YALE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
A CUSTOMS UNION WITH MULTINATIONAL FIRMS: Irene Brambilla October 2005 In this paper, I estimate the economic effects of adopting a customs
union in the context of an oligopolistic market with multinational firms, tariffs and
non-tariff barriers. Specifically, I estimate a model of demand and supply for cars in
Argentina and Brazil and I look at the consequences of adopting MERCOSUR, a regional trade
agreement to be fully implemented in 2006. I develop a model of the strategic behavior of
multinational firms in the presence of active trade intervention in the form of tariffs
and non-tariff barriers and I show how a particular form of trade balance restriction
applied at the firm level can lead to an increase in trade flows in the presence of
intra-firm strategic trade. I propose a minimum-distance estimator that allows for the
joint estimation of production costs and shadow costs of the NTBs without making
functional form assumptions on the cost side. To explore the effects of the trade policy,
I derive equilibrium conditions for firms under the changed policy parameters and I use
the estimates of demand and costs to predict the outcome in these counterfactual
equilibria. I decompose the effects on prices, volumes of trade, profits and consumer
welfare into the separate impacts of two simultaneous changes in policy: the removal of
NTBs and the adoption of a common external tariff. |