MICHAEL THOMAS MCBRIDE

Home Address:   515 Red Rose Lane #5   Santa Barbara, CA 93109   Tel: (805) 560-8085 Office Address:   Department of Economics   Yale University   Box 208268   New Haven, CT 06520-8268   Fax: (203) 432-5779 Birth Date: August 4, 1973 Citizenship: USA Marital status: married, Caroline Kline

Fields of Concentration

Game Theory Political Economy Development Economics Experimental Economics

Desired Teaching:

Game Theory Political Economy Microeconomics Development Economics Undergraduate Macroeconomics

Comprehensive Examinations Completed:

May 1999 (Oral) Game Theory, Economic Development May 1998 (Written) Microeconomic Theory, Macroeconomic Theory

Dissertation Title:

Collective Action under Uncertainty

Committee:

Professor Benjamin Polak Professor Stephen Morris

Expected Completion Date:

May 2002

Degrees:

Ph.D., Yale University, expected May 2002 M.Phil., Yale University, December 1999 M.A., University of Southern California, August 1997, magna cum laude B.A., University of Southern California, August 1997, magna cum laude

Fellowships, Honors and Awards:

Yale University    Yale Dissertation Fellowship (Spring 2002)    Anderson Prize Fellowship in Economics (Fall 2001)    Sasakawa Fellowship (Fall 2000-Spring 2001)    Yale University Fellowship (1997-2001) University of Southern California    Combined Four-year B.A./M.A. Honors Program in Economics    Phi Beta Kappa Honor Society    Dean’s List Recognition Grants    ISPS Grant for the Effects of Threshold Uncertainty in Discrete Public Good Games (2001)    CASSEL Grant for the Study of Threshold Effects in Public Good Games (2001)

Teaching Experience:

Teaching Fellow, Economics Department, Yale University    Undergraduate Game Theory (Fall 2000)    Introductory Macroeconomics (Spring 2000, Fall 1999) Visiting Instructor, Economics Department, Brigham Young University    Introductory Economics (Summer 1999)

Related Work Experience:

Summer Intern, Micronomics, Inc., Los Angeles (Summer 1998) (Performed merger simulations, conducted cost analysis, and designed SAS programs.)

Referee Experience:

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Papers:

"Discrete Public Goods under Threshold Uncertainty: Theory and Experiments" (job-market paper). "Discrete Public Goods Under Threshold Uncertainty," Yale University, September 2001 (1st half of job-market paper, 1st chapter of dissertation). "Experimental Results Testing the Effects of Threshold Uncertainty in Discrete Public Good Games" (2nd half of job-market paper, 2nd chapter of dissertation). "Non-cooperative Network Equilibria Under Heterogeneity and Uncertainty," Yale University, January 2001 (3rd chapter of dissertation). "Relative-income Effects on Subjective Well-being in the Cross-section," 2001, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 45: 251-278. "Political Exit, Commodity Prices, and Export Marketing Boards in Sub-Saharan Africa," Yale University, May 1999.

References:

Professor Benjamin Polak Department of Economics Yale University Box 208268 New Haven, CT 06520-8268 E-mail: benjamin.polak@yale.edu Fax: (203) 432-5779 Professor James Robinson Departments of Political Science and Economics University of California, Berkeley 210 Barrows Hall #1950 Berkeley, CA 94720-1950 E-mail: jamesar@socrates.berkeley.edu Fax: (510) 642-9515 Professor Stephen Morris Department of Economics Yale University Box 208281 New Haven, CT 06520-8281 E-mail: stephen.morris@yale.edu Fax: (203) 432-6167 Professor Christopher Udry Department of Economics Yale University Box 208269 New Haven, CT 06520-8269 E-mail: udry@yale.edu Fax: (203) 432-3635

Dissertation Abstract:

I examine collective action under uncertainty in public good games and social networks. The first two chapters consider discrete public good games where the threshold number of contributions needed to provide the good is not known. For example, peasants who could participate in a revolution might not know how big the peasant army needs to be in order to successfully defeat the dictator. Chapter 1 contains theoretical analysis to determine if and when this uncertainty can ever be good in the sense of efficiency or in the sense of contributions. Chapter 2 presents results from public good experiments I conducted. These results support the main predictions of the theoretical model. The idea of this work came from my earlier work on political instability (see below). Chapter 3 examines networks in which there is uncertainty about both the benefits of participating in and the structure of the network. For example, an individual might know the benefits of the network of which he is a member, but he might not know the benefits of another network of which he is not a member. This work was motivated by my structural econometrics paper on well-being (see below). The first chapter analyzes discrete public good games where the threshold is randomly selected from a publicly known probability distribution. I examine situations in which individuals make a binary choice to participate or not participate. I consider the full set of equilibria, including mixed equilibria, under different threshold distributions. Simultaneous voluntary-contribution equilibria are often inefficient. Greater uncertainty about the threshold, however, can reduce inefficiencies. The reason is that contributions are higher when there is greater uncertainty about the threshold (in terms of second-order stochastic dominance) if the value of the public good is sufficiently high. This result arises because of the increased probability of being pivotal at higher contribution strategy profiles when the value of the public good is high. Binary contribution decisions are contrasted with situations in which individuals choose contribution levels from a continuous set, like monetary contribution levels. Such continuous contribution games are less inefficient than binary contribution games. These results are unchanged when considering sequential equilibria. The second chapter presents results from a series of public good experiments specially designed to test the main qualitative predictions of the above theoretical work. As predicted for within-session changes, actual contributions are higher when the uncertainty is increased if the value of the public good is high, and contributions are lower when the value of the public good is low. I also elicit data on agents’ beliefs using a proper scoring rule. These data exhibit qualitative features of standard learning models. Using these data to proxy for actual beliefs, I show that aggregate decisions are not consistent with expected payoff maximization. This result is confirmed both parametrically and non-parametrically. However, I show that decisions in later rounds become more consistent with a game-theoretic decision rule as I account for risk aversion and innate cooperativeness. This last result is found using probit regressions in the Quantal Response Equilibrium framework. Together, my theoretical and experimental work provides insights into how real-life groups can deal with different levels of threshold uncertainty. The third chapter examines equilibrium network structures under uncertainty. Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 2000) model network formation as a non-cooperative game under complete information. I extend their approach to include two types of uncertainty: uncertainty about the network structure and uncertainty about the benefits of network participation. I also consider five levels of uncertainty: (1) each individual receives information about all others in the game (i.e., the Bala and Goyal (2000) case); (2) each individual only receives information about others in his own network; (3) each individual only receives information about all others directly connected to his own direct neighbors; (4) each individual only receives information about those to whom his own neighbors have initiated connections; (5) each individual receives no information. To study these environments, I define an incomplete-information imperfect-monitoring equilibrium concept, called Generalized Conjectural Equilibrium. I use this concept to solve for the strict equilibria in each of the twenty different cases. I find that the unique equilibrium architecture of complete information games -- the center-sponsored star -- is still unique even under large decreases in information. The crucial aspect in determining network equilibrium structures is whether or not an agent knows aspects of the network that are beyond his direct links. Furthermore, as uncertainty increases, the set of equilibrium structures increases in interesting ways. For example, the set of equilibria in a game where players know the benefits of network participation but not the network architecture can be very different from the set of equilibria when the players know the architecture but not the benefits. A main contribution of this paper is the characterization of network uncertainty. Another contribution is the definition and use of a new non-Nash equilibrium concept. In future research, I plan to combine elements of all three chapters to formalize informational structures in collective action environments. For example, a public good game where players have private threshold information can be embedded into a larger communication network.

Other Papers:

"Relative-income Effects on Subjective Well-being in the Cross-section" (JEBO 2001). Past studies using aggregated measures of subjective well-being cannot separately identify the nature of relative-income effects. I discuss this problem and implement an estimation strategy designed to separately identify the sources of these effects. Using ordered logit regression procedures, I find micro-level evidence that both current social income comparisons and past personal income comparisons affect current subjective well-being. I then use the cross-sectional coefficients to replicate the aggregate time-series trends. Doing so gives an individual-level explanation for the finding that average happiness does not increase over time despite rises in real incomes. I also find that the comparison effects are smaller for low-income individuals. "Political Exit, Commodity Prices, and Export Marketing Boards in Sub-Saharan Africa" (May 1999). I formally model export marketing board behavior under the threat of riot. The model places a general equilibrium economy inside a larger political game. I obtain an explanation for why marketing boards set producer prices below monopsony prices -- an action that has occurred in some sub-Saharan African nations. Setting producer prices below the monopsony price will shift more agricultural resources to the production of food. This shift in resources lowers the domestic price of food, decreases the chance of a riot, and increases the elites’ probability of staying in power. The model implies that political exit occurs only if the realized world price of food is sufficiently below the expected world price. I am currently in the process of obtaining data on political exit and world commodity prices in order to test some of the model’s implications.