar in magnitude to the one estimated in the whole sample. The only puzzling aspect is that our measure of risk aversion has a negative impact on the number of stocks held.

An alternative way to separate trust from risk aversion is to look at insurance data. On the one hand, more risk tolerant individuals should buy less insurance, at least as long as insurance contracts are not actuarially fair (as generally they are not). On the other hand, more trusting individuals should buy more insurance because insurance is just another financial contract with delayed and uncertain repayment, where trust can play a role. An individual who is less confident the insurance promise will not be kept - i.e. has less trust - will be less likely to insure himself.

Panel B uses data on holdings of private health insurance to distinguish between these alternative predictions. Inconsistent with trust being a proxy for risk tolerance, trust has a positive effect on the decision to buy private health insurance (first three columns), as well as on the amount purchased (last two columns), albeit these effects are very imprecisely estimated.¹¹

In sum, there is no evidence that trust is a proxy for risk tolerance, while all the evidence is consistent with mistrust creating a wedge between the demand the supply of financial contracts.

¹¹These results also suggest that trust is not a proxy for loss aversion. Loss aversion should make people to buy more insurance, while the the regression evidence, albeit weak, is consistent with the trust interpretation.

5 Is Generalized or Personalized Trust that Matters?

The degree of trust a person has towards another or towards a company depends both on his general trusting attitude and on the perceived trustworthiness of the counterparty. The nature of the Dutch sample allowed us to capture only the first effect, we now move to our second dataset (the Italian Bank customers survey), where we are able to capture the second one.

5.0.1 Bank customers' data

This survey contains detailed information on portfolio composition and demographic characteristics for a sample of 1,834 customers. It also asks participants to report how much they trust the bank by asking:

“How much do you trust your bank official or broker as financial advisor for your investment decisions?”

We create a dummy equal to one when a customer answers that he trusts the bank a lot and a second dummy equal to one if he instead says he trusts the bank enough. The offset are the customers who trust the bank little or very little. Since the people interviewed are already customers of the bank, their average level of trust is high: 30 percent report they trust their banker a lot, while 45 percent report they trust it “enough”. We use these dummies as a measure of personalized trust, i.e. of trust towards a well identified entity, in contrast to the measure of generalized trust

This bank survey also tried to elicit attitudes towards risk by asking individuals to report whether they view risk predominantly as *a*) an uncertain event from which one can profit; *b*) an uncertain event one should protect from. Hence, we will be able to control for this indicator of risk preferences. Summary statistics for this sample are shown in Table 4F

5.1 Results

Table 10 reports the estimates of both the participation and the portfolio share decisions. As the first column shows, those who perceive risk as something to avoid rather than an opportunity - the risk averse - are less likely to be stockholders. Differently from what we found in the DNB

data, this measure of risk aversion has predictive power, perhaps because eliciting attitudes towards risk this way is less subject to measurement errors. The effect is also economically important: being risk averse reduces the likelihood of investing in risky financial assets by 5 percentage points (7.8% of the sample mean).

More importantly for our purposes, trust in the bank officer has also a positive and statistically significant effect on the choice to invest in equity and the impact is sizeable. Compared to those who do not trust, investors who trust a lot their bank are 16 percentage points more likely to invest in stocks (25% of the sample mean).

The second column reports Tobit estimates for the share of financial wealth in stocks, while the third column reports estimates for the conditional share. In both cases trust has a positive effect on the investment in stocks, albeit in the conditional share equation this effect is poorly estimated.

Overall, these results confirm those obtained by using a measure of generalized trust. That lack of trust towards your *own* bank affects financial investment in risky assets testifies the pervasiveness of the effects of trust on portfolio allocation. That the effect is present even when we have a better measure of risk further strengthens the conviction that trust is not a proxy for risk tolerance.

6 The Effect of Trust on Stock Market Development

Thus far, we have only analyzed the effect of differences in trust across individuals. But what are the aggregate implications of a low *average* level of trust in a country? When the average level of trust is low, for any given level of returns, investors are more reluctant to invest. Hence, to attract them, price-earnings ratios should fall. If they do, entrepreneurs will be less interested in floating their companies or even in selling pieces of them to private investors (see Giannetti and Koskinen, 2005).

We will test this implication both within a country and across countries.

6.1 Firms data

For our within-country test we rely on a sample of Italian firms and we exploit the variation in the level of trust and social capital, which is very pronounced within Italy (Putnam, 1993).

The dataset used for this test draws from the 1999 Italian Survey of Manufacturing Firms (SMF), which is run every three years by Mediocredito Centrale (an Italian investment bank) on a sample of over 4,000 small and medium-sized manufacturing firms. The main purpose of the survey is to collect information on several aspects of a firm's activities with a focus on technological innovation and investment in research and development. It also contains information on the firm ownership structures and their location.

6.2 Within country results

As a proxy for the local level of trust, we use a measure of electoral participation that Putnam argues is very closely associated with trust (GSZ, 2004a). As a measure of entrepreneurs' propensity to sell a stake in their company, we use a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a single shareholder owning all the firm's equity and zero otherwise.

Table 11 presents the results of this probit regression, where we control for other possible determinants of a firm ownership structure (the north-south divide, the level of GDP per capita, and a proxy for judicial inefficiency in the province where the firm is located).

Even controlling for all these environmental variables, the indicator of the level of local trust has always a negative and highly statistically significant effect on the probability that a firm is entirely owned by a single shareholder. This is consistent with the prediction that in places where trust is scarce, corporations are reluctant to broaden their shareholder base.

6.3 International data

To test this prediction across countries we assemble information from three sources. We get stock market participation (fraction of individuals who directly own stocks) from Giannetti and Koskinen (2005).¹² These data show remarkable variation: the fraction of direct stockholders

¹²Since individuals can also participate through mutual funds, pension funds, and managed investment accounts, these figures represent a lower bound. But a very relevant one, since trust should be most important for direct

is only 1.2 percent in Turkey (the lowest value in the sample) and 40 percent in Australia (the highest value). The fraction of stock market capitalization that is closely held is obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). From the same source we obtain an index of legal enforcement, and the country legal origin. Finally, average trust in each country is obtained from the World Values Survey. It is computed as fraction of individuals in each country who reply that most people can be trusted.

6.4 Cross-country results

Table 12 reports the results. In the first three columns the dependent variable is the percentage of the stock market capitalization that is closely held. As expected, trust has a negative effect on this variable and the effect is both statistically and economically significant. If Turkey had the same level of trust as Belgium (the median country) the fraction of the stock market closely held would be 11 percentage points lower.

When we control (column 2) for legal enforcement as done by Giannetti and Koskinen (2005), the coefficient of trust becomes even larger in absolute value. Further controlling for Common Law, leaves the effect of trust positive and significant and its coefficient unchanged suggesting that trust plays an independent and additive role with respect to the quality of formal institutions in explaining worldwide differences in ownership concentration. The results (not reported) are substantially the same when, as a measure of trust, we use the fraction of people who do not have at all confidence in major corporations.

If entrepreneurs are reluctant to float their companies and investors are reluctant to invest, countries with low levels of trust should also exhibit low levels of stock market participation. To test this implication we look at the proportion of population that invests in the stock market. As Figure 2 shows, this proportion varies widely across countries. Stockholders are as low as 2 percent in Turkey and as high as 40 percent in Australia.

While entry costs might differ across countries, it is hard to believe that they are much lower in Australia and New Zealand (the countries with the highest participation) than in Switzerland (with a participation rate of 18%) or Belgium (where only 6 percent buy equity).

investment.

It would also be hard to explain this variation just with differences in risk or ambiguity aversion. In so far as these preference parameters reflect innate traits, their distribution should be similar across different populations.

By contrast, since generalized trust is affected by culture and history, it can potentially differ considerably across communities, as indeed it does. In our sample, the share of individuals that trust varies between a low of 3 percent in Brazil and a high of 67 percent in Denmark.

The second three columns of Table 13 formally test this relation by regressing the share of stockholders in each country on the World Values Survey measure of trust. As predicted, trust has a positive effect on stock ownership and this effect is statistically significant. This result is unchanged if we control for the quality of legal enforcement (column 5) and for the fact a country has a common law system (6). In all these cases the effect is very economically significant. If Turkey had the same level of trust as Ireland (the median country) the share of stockholders would increase to 8 percentage points, more than a six-fold increase in the level of participation in that country.¹³

7 Conclusions

After the recent corporate scandals, a lot of politicians and business commentators argued that investors were deserting the stock market because they had lost their trust in Corporate America. In spite of the popularity of this interpretation, the finance literature has so far ignored the role of trust in explaining stock market participation and portfolio choices.

This paper tries to fill this gap. Not only do we show that, in theory, lack of trust can explain why individuals do not participate in the stock market even in the absence of any other friction. But we also show that, in practice, differences in trust across individuals and countries help explain why some invest in stocks, while others do not. Our simulations also suggest that this problem can be sufficiently severe to explain the percentage of wealthy people who do not invest in the stock market in the United States and the wide variation in this percentage across countries.

¹³The results (not reported) are substantially the same when, as a measure of trust, we use the fraction of people who do not have at all confidence in major corporations.

Another outstanding puzzle regarding stock market participation is why some demographics, such as race, have so much impact on the decision to invest in stock, even after controlling for wealth and education (e.g., Chiteji and Stafford (2000)). That the race effect disappears when Chiteji and Stafford (2000) control for whether parents owned stock points to a cultural explanation of the phenomenon. Since trust is very much linked to family background (Banfield (1958) GSZ (2004a)), our trust-based model has the potential to address even this puzzle.

If it is a policy goal to promote wider stock ownership, then this paper has two implications. First, a better education about the stock market can reduce the negative effect of lack of trust. Second, it becomes crucial to understand the determinants of investors' (possibly biased) perception of the trustworthiness of the stock market. This is the next item in our research agenda.

A Appendix A

Proof of Proposition 3

First notice that $EU(\alpha_0^* \widehat{r}(W-f) + (1-\alpha_0^*)r_f(W-f)) = U(\alpha_0^* \widehat{r}_0(W-f) + (1-\alpha_0^*)r_f(W-f)) > EU(\alpha_p^* \widehat{r}(W-f) + (1-\alpha_p^*)r_f(W-f)) = U(\alpha_p^* \widehat{r}_p(W-f) + (1-\alpha_p^*)r_f(W-f))$, since α_0^* maximizes the first expression above and U is increasing in final wealth. It follows that $\alpha_0^* \widehat{r}_0 > \alpha_p^* \widehat{r}_p$. We can now show that if $W = \overline{W}_0$ and $p > 0$ the investor will not participate, i.e. $(1-p)EU(\alpha_p^* \widehat{r}_p(\overline{W}_0-f) + (1-\alpha_p^*)r_f(\overline{W}_0-f)) + pU((1-\alpha_p^*)r_f(\overline{W}_0-f)) < U(r_f \overline{W}_0)$. Since $(1-\alpha_p^*)r_f(\overline{W}_0-f) < r_f \overline{W}_0$, it is enough to show that $\alpha_p^* \widehat{r}_p(\overline{W}_0-f) + (1-\alpha_p^*)r_f(\overline{W}_0-f) < r_f \overline{W}_0$. Substituting the value of \overline{W}_0 , the above inequality always holds since $\alpha_0^* \widehat{r}_0 > \alpha_p^* \widehat{r}_p$. Thus, with partial trust, the wealth threshold required to enter the stock market is larger than when there is full trust.

Existence of a Solution for the Optimal Number of Stocks

The first order condition for the problem

$$\text{Max}_n - \left[p + (1-p)e^{-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2} \right]^n - cn$$

is

$$FOC : -Z^n \left[\log Z + \frac{Z-p}{Z} (\theta \frac{W}{n} \bar{r} - \theta^2 (\frac{W}{n})^2 \sigma^2) \right] = c$$

$$\text{where } Z = \left[p + (1-p)e^{-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2} \right].$$

To show that the first-order condition has at least one solution, we take limits of the LHS of the first order condition for $n \rightarrow +\infty$ and $n \rightarrow 0$.

- Limit of LHS when $n \rightarrow +\infty$

In this case, $\lim_{n \rightarrow +\infty} Z = 1$, $\lim_{n \rightarrow +\infty} Z^n = e^{-(1-p)\theta\bar{r}w}$ and $LHS \rightarrow 0$.

To see why $\lim_{n \rightarrow +\infty} Z^n = e^{-(1-p)\theta\bar{r}w}$, we write the following approximations:

- 1) $\log(Z) \approx \log(1 + Z - 1) \approx Z - 1$
- 2) $Z - 1 = (1-p)(e^{-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2} - 1) \approx (1-p)(-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2)$
- 3) $Z^n = e^{n \log(Z)} \approx (1-p)(-\theta(W)\bar{r})$

- Limit of LHS when $n \rightarrow 0$

1) Now $\lim_{n \rightarrow 0} Z = +\infty$ and $\lim_{n \rightarrow 0} Z^n = +\infty$

$$2) \frac{Z-p}{Z} = \frac{(1-p)e^{-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2}}{p + (1-p)e^{-\theta(W/n)\bar{r} + \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2}}$$

$$= \frac{1-p}{1-p + pe^{\theta(W/n)\bar{r} - \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2}}$$

So that $\lim_{n \rightarrow 0} \frac{Z-p}{Z} = 1$

3) Let $K = \theta(W/n)\bar{r} - \frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2$

We can write the following approximations:

$$\frac{Z-p}{Z} = \frac{(1-p)e^{-K}}{(1-p)e^{-K} + p}$$

$$= \frac{1}{1 + \frac{p}{1-p}e^K}$$

$$\approx 1 - \frac{p}{1-p}e^K$$

$$\log(Z) = \log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}e^K + 1\right) + \log(1-p)e^{-K}$$

$$= \log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}e^K + 1\right) + \log(1-p) - K$$

So that:

$$\log Z + \frac{Z-p}{Z}(\theta(W/n)\bar{r} - \theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2)$$

$$\approx \log\left(\frac{p}{1-p}e^K + 1\right) + \log(1-p) - K + \left(1 - \frac{p}{1-p}e^K\right)(\theta(W/n)\bar{r} - \theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2)$$

$$\underset{n \rightarrow 0}{\sim} -\frac{1}{2}\theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2$$

This means that $\left(\log Z + \frac{Z-p}{Z}(\theta(W/n)\bar{r} - \theta^2(W/n)^2\sigma^2)\right) \rightarrow -\infty$ as $n \rightarrow 0$ and that LHS goes to $+\infty$.

Since $c > 0$, according to the intermediate value theorem, the first-order conditions have a solution.

B Appendix B: The DNB survey and the bank customers survey

B.1 The DNB Survey

We rely on the the 2003 wave of the DNB Household Survey. The DNB survey collects information on a sample of about 1,943 Dutch households (about 4,000 individuals). The survey, sponsored by the Dutch National Bank, is administered and run by Center at Tilburg University. The purpose of the survey is to collect household level data to study the economic and psychological determinants of households savings behavior. Interviews are done via computer through the internet. If a household has no computer or access to the net, Center provides a set-top box and if necessary a television set that can be used to fill in questionnaires. This feature allows Center to interview the panel occasionally after the main survey has been conducted and collect additional data on some topic of interest. On the main survey, participants are submitted seven questionnaires each covering a different feature of the household: general information on household demographics; home and market work; housing and mortgages; health conditions and income; financial assets and liabilities; economic and psychological attitudes and work and home. All individuals in the households of age above 16 are interviewed but the general information is collected for all household members.

B.2 The bank customers survey

The bank customer survey (BCS) draws on a sample of one of the largest Italian banking groups, with over 4 million accounts. The survey was conducted in the Fall of 2003 and elicits detailed financial and demographic information on a sample of 1,834 individuals with a checking account in one of the banks that are part of the group. The sample is representative of eligible population of customers, excluding customers aged less than 20 and more than eighty, and those who hold accounts of less than 1,000 euro or more than 2.5 million euro. Account holders are stratified according to three criteria: geographical area, city size, and financial wealth, and it explicitly over-samples rich individuals.

The goal of the survey is to understand customers' behavior and expectations.

The questionnaire was constructed with the help of field experts and academic researchers. It has 8 sections, dealing with household demographic structure and on occupation, propensity to save, to invest and to risk, individuals and household financial wealth and liabilities, real estate and on entrepreneurial activities, income and expectations and needs for insurance and pension products.

C Appendix C: Measuring risk and ambiguity aversion

C.1 The coefficient of risk aversion

Since survey participants are reporting the price that makes them indifferent between participating in the lottery and paying the reported price q and not participating, it must be that

$$-e^{\theta W} = \frac{1}{2}(-e^{\theta(W+X-q)}) + \frac{1}{2}(-e^{\theta(W-q)})$$

where X is the lottery prize (5,000 euros in the survey). Using this indifference condition we compute for each individual in the sample his/her absolute risk aversion parameter θ . A measure of relative risk aversion can be obtained multiplying θ by the individual endowment (income or wealth or the sum of the two).¹⁴

C.2 The coefficient of ambiguity aversion

To get a measure of ambiguity aversion from the answers to our questions we rely on the utility model recently developed by Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2005). Consider an individual who must make a decision prior to the realization of an unknown state of nature s . There is a finite set S of possible states and a typical choice will be a vector (x_1, \dots, x_S) among a choice set X . The environment is ambiguous in the sense that the decision maker cannot precisely evaluate his subjective probability distribution for the states of nature but he however has a set of subjective probability distributions Π .

¹⁴The assumption about the shape of the utility function to obtain the risk aversion parameter is not important. Assuming that individuals have CRRA preferences and backing the relative risk aversion parameter under this assumption gives essentially the same estimates of absolute risk aversion as using CARA preferences.

In this framework ambiguity-averse preferences for two-state lotteries can be written as

$$v(x) = E_{\pi}u(x) \text{ if there is no ambiguity}$$

$$v(x) = \min_{\pi \in \{\pi_A, \pi_B\}} \left\{ E_{\pi}u(x) + \omega \left(\pi \log \frac{\pi}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi) \log \left(\frac{1 - \pi}{1 - \pi^*} \right) \right) \right\}$$

where π^* is a reference probability measure for the distribution $(\pi, 1 - \pi)$. The term $(\pi \log \frac{\pi}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi) \log(\frac{1-\pi}{1-\pi^*}))$ is a measure of entropy and the extent of aversion to ambiguity is measured by the parameter ω . Letting q_A denote the willingness to pay for the ambiguous lottery and X the prize of the lottery (5,000 euro), the index of ambiguity aversion can be computed as:

$$\omega = \frac{u(W) - \pi_A u(W - q_A) - (1 - \pi_A) u(W + X - q_A)}{(\pi_A \log \frac{\pi_A}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi_A) \log(\frac{1-\pi_A}{1-\pi^*}))}$$

where W is the person's wealth and the risk aversion of the utility function $u(W)$ is obtained from the answers to the purely risky lottery. In our case the reference measure $(\pi^*, 1 - \pi^*)$ can be taken to be $(1/2, 1/2)$.

We can further develop this formula to separate the effect of pure risk-aversion on the ambiguity index a from the effect of ambiguity and write it as

$$\omega = \frac{u(W) - 1/2u(W - P) - 1/2u(W + X - P)}{(\pi_A \log \frac{\pi_A}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi_A) \log(\frac{1-\pi_A}{1-\pi^*}))} +$$

$$\frac{1/2u(W - P) + 1/2u(W + X - P) - \pi_A u(W - P) - (1 - \pi_A) u(W + X - P)}{(\pi_A \log \frac{\pi_A}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi_A) \log(\frac{1-\pi_A}{1-\pi^*}))}$$

The first term reflects the pure effect of risk-aversion and is equal to zero if the participant is risk neutral; the second term reflects the effect of ambiguity, that is the effect of distorting the perceived probability from $(1/2, 1/2)$ to $(\pi_B, 1 - \pi_B)$. Here the distortion of the perceived probability distribution is made in favor of the "worst case model" $(\pi_A, 1 - \pi_A)$. Another way to refine the index is to consider the second term only as the index of ambiguity aversion.

Note that in this model there will be a non zero ambiguity aversion index even if the willingness to pay are the same for both the purely risky lottery and the ambiguous lottery. This is due to the fact that ambiguity (the sole fact of not knowing the probabilities) has this effect of distorting the perceived probabilities for the decision maker which should be taken into account.

In practice, for *CARA* utility, we have that:

$$\begin{aligned}
u(x) &= -\frac{1}{\theta}e^{-\theta x} \\
\omega &= -\frac{1}{\theta}e^{-\theta W} \frac{1 - \pi_A e^{\theta q_A} - (1 - \pi_A)e^{-\theta(X-q_A)}}{(\pi_A \log \frac{\pi_A}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi_A) \log(\frac{1-\pi_A}{1-\pi^*}))} \\
&= u(W) \frac{1 - \pi_A e^{\theta q_A} - (1 - \pi_A)e^{-\theta(X-q_A)}}{(\pi_A \log \frac{\pi_A}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi_A) \log(\frac{1-\pi_A}{1-\pi^*}))}
\end{aligned}$$

and for *CRRA* utility, we have that:

$$\begin{aligned}
u(x) &= \frac{x^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \\
\omega &= \frac{W^{1-\gamma} 1 - \pi_A(1 - \frac{q_A}{W})^{1-\gamma} - (1 - \pi_A)(1 + \frac{X-q_A}{W})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma (\pi_A \log \frac{\pi_A}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi_A) \log(\frac{1-\pi_A}{1-\pi^*}))} \\
&= u(W) \frac{1 - \pi_A(1 - \frac{q_A}{W})^{1-\gamma} - (1 - \pi_A)(1 + \frac{X-q_A}{W})^{1-\gamma}}{(\pi_A \log \frac{\pi_A}{\pi^*} + (1 - \pi_A) \log(\frac{1-\pi_A}{1-\pi^*}))}
\end{aligned}$$

As already noticed by Maenhout (2000,2002), the Hansen-Sargent static multiplier preferences, of which the Maccheroni et al. (2005) are a generalization, are not homogeneous in wealth even if the utility function u is homogeneous in wealth, this is the reason why the ambiguity aversion index ω is proportional to $u(W)$ when u is homogeneous in wealth. In the numerical calculations, we report only $\frac{\omega}{u(W)}$, the main reason is that $u(W)$ is extremely small (in the order of 10^{-10}).

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Figure 1

This figure reports the optimal number of stock an investor should hold for different levels of risk aversion and different levels of trust. Trust is the percentage probability of being cheated. Theta is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of an exponential utility function.




Figure 2




Table 1
Proportion of Households Investing in Risky Assets, by Asset Quartiles

The first panel shows the proportion of households in each quartile of gross financial wealth who owns stock directly. The second panel shows the same proportion when we include also indirect ownership, via mutual funds or pension funds. Data for European countries are computed from the 2004 wave of the Survey for Health, Age, and Retirement in Europe (Share), and refer to year 2003. Data for the U.S. are drawn from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Data for the U.K. are drawn from the 1997-98 Financial Research Survey.

| Direct Stockholding | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | Quartile I | Quartile II | Quartile III | Quartile IV | Top 5 % | Average |
| U.S. | 1.4 | 6.9 | 20.6 | 47.9 | 70.1 | 19.2 |
| U.K. | 0.0 | 4.4 | 28.3 | 53.6 | 67.9 | 21.6 |
| Netherlands | 1.5 | 7.4 | 20.0 | 40.3 | 60.2 | 17.2 |
| Germany | 0.6 | 4.1 | 16.1 | 36.1 | 50.5 | 14.0 |
| Italy | 0.0 | 0.8 | 3.1 | 12.8 | 30.8 | 4.0 |
| Austria | 0 | 1.7 | 2.8 | 15.6 | 25.7 | 5.0 |
| Sweden | 12.9 | 30.7 | 46.9 | 72.8 | 80.6 | 40.8 |
| Spain | 0 | 0.3 | 1.8 | 13.2 | 14.4 | 3.5 |
| France | 0.7 | 9.9 | 14.6 | 33.3 | 44.2 | 14.4 |
| Denmark | 6.3 | 25.9 | 36.4 | 55.6 | 68.4 | 31.0 |
| Greece | 0 | 0.7 | 3.2 | 17.3 | 23.5 | 4.9 |
| Switzerland | 2.8 | 12.2 | 30.3 | 54.2 | 63.2 | 24.9 |

| Direct and Indirect Stockholding | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | Quartile I | Quartile II | Quartile III | Quartile IV | Top 5 % | Average |
| U.S. | 4.4 | 38.3 | 66.0 | 86.7 | 93.7 | 48.9 |
| U.K. | 4.9 | 11.9 | 37.8 | 71.1 | 83.9 | 31.5 |
| Netherlands | 1.7 | 11.0 | 31.3 | 52.8 | 72.0 | 24.1 |
| Germany | 6.6 | 17.6 | 22.1 | 29.3 | 41.6 | 22.9 |
| Italy | 0.0 | 0.8 | 5.2 | 27.5 | 64.8 | 8.2 |
| Austria | 0 | 1.9 | 8.1 | 25.5 | 33.8 | 8.8 |
| Sweden | 25.8 | 63.4 | 82.7 | 92.9 | 95.8 | 66.2 |
| Spain | 0 | 1.1 | 3.0 | 19.1 | 24.6 | 5.4 |
| France | 1.1 | 17.6 | 29.9 | 57.6 | 67.3 | 26.2 |
| Denmark | 6.6 | 30.8 | 44.8 | 65.7 | 75.4 | 37.0 |
| Greece | 0 | 0.7 | 4.0 | 22.2 | 32.9 | 6.3 |
| Switzerland | 2.8 | 20.0 | 38.2 | 63.7 | 65.8 | 31.4 |

Table 2
Trust in Large Companies

This table reports data from the World Values Survey on people's trust toward large companies. The first column reports the proportion of people who do not have confidence at all in major corporations, while the second the proportion that does not have very much confidence. Column 3 is the sum of the previous two. For each country we report the value for the whole sample, for the people in the top 30% of the income distribution and for people in the top 10% of the income distribution. To compute these values we pool the 1981-1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997 waves of the WVS.

How much confidence do you have in major companies?

| Country | No confidence (1) | Not very much confidence (2) | Total fraction with limited confidence (1)+(2) |
|-------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------|---|
| USA | | | |
| Total sample | 7.22 | 41.54 | 48.76 |
| Top 30% | 6.46 | 41.78 | 48.24 |
| Top 10% | 5.03 | 43.55 | 48.58 |
| France | | | |
| Total sample | 12.51 | 30.66 | 53.17 |
| Top 30% | 13.21 | 30.88 | 44.09 |
| Top 10% | 4.62 | 21.54 | 26.16 |
| Germany | | | |
| Total sample | 16.95 | 49.27 | 66.22 |
| Top 30% | 15.47 | 48.82 | 64.29 |
| Top 10% | 13.37 | 50.87 | 64.24 |
| Italy | | | |
| Total sample | 18.54 | 31.38 | 49.92 |
| Top 30% | 28.32 | 35.49 | 53.81 |
| Top 10% | 28.89 | 38.67 | 67.56 |
| Netherland | | | |
| Total sample | 12.03 | 47.29 | 59.32 |
| Top 30% | 8.66 | 48.38 | 57.04 |
| Top 10% | 3.45 | 40.23 | 43.68 |
| Sweeden | | | |
| Total sample | 5.99 | 40.31 | 46.30 |
| Top 30% | 3.34 | 33.89 | 37.23 |
| Top 10% | 2.0 | 20.0 | 22.0 |

Table 3
Calibration

Panel A shows the result of a calibration exercise of the optimal portfolio choice for different levels of trust (expressed as perceived probability p that an investor will be cheated). The first column reports these perceived probabilities, varying between 0 and the maximum value above which no participation takes place. Column 2 reports the wealth threshold beyond which people invests in the stock market expressed as a ratio of the level of wealth that will trigger investment in the absence of trust considerations. Column 3 reports the optimal portfolio share invested in the stock market, conditional on investing. The calculations assume the investor has exponential utility, wealth is set equal to 1, relative risk aversion is 5, the participation cost is 0.1 percent of wealth and the return on equity and the risk free rate are 1.12 and 1.05, respectively. Panel B reports the ration of the 75th and 90th percentile of financial assets to median values.

A. Probability of being cheated and wealth participation threshold

| Probability of being cheated in the stock market | Wealth participation thresholds /wealth threshold when trust is full ($p=0$) | Optimal share invested in stocks if participation occurs |
|--|--|--|
| 0 | 1 | 0.350 |
| 0.005 | 1.251 | 0.249 |
| 0.01 | 1.662 | 0.197 |
| 0.015 | 2.066 | 0.160 |
| 0.02 | 2.713 | 0.131 |
| 0.025 | 3.544 | 0.107 |
| 0.03 | 5.195 | 0.087 |
| 0.035 | 6.349 | 0.070 |
| 0.04 | 7.503 | 0.054 |
| 0.05 | 8.658 | 0.028 |
| 0.06 | 9.812 | 0.005 |

B. ratio of 75th and 90th percentile of financial assets to median value

| | USA | Italy | France | Netherlands |
|------------------------------------|--------|-------|--------|-------------|
| 75 th percentile/median | 4.908 | 2.932 | 2.996 | 2.945 |
| 90 ^h percentile/median | 14.018 | 6.819 | 7.339 | 7.426 |

Table 4
Summary statistics

The table shows summary statistics of the variables used. Panels A-D use data from the Dutch National Bank survey. Financial wealth, income and health insurance premium are in thousand euro. Trust is a dummy equal to one if a person answers "most people can be trusted" to the question: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?" The price for the lotteries is obtained asking people how much were they are willing to pay to participate in a lottery. In the unambiguous lottery the interviewed is given the exact number of balls in the urn. In the ambiguous one this number is uncertain, but the interviewed is given the probability distribution. The coefficient of risk aversion is obtained fitting a CARA utility. Optimism is an index of agreement (from 1 to 5) to the statement "I expect more good things to happen to me than bad things." "Expect stock market to go up" is a dummy equal to one if the interviewed answers "increase" to the question "do you expect market stock prices to increase, remain constant or decrease in the next two years?" Panel E is from a survey of bank customers of a large Italian commercial bank. In this sample high trust is a dummy equal to 1 when a bank customer responds "a lot" or "enough" to the question: "How much do you trust your bank official or broker as financial advisor for your investment decisions?". Medium trust is a dummy variable equal to one if s/he answers "so and so" or "not much" (the left out category is "not at all"). Panel F is from an international dataset combining data from Giannetti and Koskinen (2005), from La Porta et al. (1998) and from the World Value Survey (data on trust).

A. Stock holdings, financial assets and income: DNB (N. 1,444)

| | Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|---|-------------|---------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Direct stockholders | 0.135 | 0.0 | 0.342 | 0 | 1 |
| Risky assets holders | 0.422 | 0.0 | 0.449 | 0 | 1 |
| Portfolio share in stocks | 0.033 | 0 | 0.119 | 0 | 1 |
| Portfolio share in stocks among stockholders | 0.203 | 0.118 | 0.229 | 0.0001 | 0.926 |
| Portfolio share in risky assets | 0.124 | 0 | 0.230 | 0 | 1 |
| Portfolio share in risky assets among holders of risky assets | 0.295 | 0.195 | 0.274 | 0.001 | 1 |
| Number of stocks | 0.532 | 0 | 2.873 | 0 | 97 |
| Number of stocks among stockholders | 3.90 | 3 | 6.952 | 1 | 97 |
| Holders of health insurance | 0.269 | 0 | 0.444 | 0 | 1 |
| Health insurance premium ('000 of euros) | 0.178 | 0 | 1.148 | 0 | 44.411 |
| Household financial wealth ('000 of euros) | 031.230 | 10.140 | 66.804 | 0 | 838.041 |
| Gross household income ('000 of euros) | 28.128 | 22.362 | 68.930 | 0 | 2,197.032 |
| Number of observations | | | | | |

B. Trust, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and optimism: DNB (N. 1,444)

| | Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|---|-------------|---------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Trust WVS | 0.332 | 0.0 | 0.471 | 0 | 1 |
| Absolute risk aversion | 0.107 | 0.028 | 0.186 | 0 | 0.693 |
| Ambiguity aversion | 4.155 | 7.1077 | 4.275 | -2.389 | 41.692 |
| Price to participate in risky lottery ('000 of euros) | 0.123 | 0.001 | 0.421 | 0 | 5 |
| Price to partic. in ambiguous lottery ('000 of euros) | 0.090 | 0.001 | 0.341 | 0 | 3 |
| Individual optimism | 3.127 | 4 | 1.532 | 0 | 5 |
| Expect stock market to go up | 0.596 | 1 | 0.458 | 0 | 1 |

C. Correlation matrix between trust, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and optimism: DNB (N. 1,444)

| | Trust WVS | Absolute risk aversion | Ambiguity aversion | Optimism |
|------------------------|-----------|------------------------|--------------------|----------|
| Trust WVS | 1 | | | |
| Absolute risk aversion | 0.017 | 1 | | |
| Ambiguity aversion | 0.014 | 0.072 | 1 | |
| Optimism | 0.310 | 0.172 | 0.013 | 1 |

D. Trust and wealth

| | Financial Wealth | | | | | |
|-----------|------------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|---------|---------|
| | Quartile I | Quartile II | Quartile III | Quartile IV | Top 5 % | Average |
| Trust WVS | 0.342 | 0.373 | 0.409 | 0.396 | 0.365 | 0.382 |

E. Household head and household demographics: DNB

| | Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-----|-----|
| Male | 0.466 | 0.0 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 30.184 | 34 | 27.011 | 0 | 90 |
| High education | 0.178 | 0 | 0.382 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium education | 0.292 | 0 | 0.455 | 0 | 1 |
| Employee | 0.369 | 0 | 0.483 | 0 | 1 |
| N. of household members | 2.442 | 2 | 1.281 | 1 | 8 |
| N. of children in the household | 0.711 | 0 | 1.070 | 0 | 6 |

F. Summary statistics for the Bank Customer Dataset ((N = 1,834)

| | Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|---------------------------------|---------|--------|---------|-----|-------|
| Share holding risky assets | 0.638 | 1 | 0.481 | 0 | 1 |
| Portfolio share of risky assets | 0.223 | 0.110 | 0.269 | 0 | 1 |
| High trust in bank official | 0.665 | 1 | 0.472 | 0 | 1 |
| Medium trust in bank official | 0.135 | 0 | 0.342 | 0 | 1 |
| Averse to risk | 0.709 | 1 | 0.454 | 0 | 1 |
| Financial assets ('000, euros) | 109.185 | 25 | 270.810 | 0 | 3,760 |
| Male | 0.711 | 1 | 0.453 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 54.698 | 56 | 14.366 | 21 | 85 |
| Years of education | 11.974 | 13 | 4.412 | 0 | 21 |

G. Summary statistics for the International Data ((N= 33)

| | Mean | Median | SD | Min | Max |
|--|-------|--------|-------|------|-------|
| % of stock market cap. closely held | 44.03 | 42.43 | 18.38 | 7.94 | 77.48 |
| % population participating in the stock market | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.40 |
| Average trust | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.17 | 0.03 | 0.67 |
| Legal enforcement | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.24 | 0.17 | 1.00 |
| Common law | 0.32 | 0.00 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 1.00 |

Table 5
The effect of trust on direct stock market participation

The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household directly owns shares in a company (be it listed or not) except in his own company. The table reports the probit estimates, calculated as the effect on the LHS of a marginal change in the RHS variable computed at the average value of the RHS variables. All household characteristics, which are defined in Table 1, are assumed to be those of the household head. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level.

| | Whole sample | | | | Above median wealth |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Trust | 0.065*** (0.023) | 0.059*** (0.022) | 0.057*** (0.022) | 0.064 (0.051) | 0.072** (0.036) |
| Risk aversion | 0.055 (0.052) | 0.061 (0.047) | 0.061 (0.047) | 0.012 (0.122) | 0.113 (0.085) |
| Ambiguity aversion | | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.001 (0.004) | -0.003 (0.003) |
| Optimism | | | 0.005 (0.010) | 0.047* (0.025) | 0.023 (0.019) |
| Stock market expected to go up | | | | -0.020 (0.043) | |
| Financial wealth | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| Income | 0.994 (1.325) | 0.837 (1.190) | 0.824 (1.189) | -7.001 (20.720) | 3.831 (3.662) |
| Male | 0.039 (0.027) | 0.036 (0.024) | 0.036 (0.024) | 0.025 (0.069) | 0.047 (0.045) |
| Age | -0.005** (0.002) | -0.004* (0.002) | -0.005* (0.002) | -0.010* (0.005) | -0.006 (0.004) |
| Age square | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Household size | -0.015 (0.026) | -0.014 (0.023) | -0.014 (0.023) | 0.041 (0.060) | -0.075* (0.045) |
| Number of children | 0.040 (0.030) | 0.037 (0.028) | 0.037 (0.028) | 0.009 (0.065) | 0.121** (0.054) |
| College education | 0.072** (0.036) | 0.066** (0.033) | 0.063* (0.033) | 0.357*** (0.133) | 0.072 (0.053) |
| High school education | 0.041 (0.029) | 0.038 (0.027) | 0.036 (0.027) | 0.169* (0.091) | 0.055 (0.047) |
| Employee | -0.002 (0.030) | -0.000 (0.027) | -0.002 (0.027) | -0.139** (0.067) | -0.058 (0.053) |
| Observations | 1156 | 1156 | 1156 | 255 | 618 |

Table 6**The effect of trust on participation in risky assets**

The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household directly owns any risky asset (shares, mutual funds, corporate bonds, put and call options) except equity in his own company. The table reports the probit estimates, calculated as the effect on the LHS of a marginal change in the RHS variable computed at the average value of the RHS variables. All household characteristics, which are defined in Table 1, are assumed to be those of the household head. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level.

| | Whole sample | | | | Above median wealth |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Trust | 0.085** (0.037) | 0.084** (0.037) | 0.082** (0.037) | 0.053 (0.079) | 0.084* (0.044) |
| Risk aversion | -0.100 (0.091) | -0.107 (0.092) | -0.106 (0.092) | -0.039 (0.197) | 0.019 (0.115) |
| Ambiguity aversion | | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001 (0.006) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Optimism | | | 0.007 (0.019) | -0.009 (0.040) | 0.042* (0.023) |
| Stock market exp. to go up | | | | -0.028 (0.077) | |
| Financial wealth | 0.003*** (0.000) | 0.003*** (0.000) | 0.003*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| Income | -1.951 (3.271) | -1.979 (3.290) | -2.006 (3.295) | -53.158 (33.834) | -4.451 (5.356) |
| Male | 0.109** (0.048) | 0.109** (0.048) | 0.109** (0.048) | 0.153 (0.116) | 0.096 (0.062) |
| Age | -0.007 (0.004) | -0.006 (0.004) | -0.007 (0.005) | -0.009 (0.009) | -0.011* (0.006) |
| Age square | 0.000* (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | 0.000* (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Household size | 0.165*** (0.044) | 0.165*** (0.044) | 0.164*** (0.044) | 0.083 (0.096) | 0.119** (0.056) |
| Number of Children | -0.109** (0.052) | -0.109** (0.052) | -0.108** (0.052) | 0.023 (0.108) | -0.051 (0.066) |
| College education | 0.016 (0.050) | 0.016 (0.050) | 0.013 (0.051) | 0.136 (0.111) | -0.029 (0.061) |
| High school education | 0.020 (0.045) | 0.019 (0.045) | 0.017 (0.045) | 0.083 (0.094) | 0.011 (0.057) |
| Employee | 0.183*** (0.050) | 0.183*** (0.050) | 0.181*** (0.050) | 0.203* (0.107) | 0.109* (0.066) |
| Observations | 1,007 | 1,007 | 1,007 | 237 | 618 |

Table 7**The effect of trust on the portfolio share in stocks and risky assets**

The table reports Tobit estimates for the portfolio share invested in stocks (Panel A) and in risky assets (Panel B), except equity in his own company. The share in stocks is the value of household holdings of listed and unlisted stocks divided by total household financial assets; the share in risky assets is the value in stocks, in stock mutual funds, corporate bonds and put and call divided by total family financial wealth. All characteristics are those of the household head. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level.

A: Share of household in financial assets invested in stocks

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Trust | 0.131*** (0.047) | 0.133*** (0.047) | 0.130*** (0.048) | 0.145 (0.119) |
| Risk aversion | 0.064 (0.116) | 0.085 (0.118) | 0.085 (0.118) | -0.048 (0.332) |
| Ambiguity aversion | | -0.003 (0.003) | -0.003 (0.003) | 0.003 (0.010) |
| Optimism | | | 0.012 (0.026) | 0.088 (0.068) |
| Stock market expected to go up | | | | -0.039 (0.119) |
| Financial wealth | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Income | 0.873 (3.293) | 0.781 (3.274) | 0.754 (3.274) | -19.128 (53.827) |
| Male | 0.129* (0.067) | 0.132* (0.067) | 0.132* (0.067) | 0.161 (0.211) |
| Age | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.011** (0.005) | -0.012** (0.006) | -0.028** (0.014) |
| Age square | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Household size | -0.066 (0.058) | -0.067 (0.058) | -0.067 (0.058) | 0.071 (0.166) |
| Number of children | 0.139** (0.068) | 0.141** (0.068) | 0.141** (0.068) | 0.141 (0.179) |
| College Education | 0.169** (0.067) | 0.171** (0.067) | 0.166** (0.068) | 0.724*** (0.232) |
| High school education | 0.087 (0.063) | 0.089 (0.063) | 0.086 (0.064) | 0.400* (0.217) |
| Employee | -0.012 (0.067) | -0.010 (0.067) | -0.014 (0.067) | -0.348** (0.170) |
| Observations | 999 | 999 | 999 | 234 |

B. Share of household financial assets invested in risky financial assets

| | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Trust | 0.096*** (0.034) | 0.096*** (0.034) | 0.095*** (0.035) | 0.022 (0.071) |
| Risk aversion | -0.093 (0.086) | -0.095 (0.087) | -0.095 (0.087) | -0.068 (0.181) |
| Ambiguity aversion | | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.004 (0.005) |
| Optimism | | | 0.004 (0.018) | -0.003 (0.035) |
| Stock market expected to go up | | | | -0.030 (0.070) |
| Financial wealth | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.001* (0.000) |
| Income | -2.152 (3.295) | -2.164 (3.301) | -2.180 (3.304) | -32.009 (30.996) |
| Male | 0.125*** (0.048) | 0.124*** (0.048) | 0.125*** (0.048) | 0.231** (0.117) |
| Age | -0.009** (0.004) | -0.009** (0.004) | -0.010** (0.004) | -0.014* (0.008) |
| Age square | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) |
| Household size | 0.066 (0.043) | 0.066 (0.043) | 0.065 (0.043) | -0.034 (0.095) |
| Number of Children | -0.007 (0.049) | -0.007 (0.049) | -0.007 (0.049) | 0.169 (0.104) |
| College Education | 0.028 (0.047) | 0.028 (0.047) | 0.027 (0.048) | 0.159 (0.101) |
| High school Education | 0.017 (0.042) | 0.017 (0.042) | 0.015 (0.043) | 0.009 (0.086) |
| Employee | 0.120** (0.049) | 0.120** (0.049) | 0.119** (0.049) | 0.096 (0.101) |
| Observations | 999 | 999 | 999 | 234 |

Table 8
Trust and education

In this table we re-estimate the regressions in Table 4 (first two columns), in Table 5 (second two columns), and in Table 6 (last four columns) splitting the sample by level of education. In the first two columns the left hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the household holds equity directly; in the second two columns is a dummy equal to 1 if the household holds stocks directly or indirectly and/or invests in corporate bonds and put and call options. In the remaining columns the left hand side variable is the share of household financial assets invested directly in equity (columns 5 and 6) and in risky assets (last two columns), respectively; the share in risky assets is the value in stocks, in stock mutual funds, corporate bonds and put and call options divided by total family financial wealth. In all cases, investment in stock does not include equity in his own company. As in Tables 4 and 5, the first four columns are probit estimates, calculated as the effect on the LHS of a marginal change in the RHS variable computed at the average value of the RHS variables. The last four columns are tobit estimates. High education includes all those with a high college degree or a university degree. Low education includes all those with less than high college education. Education is that of the head of the household. All characteristics are those of the household head. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.

| | Ownership of stock | | Ownership of risky assets | | Share of stocks | | Share of risky assets | |
|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| | Low educ | High educ | Low educ | High educ | Low educ | High educ | Low educ | High educ |
| Trust | 0.059** (0.025) | 0.014 (0.046) | 0.095** (0.045) | 0.056 (0.068) | 0.155*** (0.052) | 0.071 (0.095) | 0.119*** (0.040) | 0.052 (0.063) |
| Risk aversion | 0.018 (0.038) | 0.229* (0.118) | -0.094 (0.105) | -0.201 (0.195) | -0.004 (0.126) | 0.288 (0.250) | -0.102 (0.097) | -0.174 (0.186) |
| Ambiguity aversion | -0.003*** (0.001) | -0.001 (0.002) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001 (0.002) | -0.007 (0.005) | -0.002 (0.003) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001 (0.001) |
| Optimism | -0.000 (0.008) | 0.032 (0.029) | -0.001 (0.022) | 0.021 (0.040) | -0.003 (0.026) | 0.066 (0.061) | -0.006 (0.020) | 0.021 (0.037) |
| Financial Wealth | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.003*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.000) | 0.002*** (0.000) |
| Income | -0.127 (1.136) | 3.785 (3.355) | -3.118 (5.310) | -0.618 (5.426) | -0.278 (3.653) | 2.700 (7.012) | -3.006 (4.860) | -1.194 (5.336) |
| Male | 0.022 (0.022) | 0.068 (0.050) | 0.141** (0.061) | 0.021 (0.080) | 0.089 (0.080) | 0.216* (0.122) | 0.132** (0.061) | 0.069 (0.076) |
| Age | -0.002 (0.002) | -0.009 (0.011) | -0.005 (0.005) | -0.035* (0.018) | -0.004 (0.006) | -0.025 (0.023) | -0.003 (0.005) | -0.049*** (0.016) |
| Age square | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) |
| Household size | -0.013 (0.020) | 0.003 (0.054) | 0.182*** (0.054) | 0.114 (0.080) | -0.049 (0.065) | -0.094 (0.114) | 0.121** (0.052) | -0.087 (0.076) |
| Number of children | 0.030 (0.024) | 0.012 (0.068) | -0.118* (0.062) | -0.082 (0.102) | 0.098 (0.074) | 0.211 (0.143) | -0.080 (0.058) | 0.206** (0.095) |
| Employee | -0.005 (0.021) | 0.030 (0.067) | 0.174*** (0.058) | 0.226** (0.102) | -0.035 (0.070) | 0.046 (0.144) | 0.081 (0.055) | 0.225** (0.100) |
| Observations | 858 | 298 | 748 | 259 | 740 | 259 | 740 | 259 |

Table 9
Is trust a proxy for risk aversion?

The table shows regressions for the effect of trust on the number of stocks (Panel A) and on demand for health insurance (Panel B). The first panel reports ordered probit regressions for the number of different stocks on which the household invests, excluding equity in his own company. The left hand side variable is an integer varying between 0 (no directly held stocks) and n (the household invests in n directly held stocks of different companies). In the last column the sample includes only households with strictly positive stockholdings. In Panel B the left hand side is a dummy equal to 1 if the household has a private insurance. The reported figures are probit estimates calculated as the effect on the LHS of a marginal change in the RHS variable computed at the average value of the RHS variables. The last column shows Tobit estimates for the amount of health insurance purchased (i.e. the value of the premium paid). All characteristics are those of the household head. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level.

A. Trust and the number of stocks

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Trust | 0.317*** (0.100) | 0.322*** (0.101) | 0.318*** (0.102) | 0.269** (0.105) | 0.278** (0.147) |
| Risk aversion | 0.079 (0.254) | 0.151 (0.259) | 0.152 (0.259) | 0.150 (0.265) | -1.038** (0.476) |
| Ambiguity aversion | | -0.013 (0.010) | -0.013 (0.010) | -0.014 (0.011) | -0.016 (0.024) |
| Optimism | | | 0.016 (0.055) | 0.020 (0.057) | -0.096 (0.121) |
| Own mutual funds | | | | 0.751*** (0.108) | |
| Financial wealth | 0.005*** (0.001) | 0.005*** (0.001) | 0.005*** (0.001) | 0.004*** (0.001) | 0.002*** (0.001) |
| Income | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.003 (0.007) | 0.002 (0.008) | -0.052 (0.037) |
| Male | 0.239* (0.144) | 0.247* (0.144) | 0.247* (0.144) | 0.220 (0.147) | 0.280 (0.282) |
| Age | -0.021* (0.011) | -0.019* (0.011) | -0.021* (0.013) | -0.016 (0.013) | 0.025 (0.023) |
| Age square | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000** (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | -0.000 (0.000) |
| Household size | -0.094 (0.124) | -0.097 (0.124) | -0.097 (0.124) | -0.109 (0.127) | -0.145 (0.222) |
| Number of children | 0.227 (0.145) | 0.233 (0.145) | 0.233 (0.145) | 0.249* (0.149) | 0.238 (0.254) |
| High school education | 0.177 (0.135) | 0.185 (0.136) | 0.180 (0.136) | 0.223 (0.140) | -0.147 (0.264) |
| College education | 0.259* (0.144) | 0.263* (0.144) | 0.256* (0.146) | 0.262* (0.150) | 0.041 (0.272) |
| Employee | -0.042 (0.142) | -0.035 (0.142) | -0.039 (0.143) | -0.083 (0.146) | -0.232 (0.269) |
| Observations | 1156 | 1156 | 1156 | 1156 | 162 |

B. Trust and the demand for health insurance

| | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|
| Trust | 0.050 (0.031) | 0.048 (0.031) | 0.043 (0.031) | 179.759 (223.050) |
| Risk aversion | -0.126 (0.079) | -0.137* (0.080) | -0.135* (0.080) | -773.808 (591.815) |
| Ambiguity aversion | | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.188 (0.284) |
| Optimism | | | 0.019 (0.016) | 178.813 (115.943) |
| Financial wealth | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 0.001*** (0.000) | 5.767*** (1.411) |
| Income | 1.867 (2.111) | 1.852 (2.116) | 1.797 (2.118) | 6,931.391 (17,158.756) |
| Male | 0.115*** (0.038) | 0.115*** (0.038) | 0.116*** (0.038) | 750.441** (305.882) |
| Age | -0.011*** (0.003) | -0.011*** (0.003) | -0.013*** (0.004) | -34.931 (28.967) |
| Age square | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.000*** (0.000) | 0.578* (0.334) |
| Household size | 0.005 (0.037) | 0.005 (0.037) | 0.003 (0.037) | 144.074 (269.719) |
| Number of children | 0.002 (0.044) | 0.002 (0.044) | 0.005 (0.044) | -31.349 (320.463) |
| High school education | 0.157*** (0.040) | 0.156*** (0.040) | 0.151*** (0.041) | 451.967 (294.534) |
| College education | 0.249*** (0.046) | 0.249*** (0.046) | 0.241*** (0.047) | 986.477*** (318.290) |
| Employee | 0.126*** (0.042) | 0.126*** (0.042) | 0.122*** (0.042) | 71.651 (313.147) |
| Observations | 1156 | 1156 | 1156 | 1156 |

Table 10
The role of personalized trust

The table shows the effect of personalized trust on the participation in risky assets and the share invested in risky assets. Personalized trust is the trust a person has towards his bank official. In the first column the left-hand side variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the person invests in risky assets (directly held stocks, stock mutual funds, corporate bonds, derivatives); in the second and third is the share of financial wealth invested in these assets. "Risk averse" is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the interviewed answered (2) Risk is an uncertain event from which one should seek protection" instead of (1) Risk is an uncertain event from which one can extract a profit to the question of the individual chooses (2). All characteristics are those of the respondent. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *** indicate the coefficient is different from zero at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10 % level.

| | Probit for ownership of risky assets | Share invested in risky assets (Tobit regression) | Conditional share (second stage Heckman) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| High personalized trust | 0.1610*** (0.000) | 0.0653*** (0.002) | 0.0156 (0.280) |
| Medium personalized trust | 0.0580 (0.121) | 0.0226 (0.431) | 0.0011 (0.955) |
| Averse to risk | -0.04* (0.025) | -0.0883*** (0.000) | -0.0730*** (0.000) |
| Financial wealth | 0.0010*** (0.000) | 0.0001*** (0.000) | 0.00002*** (0.000) |
| Male | 0.1050*** | 0.0753*** | - |
| Age | 0.0219*** | 0.0144*** | 0.0073*** |
| Age squared | -0.0002*** | -0.0001*** | -0.00006*** |
| Education | 0.0221*** | 0.0138*** | |
| Observations | 1,834 | 1,834 | 1,834 |

Table 11
The effect of Trust on Firms' Ownership Structure

The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if a firm has a single shareholder owning all the shares. The sample is a cross-section of Italian manufacturing firms with at least 10 employees. Trust is an indicator of social capital at the local level devised by Putnam (1993). It is the average participation to national referendums, measured at the provincial level. Judicial inefficiency is the number of years it takes to complete a first-degree trial in the local courts. All the regressions contain the following control variables (not reported): firm age (computed as 1994 minus the year of foundation), its growth rate in sales, its leverage (ratio of debt to total assets), return on assets, indicator variables for whether the firm belongs to a group, is incorporated, has a number of employees below the median value, and has its major competitors located in the same area. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of having just one shareholder, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. The standard errors reported in parentheses and are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the provincial level.

| | | | |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Trust | -0.394*** (0.152) | -0.468*** (0.167) | -0.394*** (0.157) |
| North | -0.023 (0.017) | -0.015 (0.017) | |
| South | 0.021 (0.030) | -0.029 (0.028) | |
| Judicial inefficiency | -0.039 (0.029) | -0.028 (0.030) | -0.026 (0.029) |
| Judicial inefficiency Squared | 0.003 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.004) | 0.004 (0.004) |
| Per capita GDP | 0.324 (0.402) | 0.319 (0.483) | 0.286 (0.420) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.105 | 0.104 | 0.105 |
| Observations | 3,268 | 3,268 | 3,268 |

Table 12**Trust, stock market participation and ownership concentration around the world**

| | % stock market cap closely held | | | % population participating in the stock market | | |
|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Trust (WVS) | -42.65** (0.023) | -46.80*** (0.01) | -46.84*** (0.01) | 0.272** (0.041) | 0.399*** (0.001) | 0.390*** (0.000) |
| Legal Enforcement | | -23.95* (0.074) | -21.68 (0.20) | | 0.246*** (0.003) | 0.143* (0.08) |
| Common Law | | | -1.92 (0.82) | | | 0.091** (0.02) |
| Observations | 33 | 33 | 33 | 24 | 23 | 23 |
| R-squared | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.50 | 0.62 |