Presents a Conference on
ROBUST MECHANISM DESIGN

May 14-15, 2004

Preliminary Program

Aviad Heifetz (Tel Aviv University) and Zvika Neeman (Boston University), "On the Generic Infeasibility of Full Surplus Extraction In Auctions"

Sergio Parreiras (University of North Carolina), "Correlated Information, Mechanism Design and Informational Rents"

Dirk Bergemann (Yale University) and Stephen Morris (Yale University), "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces"

Jeff Ely (Boston University) and Kim Sau Chung (Northwestern University), "Foundations of Dominant Strategy Mechanisms"

Richard McLean (Rutgers University) and Andrew Postlewaite (University of Pennsylvania), "Implementation with Interdependent Valuations"

Pino Lopomo (Duke University), Luca Rigotti (Duke University) and Chris Shannon (UC Berkeley), "Uncertainty in Mechanism Design"

Andrew V. Goldberg (Microsoft Research) and Jason D. Hartline (University of Washington), "Collusion, Group Strategyproffness, and Auctions"