

Persistent Liquidity Effect and Long Run Money Demand*

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Abstract

We present a new monetary model in the presence of segmented asset markets that implies a persistent fall in interest rates after a once and for all increase in liquidity. The gradual propagation mechanism produced by our model is novel in the literature. We provide an analytical characterization of this mechanism, showing that the magnitude of the liquidity effect on impact, and its persistence, depend on the ratio of two parameters: the long-run interest rate elasticity of money demand and the intertemporal substitution elasticity. At the same time, the model has completely classical long-run predictions, featuring quantity theoretic and Fisherian properties. The model simultaneously explains the short-run “instability” of money demand estimates as-well-as the stability of long-run interest-elastic money demand.

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1 Summary Introduction

We develop a model based on the ideas proposed in the literature on liquidity effects of money shocks by [Lucas \(1990\)](#), [Fuerst \(1992\)](#), [Christiano and Eichenbaum \(1992\)](#), and others. They remarked that segmented market models in the literature so far, to keep the analysis tractable, have been constructed to ignore the lingering distributional effects that in reality most likely follow an injection of liquidity. We develop a tractable model of these effects, and analytically characterize the determinants of the persistence of the interest changes on interest rate that follow an open market operation. For instance we show that including this distributional effect, a once and for all increase in liquidity necessarily produces a persistent drop in interest rates, whose half life is determined by two type of factors: those determine the adjustment of consumption in permanent income theory, as well as the long run interest rate elasticity of money demand.

We use the model to show that the persistent liquidity effects imply a behavior of velocity and interest rates that is consistent with the short run “instability” of money demand in the presence of transitory monetary shocks. At the same time, and also novel in the segmented market models applied to monetary shocks, we show that if the changes in money growth are nearly permanent, the model delivers and standard money demand, with a positive relationship between velocity and interest rates.

2 Description of the Model and Literature Review

The model in this paper is a descendent of the monetary models with segmented markets of [Grossman and Weiss \(1983\)](#) and [Rotemberg \(1984\)](#). These models are motivated by the hypothesis that, as described by Friedman in his presidential address, and in contrast with the working of the simpler neoclassical monetary models, an open market operation that increases the quantity of money once and for all produces a protracted decrease in nominal interest rates.¹ In the models in these two papers agents are subject to a cash in advance constraint, but access to asset markets where open market operation takes place is restricted

¹For instance, pages 5-6 of Friedman’s 1968 presidential address: “Let the Fed set out to keep interest rates down. How will it try to do so? By buying securities. This raises their prices and lowers their yields. In the process, it also increases the quantity of reserves available to banks, hence the amount of bank credit, and, ultimately the total quantity of money. That is why central bankers in particular, and the financial community more broadly, generally believe that an increase in the quantity of money tends to lower interest rates. [...] The initial impact of increasing the quantity of money at a faster rate than it has been increasing is to make interest rates lower for a time than they would otherwise have been. But this is only the beginning of the process not the end. [...] These three effects will reverse the initial downward pressure on interest rates fairly promptly, say, in something less than a year. Together they will tend, after a somewhat longer interval, say, a year or two, to return interest rates to the level they would otherwise have had.”

to a fraction of the agents. This fraction of agents, who holds only half of the money stock, have to absorb the entire increase on the money supply associated with the open market operation, which will be absorbed only with a lower real interest rate. Moreover, if this effect is large enough, the nominal interest rate decreases also. Mostly for tractability, these two papers assume that agents have access to the asset markets every-other period. Not surprisingly, with this pattern of visits to the asset market, the effect of a once and for all increase in money supply on interest rates are short lived: the largest effect is in the first two periods, after which there are small lingering echo effects.

Several monetary models of segmented asset markets have been written to analyze a variety of related questions since the seminal work of Grossman and Weiss, and Rotemberg. In all of them, some carefully chosen assumptions are used to avoid having to keep track of the lingering effects on the cross section distribution of asset holdings produced by an open market operation. The simplifications have the advantage of allowing a sharper analytical characterization of the equilibrium.² For instance, in Lucas (1990) asset and good markets are separated within the period, but at the end of the period all agents pool their resources. Similar assumptions are made in the base-line models in Fuerst (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), who use set-ups closely related to the one in Lucas (1990) to study the effects on output of a monetary shock. In Alvarez and Atkeson (1997) agents visit the asset market at exogenously randomly distributed times, at which they effectively –via the complete market assumption– pool resources. In Alvarez et al. (2002) agents face a fixed cost of accessing the asset market, making participation endogenous and time-varying. Yet the parameters considered and the nature of the equilibrium is such that, at the end of the period the distribution of asset is degenerate. Finally, the closest environments to the one consider in this paper are the ones in Alvarez et al. (2001) and in Occhino (2004). In these set ups a fraction λ of the agents have permanent access to asset markets, the remaining fraction is excluded from the asset markets permanently. Apart from these differences in the way that agents are segmented in their participation in asset markets, the model has a binding cash-in-advance, with exogenous velocity.

All these models have in common that an open market operation that produces a once and for all increase in the money supply, decreases interest rate on impact, but then the

²See, for instance Lucas (1990): “In [2] and [13], (referring to Grossman and Weiss, and Rotemberg) an open market operation that induces a liquidity effect will also alter the distribution of wealth, since agents who participate in the trade will have different post-trade portfolios than those who were absent. These distributional effects linger on indefinitely (as they no doubt do in reality), a fact that vastly complicates the analysis, effectively limiting both papers to the study of a one-time, unanticipated bond issue in an otherwise deterministic setting. This paper studies this same liquidity effect using a simple device that abstracts from these distributional effects.” Fuerst (1992) uses the same assumption and comments about it: “This methodology is not without cost. By entirely eliminating these wealth effects, the model loses the persistent and lingering effects of a monetary injection captured, for example, in Grossman and Weiss (1983).”

interest rate returns immediately to its previous level. These models also have in common that they produce a version of the quantity theory in which different permanent values of the growth rate of money supply are associated with different inflation rates, and hence -via a Fisher equation- different nominal interest rates, but with the same level of velocity. In this sense, these models have an interest rate inelastic long run money demand. In this paper, we introduce a modification of the set-up in which a once and for all increase in the money supply has a persistent liquidity effect, due to persistent redistribution effects of the open market operation, and additionally it implies a long run interest elastic money demand.

There are examples in the literature of models where a once and for all increase in the money supply produce a transitory, but persistent, decline in interest rates. These examples feature a different mechanism to generate persistence. An early example is the model in [Christiano and Eichenbaum \(1992\)](#). In their basic set up, firms face a CIA constraint and, given the assumption on when the household have to decide their cash holdings, asset market are segmented. In this set-up, as well in the closely related set-up of [Fuerst \(1992\)](#), liquidity effect are short lived.³ [Christiano and Eichenbaum \(1992\)](#) add to this basic-set up, a convex adjustment cost on households cash holdings, which produces a persistent liquidity effect. A recent contribution by [Curdia and Woodford \(2008\)](#) uses a modeling device very close to the one in [Alvarez and Atkeson \(1997\)](#). But additionally, this model adds another channel that produces the persistent liquidity effect, namely slow price adjustment of firms a la Calvo.

The model we analyze in this paper is a version of the segmented market model in [Alvarez et al. \(2001\)](#) where instead of using a binding cash in advance constraint, we use a Sidrausky money in the utility function set-up. In this setup we obtain the standard result that velocity, is endogenous and forward looking, it is a function of an appropriately expected discounted value of future monetary expansions. This implies that the price level and inflation are also functions of future expected monetary expansions. Surprisingly, we show that this relationship between inflation and money is, up to first order, exactly the same regardless of the degree of segmentation, and hence it is the same as in the otherwise standard monetary model. Instead, the degree of segmentation on the asset markets determines the effect of monetary expansions on interest rates, i.e. whether or not there is a liquidity effect. To understand the behavior of interest rate, we consider two extreme cases, in terms of the

³Fuerst explains the lack of propagation in terms of his model very clearly: “As for the failures, the most glaring is that the model is lacking a strong propagation mechanism. The real effects of monetary injections are a result of (serially uncorrelated) forecast errors. These effects will therefore be strongest during the initial period of the shock.” ...“This failure to achieve persistence is more a criticism of my particular modeling strategy than of this class of models as a whole. If it takes more than one period for the economy to re-balance its portfolio and ‘undo’ the monetary injection, then the effects of monetary shocks will of course persist. While this assumption may be the most natural, it is also somewhat intractable for the reasons outlined in section 2.”

persistent of open market operations.

The first case is a once and for all increases in money supply. In this case there is a jump on impact in the price level, and no effect on expected inflation. The model with segmented markets necessarily produces a persistent decrease in nominal interest rates. The magnitude of this effect at impact is inversely proportional to the fraction of agents participating in the open market operation. The persistence of the liquidity effect depends on the ratio of two elasticities, that govern how long it would take to return to the same distribution of liquidity across agents. The half life of the liquidity effect is shorter, the higher is the ratio of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution relative to the elasticity of substitution between consumption and cash balances. On the other extreme, a very persistent increase in the growth rate of money supply, that immediately increases expected inflation, produces a persistent increase in nominal interest rates.

The model in this paper may display liquidity effect for both unanticipated and anticipated monetary shocks, although the effects of anticipated monetary shocks may differ from anticipated shocks. In the model in [Lucas \(1990\)](#) and in versions by of [Christiano and Eichenbaum \(1992\)](#) and [Fuerst \(1992\)](#) only unanticipated shocks display liquidity effects. On the other hand, in [Alvarez et al. \(2001\)](#), [Occhino \(2004\)](#), [Alvarez et al. \(2002\)](#), there is no distinction between the effect of expected and unexpected monetary shocks on interest rates. The feature that the theory implies that both unanticipated and unanticipated monetary shocks have an effect on interest rates, but that they differ, can be used to employ the identification strategy proposed by [Cochrane \(1998\)](#) to estimate the impulse responses of interest rates.

Combining the results for the dynamics of monetary expansions, inflation and interest rates we obtain the following behavior for money demand. In the long run, i.e. comparing across steady states with different constant monetary growth rates, the model displays an interest-elastic money demand. In the short run, i.e. comparing mean reverting shocks on the growth rate of money, the model features persistent departures of the relationship between real balances and interest rates, due to the persistent liquidity effects. We view this property of the model as a useful step to reconcile low frequency US data on interest rate and velocity, which is consistent with an interest elastic money demand, and the high frequency data, which features persistent deviation from it, and with lower interest rate elasticities. We illustrate the quantitative impact of this feature by simulating the model economy with a process for the growth rate of money supply with both low and high frequency components, and comparing it with the US economy.

3 The Environment

Let $U(c, m)$ be the period utility function, where c^i is consumption m^i are beginning-of-period real balances. We assume that U is strictly increasing and concave. Let $i = T, N$ be the type of agents, trader, or which there are λ , and non-traders, of which there are $(1 - \lambda)$, respectively. While the focus of the paper is on the analysis of the behavior of interest rates due to the unequal access to asset market at the time of open market operations, we first describe the equilibrium in a model without a bond market, and hence without open market operations. We do so, because it is easier, and it highlights the logic of the determination of different equilibrium variables.

Time is discrete and starts at $t = 0$. The timing within a period is as follows: agent start with nominal beginning-of-period cash balances M_t^i , they receive nominal income $P_t y^i$, choose real consumption c_t^i and end-of-period nominal balances N_t^i . Next period nominal cash balances M_{t+1}^i are given this period nominal balances plus $P_{t+1} \tau_{t+1}^i$ the nominal lump-sum transfer from the government. Their budget constraint at $t \geq 0$ are:

$$N_t^i + P_t c_t^i = P_t y^i + M_t^i \quad , \quad M_{t+1}^i = N_t^i + P_{t+1} \tau_{t+1}^i \quad (1)$$

Our choice of the timing conventions for this problem are consistent with an interpretation of U as a cash-credit good, as in [Lucas and Stokey \(1987\)](#). We use a Sidrausky money-in-the-utility function specification because, relative to a cash-in-advance model, allows, albeit in a mechanical way, more flexibility to accommodate a stock m and a flow c . We will return to the discussion of the specification, and the relation between stocks and flows below.

The problem of an agent of type i is

$$\max_{\{N_t^i\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(c_t^i, M_t^i/P_t) \right]$$

subject to (1) given M_0 . Notice that while we labeled the agents traders and non-traders, the budget constraint in (1) indicates that neither type of agent is allowed to trade in bonds or any other security. Their only intertemporal choice is the accumulation of cash balances. Yet, in [Section 3.1](#) we show that the equilibrium of the model will be the same as one in which traders and the government do participate in a market for nominal bonds.

Market clearing of goods and money is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda c_t^T + (1 - \lambda) c_t^N &= \lambda y^T + (1 - \lambda) y^N, \\ \lambda M_t^T + (1 - \lambda) M_t^N &= M_t \end{aligned}$$

for all $t \geq 0$. The government budget constraint is given by

$$M_t - M_{t-1} = P_t [\lambda \tau_t^T + (1 - \lambda) \tau_t^N] ,$$

for all $t \geq 1$. Notice that the government budget constraint does not apply for $t = 0$, since our convention for timing is that we start the period with the cash after transfers. To simplify the notation, in this section we assume that the government does not trade in bonds, an assumption that we remove in Section 3.1. We note for future reference that the budget constraint of the agents and market clearing imply that aggregate beginning-of-period and end-of-period money balances are the same:

$$M_t = N_t \equiv \lambda N_t^T + (1 - \lambda) N_t^N$$

for all $t \geq 0$. Notice that using the definition of N_t the budget constraint of the government follows from the budget constraint of the households:

$$M_{t+1} = M_t + P_{t+1} [\lambda \tau_{t+1}^T + (1 - \lambda) \tau_{t+1}^N] = N_t + P_{t+1} [\lambda \tau_{t+1}^T + (1 - \lambda) \tau_{t+1}^N] .$$

We define inflation π_t , growth rate of money, μ_t , beginning-of-period real balances, m_t , and end-of-period real balances, n_t as:

$$\pi_{t+1} = \frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t}, \mu_{t+1} = \frac{M_{t+1}}{M_t}, m_t = \frac{M_t}{P_t}, m_t^i = \frac{M_t^i}{P_t}, n_t^i = \frac{N_t^i}{P_t},$$

for $i = T, N$ and $t \geq 0$. With these definitions we write the budget constraints as

$$c_t^i + n_t^i = y^i + m_t^i \quad \text{and} \quad m_{t+1}^i = n_t^i / \pi_{t+1} + \tau_{t+1}^i, \quad t \geq 0 \quad (2)$$

market clearing as

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda m_t^T + (1 - \lambda) m_t^N &= m_t, \\ \lambda c_t^T + (1 - \lambda) c_t^N &= \lambda y^T + (1 - \lambda) y^N, \quad t \geq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

the money growth identity

$$m_{t+1}/m_t = \mu_{t+1}/\pi_{t+1}, \quad t \geq 0 \quad (4)$$

and the government budget constraint as

$$(\mu_t - 1) m_{t-1} = [\lambda \tau_t^T + (1 - \lambda) \tau_t^N], \quad t \geq 1. \quad (5)$$

The exogenous random process for this economy are given by $s_t \equiv (\mu_t, \tau_t^T, \tau_t^N)$. We use s^t for the histories of such shocks, but we avoid this notation when it is clear from its context. The f.o.c. for the agent problem w.r.t. n_t^i , $i = T, N$ are:

$$U_1(c_t^i, m_t^i) = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \frac{\beta}{\pi_{t+1}} [U_1(c_{t+1}^i, m_{t+1}^i) + U_2(c_{t+1}^i, m_{t+1}^i)] \right\}. \quad (6)$$

for $t \geq 0$, where the expectation is with respect to the realization of inflation and the lump sum subsidy τ_{t+1}^i . Now we can define an equilibrium.

DEFINITION 1. Given initial conditions $\{M_0^i\}$ and a monetary and fiscal policy described by stochastic processes $\{\mu_{t+1}, \tau_{t+1}^T, \tau_{t+1}^N\}_{t=0}^\infty$ an *Equilibrium* is an initial price level P_0 , inflation rates $\{\pi_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty$, and stochastic processes $\{n_t^i, m_t^i, c_t^i, m_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ for $i = T, N$ such that: the budget constraints (2), Euler equations (6), identity (4), the government budget constraint (5), and market clearing (3) hold.

We finish this section with two comments on the set-up. The first is that our convention for the timing of the model is one where the initial conditions M_0^i contain the period zero monetary injection, and thus τ_0^i and μ_0 are not part of the set-up. For instance, our convention entails that $\{\mu_1, \tau_1^i\}$ are random variables, whose realization is not known as of time $t = 0$. Second, in the monetary-fiscal policy described by (5), the resources obtained by monetary expansions can be used for redistribution across agents, since the lump sum transfers τ_t^T and τ_t^N are allowed to differ across types.

3.1 Interest Rates in an Equilibrium with an Active Bond Market

In this section we introduce a bond market where traders participate and where the open market operation take place. We show an equivalence result for equilibrium with and without an active bond market, and analyze how interest rates depend on the equilibrium allocation.

We assume that traders at time t have access to a bond market and a set of Arrow securities that pays contingent on the realization of s_{t+1} which opens at the beginning of the period, before consumption takes place, at the same time as the money expansions τ_t^T are given to agents. Thus, if a trader buys one nominal zero coupon bond in period t , it pays Q_t dollars, reduces his holding of money M_t^T by this amount, and increases next period holding of money across all the realizations of the shocks by one dollar. Let H_t the beginning-of-period money stock, after the current period lump-sum transfer from the government but before participating in the bond market, and let B_t^T the number of nominal bonds purchased, and $A_t(s_{t+1})$ the quantity of Arrow securities that pay one dollar contingent on the realization of s_{t+1} . The price of each of these securities at the beginning of period t is denoted by $q_t(s_{t+1})$.

In this case we can write the budget constraint of the trader at time t and history s^t -which we omit to simplify the notation-

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{s_{t+1}} A_t^T(s_{t+1})q_t(s_{t+1}) + Q_t B_t^T + M_t^T &= H_t, \\ N_t^T + P_t c_t^T &= M_t^T + P_t y^T, \\ H_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) &= N_t^T + B_t^T + A_t^T(s_{t+1}) + P_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) \tau_{t+1}^T(s_{t+1}) \end{aligned}$$

for $t \geq 0$. The interpretation is that during the period the agent chooses bond holdings B_t^T and consumption c_t^T , and given the budget constraint, this gives next period cash balances before transfers N_t^T . The last line shows the next period cash balances, which include the cash from the bonds purchased this period, as well as the lump-sum transfer of cash from the government. Equivalently, we can write the budget constraint in real terms as:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{s_{t+1}} a_t^T(s_{t+1})q_t(s_{t+1}) + Q_t b_t^T + m_t^T &= h_t, \\ n_t^T + c_t^T &= m_t^T + y^T, \\ h_{t+1}(s_{t+1}) &= \frac{n_t^T + b_t^T + a_t^T(s_{t+1})}{\pi_{t+1}(s_{t+1})} + \tau_{t+1}^T(s_{t+1}), \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

for $t \geq 0$. The government budget constraint is:

$$\sum_{s_{t+1}} A_t(s_{t+1})q_t(s_{t+1}) + Q_t B_t + M_t - M_{t-1} = B_{t-1} + A_{t-1} + P_t [\lambda \tau_t^T + (1 - \lambda) \tau_t^N], \tag{8}$$

for $t \geq 1$, or in real terms:

$$\sum_{s_{t+1}} a_t(s_{t+1})q_t(s_{t+1}) + Q_t b_t + m_t = \frac{b_{t-1} + a_{t-1} + m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + [\lambda \tau_t^T + (1 - \lambda) \tau_t^N], \tag{9}$$

for $t \geq 1$. The trader's problem is to maximize utility by choice of $\{n_t^T, b_t^T\}_{t=0}^\infty$ subject to (7), and given an initial condition h_0 .

The first order conditions for the choice of nominal bond holdings B_t^T and Arrow securities $A_t^T(s_{t+1})$ are:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_t [U_1(c_t^T, m_t^T) + U_2(c_t^T, m_t^T)] &= \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{\beta}{\pi_{t+1}} [U_1(c_{t+1}^T, m_{t+1}^T) + U_2(c_{t+1}^T, m_{t+1}^T)] \right] \\ q_t(s_{t+1}) [U_1(c_t^T, m_t^T) + U_2(c_t^T, m_t^T)] &= \frac{\beta \Pr(s_{t+1}|s^t)}{\pi_{t+1}} [U_1(c_{t+1}^T, m_{t+1}^T) + U_2(c_{t+1}^T, m_{t+1}^T)] \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

where $\Pr(s_{t+1}|s^t)$ is the probability of state s_{t+1} conditional on the history s^t . Combining this first order condition with the Euler equation for n_t^T we obtain:

$$Q_t = \frac{U_1(c_t^T, m_t^T)}{U_1(c_t^T, m_t^T) + U_2(c_t^T, m_t^T)}, \quad (11)$$

or, by letting r_t be the nominal interest rate, $1 + r_t \equiv Q_t^{-1}$, we can write:

$$r_t = \frac{U_2(c_t^T, m_t^T)}{U_1(c_t^T, m_t^T)}.$$

Notice that, given the timing assumptions for the bond market, interest rates are functions of the time t allocation, i.e. they do not involve any expected future values. For instance consider the the utility function

$$U(c, m) = \frac{h(c, m)^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma}, \quad \text{where } h(c, m) = [c^{-\rho} + \mathcal{A}^{-1}m^{-\rho}]^{-\frac{1}{\rho}}, \quad (12)$$

which has a constant elasticity of substitution $1/(1+\rho)$ between c and m , a constant intertemporal substitution elasticity $1/\gamma$ between the consumption-money bundles, and \mathcal{A} is a parameter. This case yields the constant elasticity, unitary income, money demand:

$$r_t = \frac{U_2(c_t^T, m_t^T)}{U_1(c_t^T, m_t^T)} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} \left(\frac{m_t^T}{c_t^T} \right)^{-(1+\rho)}. \quad (13)$$

Finally, market clearing in the market for Arrow securities and bonds, under the assumption that only traders participate in these markets, is given by:

$$b_t = \lambda b_t^T \quad \text{and} \quad a_t(s_{t+1}) = \lambda a_t^T(s_{t+1}) \quad , \quad \forall s_{t+1} \quad (14)$$

for all $t \geq 0$. Next we give an equilibrium definition for the model with an active nominal bond market:

DEFINITION 2. Given initial conditions $\{\tilde{M}_0^N, H_0\}$ and a monetary and fiscal policy described by stochastic processes $\{\tilde{\mu}_{t+1}, \tilde{\tau}_{t+1}^T, \tilde{\tau}_{t+1}^N, \tilde{b}_t, \tilde{a}_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$, an *Equilibrium with an active bond market* is an initial price level \tilde{P}_0 , inflation rate process $\{\tilde{\pi}_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty$, stochastic processes $\{\tilde{n}_t^i, \tilde{m}_t^i, \tilde{c}_t^i, \tilde{m}_t^i\}_{t=0}^\infty$ for $i = T, N$, and stochastic processes $\{h_t, b_t^T, a_t^T, q_t, Q_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ that satisfy: the budget constraints for non-traders (2) and traders (7), Euler equations for end-of-period cash balances (6), the f.o.c. for bonds and Arrow securities (10), identity (4), the government budget constraint (9), and market clearing (3) and (14).

As in the equilibrium described in [Definition 1](#), our convention for the initial conditions H_0, M_0^N include the time zero money injection, and so neither τ_0^i nor μ_0 are part of the definition. Instead B_0^T and M_0^T are choices for the traders, and hence bond prices Q_t are determined starting from period $t = 0$ on. The following proposition shows the sense in which the equilibrium with and without an active bond market are equivalent.

PROPOSITION 1. Consider an equilibrium in the model without bond market: $\langle P_0, \{\pi_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty, \{n_t^i, c_t^i, m_t^i, m_t\}_{t=0}^\infty \rangle$, for initial conditions $\{M_0^i\}$ and policy $\{\mu_{t+1}, \tau_{t+1}^T, \tau_{t+1}^N\}_{t=0}^\infty$. Then, for any stochastic process of transfers to traders, $\{\tilde{\tau}_{t+1}^T\}_{t=0}^\infty$, there is an equilibrium with an active bond market that satisfies:

$$\left\langle \tilde{P}_0, \{\tilde{\pi}_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty, \{\tilde{n}_t^i, \tilde{c}_t^i, \tilde{m}_t^i, \tilde{m}_t\}_{t=0}^\infty \right\rangle = \left\langle P_0, \{\pi_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty, \{n_t^i, c_t^i, m_t^i, m_t\}_{t=0}^\infty \right\rangle ,$$

with bond and Arrow prices $\{Q_t, q_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ given by [equation \(10\)](#) for all $t \geq 0$, the fiscal and monetary policy given by $\{\tilde{\tau}_t^N, \tilde{\mu}_t\}_{t=1}^\infty = \{\tau_t^N, \mu_t\}_{t=1}^\infty$, and $\{a_t, b_t\}_{t=1}^\infty$ satisfying [\(14\)](#) and:

$$\frac{a_{t-1} + b_{t-1}}{\tilde{\pi}_t} - Q_t b_t - \sum_{s_{t+1}} q_t(s_{t+1}) a_t(s_{t+1}) = \lambda (\tau_t^T - \tilde{\tau}_t^T) , \quad t \geq 1.$$

with initial conditions $\tilde{M}_0^N = M_0^N$, $H_0 = M_0^T - Q_0(a_0 + b_0)/\lambda$, where $a_0 + b_0$ satisfies an appropriately chosen present value.

The proposition shows that it is only the combination of monetary and fiscal policy that matters. We use this proposition to analyze the equilibrium where all monetary injections are carried out through open market operations. To do so, first consider an equilibrium without an active bond market and where $\tau_t^N = 0$. In this case the budget constraint of the government is:

$$M_t - M_{t-1} = \lambda P_t \tau_t^T .$$

Then using the previous proposition, we can construct an equilibrium where $\tilde{\tau}_t^T = 0$ for all $t \geq 0$. The budget constraint of the government is:

$$\sum_{s_{t+1}} q_t(s_{t+1}) A_t(s_{t+1}) + Q_t B_t + M_t - M_{t-1} = B_{t-1} + A_{t-1} ,$$

which in the case of a time varying but deterministic policy is:

$$Q_t B_t + M_t - M_{t-1} = B_{t-1} , \quad t \geq 1 \quad \text{or} \quad \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} (M_t - M_{t-1}) (\Pi_{i=1}^t Q_i) = B_0 .$$

In this equilibrium, traders start with an initial value of government bonds that will enable them to buy the present value of the future seigniorage. The equivalence, in terms of real allocations, of the equilibrium where lump sum transfers are different across agents and the one where money injections are carried out through open market operations, makes clear the sense in which open market operations with segmented asset markets have redistributive effects.

We will consider below a fiscal and monetary policy that is similar, but not identical, to the one described above. We will assume $\tau_t^N = \tilde{\tau}_t^N = \bar{\tau}$ and $\tilde{\tau}_t^T = 0$. In this case non-traders receive a lump sum transfer with constant real value $\bar{\tau}$ and the government budget constraint is:

$$\sum_{s_{t+1}} q_t(s_{t+1}) A_t(s_{t+1}) + Q_t B_t + M_t - M_{t-1} = B_{t-1} + A_{t-1} + P_t (1 - \lambda) \bar{\tau}$$

We will choose the value $\bar{\tau}$ so that it coincides with the “average” seigniorage in the economy, as described in detail in [Section 6](#). We choose this policy so that traders and non-traders are, at least in some average long run sense, completely symmetric.⁴

4 Approximate aggregation with Segmented Markets

In this section we examine the determination of inflation in the model where traders and non-traders are not identical. Given the equivalence established by [Proposition 1](#), the argument is developed using the simpler framework without an active bond market. In particular, we allow traders and non-traders to be subject to different arbitrary processes for $\{\tau_t^N\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$ and $\{\tau_t^T\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, up to a linear approximation the relation between aggregate inverse velocity m_t/y and future money growth rates $\{\mu_{t+s}\}$ is independent of the fraction of traders (λ), and hence that it is the same one obtained in a model with a representative agent where $\lambda = 1$.

We assume that both types of agents have the same real income, so that $y^T = y^N = y$. We define an approximate equilibrium by replacing the Euler Equations of each agent (6) and the identity (4) by linear approximations around the values that correspond to the steady state of an aggregate model with $\bar{m}^i = \bar{m}$, $\bar{c}^i = \bar{c} = y$ for $i = T, N$, and constant growth of the money supply $\bar{\mu} = \bar{\pi}$, satisfying

$$\bar{\tau} = \bar{m} (\mu - 1) \quad , \quad U_1(y, \bar{m}) = \frac{\beta}{\bar{\mu}} [U_1(y, \bar{m}) + U_2(y, \bar{m})] \quad . \quad (15)$$

⁴ We can preserve the symmetry in other ways too. For instance, we can let non-traders have a higher real income, i.e. we can let y^N be higher than y^T and assume that non-traders receive zero real lump sum transfer.

Let $\hat{x}_t \equiv x - \bar{x}$ denote the deviation of the variable x from its steady state value \bar{x} . The linearization for the Euler equation (6) gives:

$$\bar{U}_{11}\hat{c}_t^i + \bar{U}_{12}\hat{m}_t^i = \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}}\mathbb{E}_t [(\bar{U}_{11} + \bar{U}_{21})\hat{c}_{t+1}^i + (\bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{22})\hat{m}_{t+1}^i] - \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}^2}\mathbb{E}_t [\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2]\hat{\pi}_{t+1} \quad (16)$$

We also linearize the identity $\pi_t = \mu_t m_{t-1}/m_t$ obtaining:

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \hat{\mu}_t + \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\hat{m}_{t-1} - \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\hat{m}_t, \quad (17)$$

and the budget constraint of the government $m_t - \frac{m_{t-1}}{\pi_t} = \lambda\tau_t^T + (1 - \lambda)\tau_t^N$ obtaining:

$$m_t - \frac{m_{t-1}}{\bar{\pi}} + \frac{\bar{m}}{\bar{\pi}^2}(\pi_t - \bar{\pi}) = \lambda\tau_t^T + (1 - \lambda)\tau_t^N \quad (18)$$

We are now ready to define an approximate equilibrium.

DEFINITION 3. Given initial conditions $\{M_0^i\}$ and a fiscal and monetary policy described by $\{\mu_{t+1}, \tau_{t+1}^i\}_{t=0}^\infty$ an *Approximate Equilibrium* is given by $\{n_t^i, m_t^i, c_t^i, m_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ for $i = T, N$, and $P_0, \{\pi_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty$ that satisfy: the linearized version of the budget constraints (2), the linearized Euler equation (16), the linearized identity (17), the linearized government budget constraint (18), and market clearing (3).

Using this definition we state our main result on aggregation:

PROPOSITION 2. In an approximate equilibrium the processes for aggregate real balances and inflation $\{m_t, \pi_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty$ and the initial price level P_0 are the same for any λ .

The proof of this result is simple: in the equilibrium without active bond markets traders and non-traders optimal decisions are characterized by the *same* Euler equation, evaluated at different shocks for $\{\tau_t^i\}$, and the same inflation process. Linearizing these equations, and using market clearing, one obtains the aggregation result. This result is important for two reasons. First, substantively, it says that the relation between inflation and money growth, to a first order approximation, is independent of the fraction of traders λ . Second, it shows that the equilibrium has a recursive nature. One can determine first the path of aggregate real balances obtaining the process for inflation, as we do next in [Section 5](#). With this process one can then solve for the decision problem of the non-trader, obtaining the process for the non-trader consumption and real balances. Using feasibility and the process for aggregate real balances, one can finally solve for the traders' real balances and consumption, which in turns gives us the interest rate from (11). Since the problem of the non-trader is a key intermediate step to determine the behavior of interest rates, [Section 6](#) analyzes it in detail.

5 Velocity and Money Growth

In this section we consider a model with one type of agent, or $\lambda = 1$. We obtain a description of the behavior of inverse velocity and inflation as a function of future expected money growth rates, as in the representative agent model of Sidrausky, or in Cagan's.⁵ Our interest in the determination of inverse velocity and inflation in this setup comes from our previous result on aggregation, [Proposition 2](#), which shows that aggregate inverse velocity and the inflation are the same irrespective of the value of $\lambda \in [0, 1]$.

Using market clearing, $c_t = y$ into the f.o.c. for m , and the inflation identity $\pi_{t+1} = \mu_{t+1} m_t/m_{t+1}$ we can write

$$U_1(y, m_t) m_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left\{ \frac{\beta}{\mu_{t+1}} [U_1(y, m_{t+1}) + U_2(y, m_{t+1})] m_{t+1} \right\}. \quad (19)$$

Our next task is to analyze the behavior of this system. We first consider the steady state, the case where money supply grows at a constant rate $\bar{\mu}$ and r is the net interest rate that corresponds to a constant money growth rate and inflation $\bar{\mu}$:

$$\frac{U_2(y, \bar{m})}{U_1(y, \bar{m})} = \bar{r} \equiv \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\beta} - 1. \quad (20)$$

We interpret the solution of \bar{m} in [\(20\)](#) as a function of $\bar{r} = \bar{\mu}/\beta - 1$, as the “long run” money demand. For the case where U is given by [equation \(12\)](#), this money demand has a constant interest rate elasticity $1/(1 + \rho)$.

In what follows we analyze a linearized version of the difference equation [\(19\)](#), expanded around a constant $\mu = \bar{\mu}$ and $m = \bar{m}$. We seek a solution for real balances as a function of future expected growth of money supply.

PROPOSITION 3. Let $\hat{m}_t \equiv m_t - \bar{m}$, $\hat{\mu}_t \equiv \mu_t - \bar{\mu}$. Linearizing [\(19\)](#) around [\(20\)](#) we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{m}_t &= \alpha \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\mu}_{t+1}] + \phi \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{m}_{t+1}] \quad \text{where} \\ \alpha &\equiv -\frac{\bar{m}}{\bar{\mu}} \frac{\bar{U}_1}{[\bar{U}_1 + \bar{m}\bar{U}_{12}]} \quad \text{and} \quad \phi \equiv (\beta/\bar{\mu}) \left[1 + \frac{\bar{U}_2 + \bar{m}\bar{U}_{22}}{\bar{U}_1 + \bar{m}\bar{U}_{12}} \right] \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

and where \bar{U}_i , \bar{U}_{ij} are the derivatives of $U(\cdot)$ evaluated at (y, \bar{m}) . With $0 < \phi < 1$ we can

⁵Equivalently, we consider a set-up where traders and non-traders are identical, i.e. where $y^T = y^N = y$, $\tau_t^N = \tau_t^T$ for all $t \geq 0$ with initial conditions $M_0^T = M_0^N = M_0$ for any λ .

express its unique bounded solution as

$$\hat{m}_t = \alpha \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \phi^{i-1} \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\mu}_{t+i}] \quad t \geq 0. \quad (22)$$

Thus, if $0 < \phi < 1$ and $\alpha < 0$, future expected money growth reduces current real money balances. We briefly discuss sufficient conditions for this configuration. If U is given by (12) the requirements for ϕ can be written in terms of conditions on: γ, ρ, \bar{r} and \bar{m}/y . In particular, in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.4 we show that when $\rho > -1$, the condition that $\phi < 1$ is equivalent to

$$\gamma < 2 + \rho + \frac{y}{\bar{r} \cdot \bar{m}} \quad (23)$$

(otherwise if $\rho = -1$, then $\phi = 1$). Notice that condition (23) holds for a wide range of parameters of interest. For instance, set the annual nominal interest rate of 4 percent, the annual money-income ratio of 1/4, and an elasticity of substitution between consumption and real balances of 1/2, so $\bar{r} = 0.04$, $\bar{m}/y = 1/4$ and $\rho = 1$, then γ has to be smaller than 103, a condition we see as meet easily for any reasonable estimate of γ .⁶

Notice that $-\alpha(\bar{\mu}/\bar{m})$ is decreasing in $U_{12} > 0$, achieving 1 if $U_{12} = 0$. The assumption of $U_{12} > 0$ has the interpretation that the durable good is a complement to the consumption of non-durables.⁷ Lemma 1 also shows that the condition $0 < \phi$, which ensures monotone dynamics, is:

$$\gamma < \frac{1}{1 + \bar{r}} \left(2 + \rho + \frac{y}{\bar{r} \bar{m}} + \bar{r} - \frac{\rho y}{\bar{m}} \right) .$$

This inequality is implied by (23) as the length of the time period goes to zero.

5.1 Linear State Space Representation for Velocity and Inflation

We specify a linear time series process for $\{\mu_t\}$ and rewrite the initial conditions exclusively in terms of real variables. We start with a representation for inflation as a function of future money growth rates and the initial aggregate money balances. Using (17) and (22) we obtain

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \hat{\mu}_t + \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \hat{m}_{t-1} - \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \alpha \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \phi^{i-1} \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\mu}_{t+i}] , \quad t \geq 0. \quad (24)$$

⁶Note that (23) holds regardless of the length of the model's time period, since the term $y/(\bar{r} \bar{m})$ contains the ratio of two flows (\bar{r}/y), and the rest of the terms are parameters independent of the length of the time period. We return to this issue in the discussion of Proposition 5.

⁷For instance for the case where U is given by (12), $U_{12} > 0$ is equivalent to the condition that intertemporal elasticity of substitution, $1/\gamma$, is higher than the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between c and m , given by $1/(1 + \rho)$.

Notice that [equation \(17\)](#) is defined for $\pi_0 \equiv P_0/P_{-1}$ and μ_0 . This representation avoids us to carry a nominal *level* variable, such as M_0 , as initial state. Instead, the initial state is the real level of \hat{m}_{-1} . It will be useful in setting up impulse responses, as well as in defining problems for agents using real variables and growth rates.

We will consider the case where we can write the de-trended growth of money supply $\hat{\mu}_t$ as a function of an exogenous state z_t :

$$\hat{\mu}_{t+1} = \nu z_{t+1} \quad , \quad z_{t+1} = \Theta z_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad (25)$$

for $t \geq 0$, where z_0 is given, ν is an $k \times 1$ vector, Θ is an $k \times k$ matrix with k stable eigenvalues, and ε_{t+1} is an $k \times 1$ vector of innovations. In this case

$$\hat{m}_t = \alpha \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \phi^{i-1} \mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\mu}_{t+i}] = \alpha \nu \Theta [I - \phi \Theta]^{-1} z_t \quad , \quad t \geq 0 \quad .$$

Replacing [\(25\)](#) into [\(24\)](#) we obtain:

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \nu z_t + \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \hat{m}_{t-1} - \alpha \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \nu \Theta [I - \phi \Theta]^{-1} z_t \quad , \quad t \geq 0 \quad .$$

For example if z_t follows the AR(1) process $z_{t+1} = \theta z_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}$ and $\nu = 1$, then $k = 1$, $\hat{\mu}_t = z_t$, and $\Theta = \theta$, so that for $t \geq 0$:

$$\hat{m}_t = \alpha \frac{\theta}{1 - \phi \theta} \hat{\mu}_t \quad , \quad \hat{\pi}_t = \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \hat{m}_{t-1} + \left[1 - \alpha \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \frac{\theta}{1 - \phi \theta} \right] \hat{\mu}_t \quad ,$$

given \hat{m}_{-1} . Recall that $\alpha < 0$ if [\(23\)](#) holds, so that real balances are decreasing in $\hat{\mu}_t$ and hence inflation increases more than one by one with $\hat{\mu}_t$. This is a well known feature of the standard variable velocity model.

We summarize the linear equilibrium representation for the aggregate economy as a function of the innovations $\{\varepsilon_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}$, the parameters $\{\bar{\mu}/\bar{m}, \alpha, \phi, \nu, \Theta\}$, and initial conditions z_0 and \hat{m}_{-1} as follows:

$$\hat{m}_t = \kappa z_t \quad , \quad \hat{\pi}_t = \left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{m}_{t-1} + \zeta z_t \quad , \quad z_{t+1} = \Theta z_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad , \quad (26)$$

for all $t \geq 0$, where the vectors ζ and κ are given by:

$$\zeta \equiv \nu \left(I - \alpha \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \Theta [I - \phi \Theta]^{-1} \right) \quad , \quad \kappa \equiv \alpha \nu \Theta [I - \phi \Theta]^{-1} \quad . \quad (27)$$

For future reference we also produce a formula for expected inflation:

$$\mathbb{E}_t [\hat{\pi}_{t+j}] = \bar{\Pi} \Theta^{j-1} z_t, \quad \text{where } \bar{\Pi} \equiv \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \kappa + \zeta \Theta. \quad (28)$$

As a special case notice that if $\nu = 1$ and $\Theta = 0$, so that $\hat{\mu}_t$ is i.i.d., we have that real money balances are constant ($\kappa = 0$), inflation is equal to money growth ($\zeta = 1$), and hence expected inflation is constant ($\bar{\Pi} = 0$), or:

$$\kappa = \bar{\Pi} = 0, \quad \text{and } \zeta = 1. \quad (29)$$

Finally we examine the behavior of interest rates in the case of $\lambda = 1$ for the utility function in (12). Denoting $\hat{r}_t = r_t - \bar{r}$ and linearizing equation (13) we have: $\hat{r}_t = -(1 + \rho) (\bar{r}/\bar{m}) \hat{m}_t$. Replacing \hat{m}_t by (26) we have:

$$\hat{r}_t = -(1 + \rho) \frac{\bar{r}}{\bar{m}} \kappa z_t, \quad t \geq 0. \quad (30)$$

For instance, in the case where $z_{t+1} = \theta z_t + \varepsilon_{t+1}$ and $\nu = 1$ we have

$$\hat{r}_t = (1 + \rho) \left(-\alpha \frac{\bar{r}}{\bar{m}} \right) \frac{\theta}{1 - \phi\theta} \hat{\mu}_t. \quad (31)$$

Since $\alpha < 0$ under our maintained assumptions, interest rates move in the same direction than $\hat{\mu}_t$, and hence there is *no liquidity effect in the standard model*. Additionally, nominal interest rates inherit the persistence of $\hat{\mu}_t$. Moreover if $\theta = 0$, so that μ_t is i.i.d., then the nominal interest rate is constant.

6 Interest Rates with Segmented Markets

This section analyzes interest rates for the following fiscal-monetary policy. We consider a steady state, i.e a value of \bar{m} for the aggregate balances that corresponds to a constant money growth rate $\bar{\mu}$ (the unconditional mean of the process for money growth). We set the fiscal policy as follows: $\tau_t^N = \bar{\tau}$, and $\tau_t^T = 0$, and endow the traders with an initial bond position that allows them to buy the seignorage not allocated to the non-traders, as outlined in Section 3.1. In the absence of shocks –“in a steady state”– traders and non-traders are symmetric. Yet when there are shocks, traders must absorb all innovations to the money supply.

While our focus is on interest rates, for simplicity we analyze the equilibrium where there is no active bond markets, which in Section 3.1 was shown to be equivalent to one where

all the money injections are carried out through open market operations. In particular, as explained above, the nature of the equilibrium is recursive: we first solve for the process for inflation in the aggregate model, then we solve for the non-trader's problem – which is done in the next subsection – and finally, using the equivalence of the allocations with and without an active bond market, we solve for interest rates.

6.1 The Non-Trader problem

In this section we consider the problem of a non-trader choosing $\{n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, facing a constant real lump sum transfer τ^N , a given process for inflation $\{\pi_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and given initial condition $m_0 = n_{-1}/\pi_0 + \tau^N$. We simplify the notation in this section by dropping the superindex N from n , c , and m , whenever it is clear from the context.

We start by studying the non-trader problem assuming inflation is constant at $\bar{\pi} \geq 1$. In this case the state of the problem is given simply by n_{t-1} . We solve for the optimal decision rule $g(\cdot)$, that gives $n_t = g(n_{t-1})$, and find conditions under which it has a unique steady state $\bar{n} = g(\bar{n})$ that is globally stable. Furthermore we characterize the local dynamics of this problem, i.e. the value of $g'(\bar{n})$. In the second part of this section we use these results to characterize the solution of the linearized Euler equation when inflation follows an arbitrary process.

The next proposition uses the Bellman equation for the non-trader problem with $\bar{\pi} > 1$:

$$V(n) = \max_{0 \leq n' \leq y + \tau^N + n/\bar{\pi}} \{U(y + \tau^N + n/\bar{\pi} - n', n/\bar{\pi} + \tau^N) + \beta V(n')\}. \quad (32)$$

PROPOSITION 4. Assume $\bar{\pi} > 1$, $\tau^N > 0$, U strictly concave and bounded above, and $0 < U_{12} < -U_{11}$. Then the function $g(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing, it has a unique interior steady state $\bar{n} = g(\bar{n})$ that is globally stable, with $0 < g'(\bar{n}) < 1$.

We briefly comment on the intuition for this result. Formally, the Bellman equation (32) can be thought of as the problem of an agent accumulating a durable good, namely money balances. Regard $U_1(y + \tau^N + n/\bar{\pi} - n', n/\bar{\pi} + \tau^N)$ as a function of n and n' . The value of $-U_1(\cdot, \cdot)$ gives the marginal cost of accumulating real balances. The assumption that $U_{11} + U_{12} < 0$ means that the marginal cost is increasing in n , i.e. $-U_1(y + \tau^N + n/\bar{\pi} - n', n/\bar{\pi} + \tau^N)$ is an increasing function of n . We are interested in the value of $g'(\bar{n})$ because it determines the speed of convergence to steady state for the non-trader problem.

Using the the decision rule $g(\cdot)$ and the budget constraint, we can define the optimal consumption rule. For future reference, it turns out to be more convenient to use m (real cash balances after the transfer) as the state. The budget constraint of the agent is given by

$m = n/\pi + \tau^N$ and $m + y = c + g(n)$. Thus $c(m) \equiv m + y - g([m - \tau^N] \pi)$ and $c'(m)$ is given by $1 - \pi g'(n)$. The elasticity of the ratio $m/c(m)$ with respect to m is:

$$\varepsilon(m) \equiv \frac{m}{m/c(m)} \frac{\partial(m/c(m))}{\partial m} = 1 - \frac{m}{c(m)} \frac{\partial c(m)}{\partial m} = 1 - \frac{m}{c(m)} (1 - \pi g'(n)) . \quad (33)$$

We are interested in this elasticity because the interest rate response to money shocks depends on the changes of the m/c ratio. In particular, ε determines the value of the impact effect and $g'(\bar{n})$ the half-life of the impulse response of interest rates to money shocks.

In the next proposition we specialize the utility function to U CRRA and h CES as described in (12) and characterize the slope $g'(\bar{n})$ and the elasticity $\varepsilon(\bar{m})$.

PROPOSITION 5. Assume U is given by equation (12), $0 < U_{12} < -U_{11}$ and $\bar{\pi} > 1$. For any values of the triplet ρ , $r = \bar{\pi}/\beta - 1$ and $\bar{m}/\bar{c} > 1$, let \mathcal{A} be such that $r = U_2/U_1$ evaluated at \bar{m}/\bar{c} . Then $g'(\bar{n})$ and $\varepsilon(\bar{m})$ depend only on \bar{m}/\bar{c} , $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$, $\bar{\pi}$, β . Moreover:

$$0 < \frac{\partial g(\bar{n})}{\partial n} < 1 \quad , \quad 0 \leq \varepsilon(\bar{m})$$

and $g'(\bar{n})$ and $\varepsilon(\bar{m})$ are increasing in the ratio $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$.

Recall that $1/\gamma$ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the bundle h , and that $1/(1 + \rho)$ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between cash balances and consumption. Proposition 5 shows that, somewhat surprisingly, the values of $g'(\bar{n})$ and $\varepsilon(\bar{m})$ depend on the ratio between the elasticities, $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$, as opposed to the values of γ and $1 + \rho$ separately.

This result can be understood by considering the behavior of an agent that starts with cash balances 1 percent below steady state. To reach (or get back to) the steady state the agent must reduce consumption. If the reduction in consumption is large, then convergence to the steady state will be fast, and hence the liquidity effect will be short lived. To see why this decision depends on $\gamma/1 + \rho$, let us consider a case where the convergence to steady state is fast, i.e. $g' \approx 0$. According to Proposition 5 this can happen either because of a small γ or a high $1 + \rho$. Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.

Consider a case where $\gamma > 0$, but cash and consumption are very poor substitutes, so that $1/(1 + \rho) \approx 0$ and $\gamma/(1 + \rho) \approx 0$. In this case, the agent would like to keep m/c almost constant, which implies that $\varepsilon \cong 0$, and since the initial decrease in consumption is large then g' must be small. Alternatively, a similar behavior is produced if the intertemporal substitution elasticity is high. Let $1/(1 + \rho) > 0$ and assume that the bundles are very close substitutes intertemporally, so that $1/\gamma \approx \infty$ and $\gamma/(1 + \rho) \approx 0$. Since the agent substitutes

intertemporally very easily then the speed of convergence is high, or g' is small, and thus it must be that the initial drop in consumption is large, or $\varepsilon \cong 0$.

These examples illustrate why only the ratio matters. To see why ε and g' are increasing in $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$ consider now the case where γ is very large, so the agent dislikes large variations in the bundle h . In this case, the initial drop in m will be partly compensated by not decreasing c too much, and hence $\varepsilon > 0$, and it can be close to one. This also implies that the adjustment to steady state will take more time, or that g' is high.

We conclude this part with two comments on the role of the steady state value of \bar{m}/\bar{c} in Proposition 5. First, as a technical comment notice that the condition that $\bar{m}/\bar{c} > 1$ is only sufficient, but not necessary, for $0 < g'(\bar{n}) < 1$.⁸ Second, and more importantly, the result on the dependence of the speed of convergence on the ratio m/c is less standard, but it should be clear in this context. If the stock of money is very small relative to consumption, the effect of starting with a value of this stock below steady state can be quickly corrected: if $\bar{m}/\bar{c} = 1$ then $g'(\bar{n}) = 0$, so the steady state is attained immediately. In other words, if the stock m is small relative to the flow c , it must be that the length of the model period is so big that it makes the analysis of convergence uninteresting. While this property was derived for a money-in-the-utility function, we think that inventory theoretical models on the lines of Baumol-Tobin, Miller and Orr, Alvarez and Lippi (2009), must display similar behavior. Indeed, in Appendix AA-1 we analyze the continuous time version of the non-trader problem, that deals more naturally with the stock/flow distinction. In this case the corresponding results of Proposition 5 holds for any value of \bar{m}/\bar{c} .

So far we have analyzed the problem for a non-trader when inflation is constant. Now we move to the problem of the non-trader facing the (linearized) equilibrium process for inflation. We use the steady state \bar{n} to define \hat{n}_t , the deviations of the end-of-period real cash balances $\hat{n}_t \equiv n_t - \bar{n}$. Notice that a bounded process $\{n_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ satisfying the Euler equation (6) is a solution to the non-trader's problem. Now we are ready to state a characterization of the linearized solution to the non-traders' Euler equation. Replacing the budget constraint (2) into the Euler equation (6) for non-traders with constant lump sum transfers $\tau_t^N = \tau^N$, and linearizing with respect to (c, m, π) around the values $(\bar{c}, \bar{m}, \bar{\pi})$ we obtain:

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\hat{n}_{t+1}] = \xi_0 \hat{n}_t - \frac{1}{\beta} \hat{n}_{t-1} + \xi_1 \hat{\pi}_t + \xi_2 \mathbb{E}_t[\hat{\pi}_{t+1}]. \quad (34)$$

where the coefficients ξ_i are functions of the second derivatives of U evaluated at the steady state as well as β and $\bar{\pi}$, given by equation (A-10) in Appendix A.7.

⁸The following case obtains $0 < g'(\bar{n}) < 1$, without requiring $\bar{m}/\bar{c} > 1$. Notice that Proposition 4 holds if $\gamma > 1$, since in this case the utility is bounded above, and it only requires that in addition $U_{11} + U_{12} < 0$, which is weaker than $\bar{m}/\bar{c} > 1$.

The next proposition assumes that inflation is governed by the linearized equilibrium described in Section 5:

ASSUMPTION 1. The deviation of inflation and real balances from their steady state value $\{\hat{\pi}_t, \hat{m}_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ are given by the linear stochastic difference equation with exogenous driving shocks $\{z_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^\infty$ described by the matrix and vectors $\{\Theta, \zeta, \kappa\}$ as detailed in equation (26). They imply that $\mathbb{E}_t[\hat{\pi}_{t+1}] = \bar{\Pi} z_t$ as given in (28).

The state for the dynamic program of the non-trader problem is given by the last period real balances \hat{n}_{t-1} , and the variables needed to forecast inflation, which given the linear representation in Section 5, are (z_t, \hat{m}_{t-1}) . The next proposition characterizes the solution $\hat{n}_t = \hat{g}(\hat{n}_{t-1}, z_t, \hat{m}_{t-1})$ for the linearized Euler equation.

PROPOSITION 6. Assume that U is bounded from above, that $0 < U_{12} < -U_{11}$, and that the deviation of inflation and real balances from their steady state value $\{\hat{\pi}_t, \hat{m}_t\}_{t=0}^\infty$ are given by Assumption 1. The unique bounded solution of the linearized Euler equation is given by:

$$\hat{n}_t = \hat{g}(\hat{n}_{t-1}, z_t, \hat{m}_{t-1}) = \varphi_0 \hat{n}_{t-1} + \varphi_1 z_t + \varphi_2 \hat{m}_{t-1} \quad (35)$$

where the φ_0 coefficients satisfy:

$$0 < \varphi_0 = g'(\bar{n}) < 1,$$

and where φ_i are functions of the coefficients ξ_i of the linearization of the Euler equation, the parameters $\beta, \bar{\pi}, \bar{m}$, and the coefficients describing the (linearized) equilibrium law of motion κ, Θ, ζ and $\bar{\Pi}$ are given by equation (A-11) in Appendix A.7.

The result that the slope of the linear optimal policy $\hat{g}(\cdot)$ that solves the linearized Euler $\partial \hat{g} / \partial \hat{n} \equiv \varphi_0$ is the same as the slope at the steady state of the optimal decision rule for the non-linear problem $g'(\bar{n})$, is a standard one. As it is standard, φ_0 is the (stable) solution of a quadratic equation with coefficients defined by ξ_0 and β . Recall that if the growth rate of money $\hat{\mu}_t$ is i.i.d. real balances are constant (see equation (29)), inflation is i.i.d., and hence expected inflation is constant or: $\Theta = \kappa = \bar{\Pi} = 0, \zeta = 1$. In this case, using our notation for $\hat{g}(\cdot)$ and the expressions (A-11) for the coefficients φ_i in Appendix A.7 we obtain that

$$\varphi_1 = -\beta \varphi_0 \xi_1 = -\varphi_0 \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}}$$

so that for all $t \geq 0$, we have $\hat{m}_t = 0$, and thus $\hat{n}_t = \varphi_0 (\hat{n}_{t-1} - \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}} \hat{\mu}_t) + \varphi_2 \hat{m}_{t-1}$. If the

economy starts with $\hat{m}_{-1} = 0$:

$$\hat{n}_t = g'(\bar{n}) \hat{n}_{t-1} - g'(\bar{n}) \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}} \hat{\mu}_t$$

so \hat{n}_t follows an autoregressive process of order one, with parameter $g'(\bar{n})$, and innovations that are proportional to inflation $\hat{\pi}_t = \hat{\mu}_t$ with a (negative) coefficient given by $-g'(\bar{n}) \bar{n}/\bar{\pi}$.

6.2 Interest Rates in a Linearized Equilibrium

In this section we use the aggregation result of [Section 4](#), the inflation dynamics of [Section 5](#) and the characterization of the non-trader's dynamic problem of [Section 6.1](#) to solve for the effect of open market operations on interest rates.

We are interested in the following particular monetary-fiscal policy. Non-traders receive a constant real transfer per period, equal to the steady state value of seigniorage. Traders receive the remaining part of the seigniorage. The deviation from the steady state growth of money supply evolves according to $\hat{\mu}_t = \nu z_t$, for an exogenous process z_t as described in [\(25\)](#). Equivalently, as shown in [Section 3.1](#), we can regard this equilibrium as one in which non-traders receive a constant real tax rebate τ_t^N and traders receive no lump sum rebate but participate in open market operations. Returning to the equilibrium without an active bond market, the values of τ_t^N and τ_t^T are given as follows. Let $\bar{m}(\bar{\mu} - 1)/\bar{\mu}$ be the average seigniorage,

$$\tau_t^N = \frac{\bar{m}(\bar{\mu} - 1)}{\bar{\mu}} \quad \text{and} \quad \tau_t^T = \frac{1}{\lambda} \left[\frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{P_t} \right] - \frac{(1 - \lambda) \bar{m}(\bar{\mu} - 1)}{\lambda \bar{\mu}}.$$

where \bar{m} solves $\frac{U_2(y, \bar{m})}{U_1(y, \bar{m})} = \bar{r} \equiv \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\beta} - 1$. In steady state (i.e. when $\mu_t = \bar{\mu}$ all t), the value of τ_t^T is also constant, and hence $\tau_t^N = \tau_t^T = \bar{m}(\bar{\mu} - 1)/\bar{\mu}$. It is straightforward to verify that these choices satisfy the government budget constraint [\(5\)](#). Also it is easy to verify that with these choices for τ_t^N and τ_t^T if M_t grows at a constant rate $\bar{\mu}$, then traders and non-traders will have the same consumption and money holdings, $\bar{m}^T = \bar{m}^N = \bar{m}$ and $\bar{c}^T = \bar{c}^N = y$.

Now we turn to the determination of the path of interest rates. To do so, let's use a first order approximation around $\mu_t = \pi_t = \bar{\mu}$ and $m_t = m_t^T = m_t^N = \bar{m}$, $c_t^T = c_t^N = y$ where $\bar{r}_t = r_t - \bar{r}$. Linearizing the f.o.c. of the traders [\(11\)](#) with respect to c^T and m^T , replacing \hat{c}_t^T , \hat{m}_t^T using market clearing for goods and money [\(3\)](#) to write the resulting expression in terms of \hat{c}_t^N , \hat{m}_t^N , and using that the elasticity of substitution between m and c is given by

$1/(1 + \rho)$, we obtain

$$\frac{\hat{r}_t}{\bar{r}} = -(1 + \rho) \left(\frac{\hat{m}_t^T}{\bar{m}} - \frac{\hat{c}_t^T}{\bar{c}} \right) = -\frac{(1 + \rho)}{\lambda} \left(\frac{\hat{m}_t}{\bar{m}} - (1 - \lambda) \left(\frac{\hat{m}_t^N}{\bar{m}} - \frac{\hat{c}_t^N}{\bar{c}} \right) \right)$$

Finally we use this equation to solve for interest rates as follows. The term \hat{m}_t is determined by the equilibrium in the aggregate economy, i.e. $\hat{m}_t = \kappa z_t$. The terms \hat{m}_t^N , \hat{c}_t^N are determined by the solution to the non-trader problem. Using the budget constraint of the non-trader we have $m_t^N = n_{t-1}^N/\pi_t + \tau^N$ and $c_t^N = y + n_{t-1}^N/\pi_t + \tau^N - n_t^N$. Linearizing these expressions gives

$$\left(\frac{\hat{m}_t^N}{\bar{m}} - \frac{\hat{c}_t^N}{\bar{c}} \right) = \hat{n}_{t-1} \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} \left(\frac{1}{\bar{m}} - \frac{1}{y} \right) + \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}^2} \left(\frac{1}{y} - \frac{1}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{\pi}_t - \frac{1}{y} \hat{n}_t .$$

Using the decision rule of non-traders: $\hat{n}_t = \varphi_0 \hat{n}_{t-1} + \varphi_1 z_t + \varphi_2 \hat{m}_{t-1}$, to replace \hat{n}_t , and that the equilibrium deviation from inflation are given by $\hat{\pi}_t = \left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{m}_{t-1} + \zeta z_t$ we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\hat{r}_t}{\bar{r}} &= \frac{(1 + \rho)(1 - \lambda)}{\bar{\pi} \lambda} \left[\frac{1}{\bar{m}} - \frac{1}{y} + \frac{\bar{\pi} \varphi_0}{y} \right] \hat{n}_{t-1} \\ &+ \frac{(1 + \rho)}{\lambda} \left(\frac{(1 - \lambda)}{\bar{\pi}} \left[\frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}} \left(\frac{1}{y} - \frac{1}{\bar{m}} \right) \zeta + \frac{\bar{\pi} \varphi_1}{y} \right] - \frac{\kappa}{\bar{m}} \right) z_t \\ &- (1 + \rho) \frac{(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda} \left[\frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}^2} \left(\frac{1}{y} - \frac{1}{\bar{m}} \right) \left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) + \frac{\varphi_2}{y} \right] \hat{m}_{t-1} . \end{aligned} \quad (36)$$

The interest rate is a function of $(\hat{n}_{t-1}, z_t, \hat{m}_{t-1})$. The variables \hat{m}_{t-1} and \hat{n}_{t-1} encode the distributional effects between traders and non-traders. Indeed, as $\lambda \rightarrow 1$, the expression for the interest rate converges to the one for the aggregate model derived above, where only aggregate real balances matters:

$$\frac{\hat{r}_t}{\bar{r}} = -(1 + \rho) \frac{\hat{m}_t}{\bar{m}} \equiv -(1 + \rho) \frac{\kappa}{\bar{m}} z_t .$$

6.2.1 Unexpected once-and-for-all increase in the money supply

This section studies the impulse-response of nominal interest rates when the growth rate of money supply follows and iid process. Equivalently, we analyze the effect of starting the system at the steady state corresponding to $\bar{\mu}$ and then shock it with an unexpected transitory one time increase in the growth rate of the money supply at t , i.e., $\mu_t > \bar{\mu}$ and $\mu_{t+s} = \bar{\mu}$ for all $s \geq 1$, i.e. a once and for all permanent increase in the level of the money supply.

Let the initial conditions $\hat{m}_{t-1} = \hat{n}_{t-1}^N = 0$, if $\hat{\mu}_t$ is iid we have that, as shown in (29),

$\kappa = \Theta = 0$, $\nu = \zeta = 1$. This gives

$$\hat{\pi}_t = \hat{\mu}_t > 0, \quad \hat{\pi}_{t+s} = \hat{\mu}_{t+s} = 0 \quad \text{all } s \geq 1, \quad \text{and } \hat{m}_{t+s} = 0, \quad s \geq 0.$$

For the non-traders we have that for all $s \geq 0$:

$$\hat{n}_{t+s} = \varphi_0 \hat{n}_{t+s-1} + \varphi_1 \hat{z}_{t+s} + \varphi_2 \hat{m}_{t+s-1} = \varphi_0 \hat{n}_{t+s-1} = [\varphi_0]^s \hat{n}_t.$$

Using that for iid shocks $\varphi_1 = -\varphi_0 \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}}$ we have:

$$\frac{\hat{r}_{t+s}}{\bar{r}} = -(1 + \rho) \frac{(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda} \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{m}\bar{\pi}} \left(1 - \frac{\bar{m}}{y} (1 - \bar{\pi} \varphi_0) \right) [\varphi_0]^s \frac{\hat{\mu}_t}{\bar{\pi}} \quad (37)$$

for all $s \geq 0$. Equation (37) shows that the sign and persistence of the liquidity effect depend on the magnitude of φ_0 . The impact effect is negative, i.e. interest rate decrease when money increases, if

$$1 - \frac{\bar{m}}{y} (1 - \bar{\pi} \varphi_0) > 0. \quad (38)$$


Equation (33) with $c = y$ immediately shows that condition (38) is equivalent to $\varepsilon(\bar{m}) > 0$, or equivalently to an elasticity of consumption with respect to money balances smaller than one, a condition established in [Proposition 5](#).

To understand the mechanics of the liquidity effect, note that the effect of an iid shock to money supply to the non-trader is to increase the price level, thus decreasing the post-transfer real money balances m of the non-trader. If the consumption elasticity is smaller than one then the ratio of money to consumption for the non-traders decreases, i.e. $\varepsilon(\bar{m}) > 0$. Since with an iid shock aggregate real balances remain the same, this implies that the ratio of money to consumption must increase for traders. In turn a higher m/c ratio for traders implies, by [equation \(11\)](#), that the nominal interest rate must decrease.

The size of the impact decrease in interest rate after a once and for all increase in money increases with $\varepsilon(\bar{m}) > 0$. Recall that [Proposition 5](#) establishes that ε is an increasing function of $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$. The persistence of the liquidity effect also depends on the magnitude of $\varphi_0 = g'(\bar{n})$, which is also increasing in $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$. The closer the value of φ_0 is to one, the more persistent the liquidity effect is. Finally, note that the more segmented markets are (the smaller is λ), the larger the (absolute value of the) liquidity effect at all horizons.

We summarize this discussion in the following Proposition, which assumes that $m/c > 1$ (a condition related to the choice of time units discussed in [Proposition 5](#)).

PROPOSITION 7. The effect of an unexpected once and for all increase in the money supply at time t of size $(\mu_t - \bar{\mu})/\bar{\mu}$ is to decrease interest rates on impact and return to the



steady state value \bar{r} according to

$$\frac{\hat{r}_{t+s}}{\bar{r}} = -(1 + \rho) \frac{(1 - \lambda)}{\lambda} \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{m}\bar{\pi}} \left[1 - \left(\frac{m}{c} \right) \frac{\partial c(m)}{\partial m} \Big|_{m=\bar{m}} \right] \left[\frac{\partial g(\bar{n})}{\partial n} \right]^s \left(\frac{\mu_t - \bar{\mu}}{\bar{\mu}} \right).$$

To illustrate this proposition we compute the impulse response to a once and for all shock to the money supply for different parameter values. In all the impulse responses we use annual inflation and real rate of 2 percent, U given by (12) and choose the value of the parameter \mathcal{A} to obtain a steady-state value of \bar{m}/\bar{c} equal to 0.25 at annual frequency. We let the model period to be a month. In the first figure we plot impulse responses for a once and for all shock to money supply, which implies a 1 percent increase in price level on impact, so $(\mu_0 - \bar{\mu})/\bar{\mu}$ to be 0.01. In the figures we let $\lambda = 0.25$, $\gamma = 2$ and we vary the value of ρ . As it is clear from Proposition 7, different values of λ scale the distance to steady state by the same proportion at all horizons.

The figure shows that for larger values of ρ , and hence lower elasticity of the long-run money demand, there are larger liquidity effects at impact, with shorter life-times. The value of ρ has two opposite effects on the impulse response of interest rates, as can be seen in the formula in Proposition 7. The first is a direct effect of the preferences: larger values of $1 + \rho$,

raise the sensitivity of the marginal rate of substitution of traders, increasing the effect of a given change in the money-consumption ratio m/c onto the interest rate. The second effect operates through the equilibrium determination of the elasticity $m/c \partial c(m) / \partial m$, that is a function of ρ , as shown in [Proposition 5](#). For a fixed value of γ larger values of ρ increase this elasticity and hence imply a smaller decrease at impact on the ratio m/c . The impulse responses in [Figure 1](#) show that the first effects almost completely dominates the second one, since the vertical distance between the impulse responses at $t = 0$, is almost proportional to the change in the value of $1 + \rho$. Additionally, different values of ρ correspond to different persistence of the liquidity effect, through changes in $(m/c) (\partial c(m) / \partial m)$, or equivalently, changes in $g'(\bar{n})$. Higher values of ρ , as shown in [Proposition 5](#), imply faster convergence, as can be seen from the impulse responses of [Figure 1](#).

[Table 1](#) complements [Figure 1](#) by computing two of the determinants of the impulses response of interest rates after a once and for all change in the money supply for different combinations of intertemporal elasticity of substitution $1/\gamma$, and intratemporal elasticity of substitution $1/(1 + \rho)$. One of the determinants, the half-life of the shock, is a simple transformation of φ_0 , and is given by $\tau \equiv [\log(1/2) / \log(\varphi_0)]$, expressed in years. The other determinant, denoted by ε , is the impact elasticity of m/c with respect to a change in m , or $\varepsilon \equiv 1 - (m/c) \partial c(m) / \partial m$, also a transformation of φ_0 .


Table 1: Once and for all shock to μ : half life τ (years), and $\varepsilon = 1 - \frac{m}{c} \frac{dc}{dm}$

ρ :	1	3	7
γ :			
2	$\varepsilon = 0.91$ $\tau = 1.77$	$\varepsilon = 0.87$ $\tau = 1.25$	$\varepsilon = 0.82$ $\tau = 0.89$
4	$\varepsilon = 0.94$ $\tau = 2.53$	$\varepsilon = 0.91$ $\tau = 1.77$	$\varepsilon = 0.87$ $\tau = 1.25$
8	$\varepsilon = 0.96$ $\tau = 3.63$	$\varepsilon = 0.94$ $\tau = 2.53$	$\varepsilon = 0.91$ $\tau = 1.77$

Note: $\tau = [\log(1/2) / \log(\varphi_0)]$ half-life of the interest shock ,
 $\varepsilon = 1 - \frac{m}{c} \frac{dc}{dm}$ elasticity of m/c w.r.t m on impact.

The values for ρ and γ for [Table 1](#) are chosen so that the ratio $\gamma / (1 + \rho)$ is constant on the diagonal. The values of τ and ε across the diagonal of [Table 1](#) are the same, which follows from [Proposition 5](#), where it is shown that the decision rules $c(\cdot)$ and $g(\cdot)$ are functions of the ratio of the elasticities $\gamma / (1 + \rho)$. The value of ε has the interpretation of the elasticity of the ratio m/c with respect to an unanticipated once and for all shock to the price level (hence to m). The values for this elasticity varies between 0.82 and 0.95 across the values

Figure 2: Segmented Mkts Model: Impulse response of interest rates money shocks
Initial shock to money chosen to have a 1% impact increase in price level



of $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$ reported in the table. The range of half-lives across the values of $\gamma/(1 + \rho)$ reported in Table 1 is between a bit less than a year, to more than 3 and a half years.


6.2.2 Persistent increase in the growth rate of the money supply

This section analyzes the effect of a persistent increase in the growth rate of the money supply on interest rates. We use the general expression for r_t in (36), the evolution of the state m_t given by (26), and the evolution of n_t given by (35).

Figure 2 plots the impulse responses of interest rates to money shocks under the assumption that the growth rate of the money supply is an AR(1) with autocorrelation θ , as opposed to iid. Otherwise the parameter values are the same ones used in Figure 1 in the case where $\rho = 1$ (so the long run elasticity of the money demand is 1/2). We plot the impulse response for four values of θ , corresponding to a half life of zero months, one month, three months, and ten years. The zero half life coincides with the iid case of Figure 1, and is included to help in the comparisons. The size of the initial shock to money is chosen so that the effect on the price level on impact is an increase of 1 percent, as in the case of iid money growth.

As can be seen from the impulse responses in Figure 2, the monetary shocks with a shorter half-life produce a liquidity effect. If the monetary shock is very persistent, instead, the Fisherian aspects of the model take over, expected inflation rises considerably on impact,

Figure 3: Aggregate Model: Impulse response of interest rates money shocks
 Initial shock to money chosen to have a 1% impact increase in price level



and there is no liquidity effect. Notice that for intermediate values of θ the impulse response has an inverted hump shape, attaining the minimum some periods after the impact effect. The hump shape of the impulse response is due to the fact that the dynamic system has two eigenvalues: θ , governing aggregate real balances and inflation, and φ_0 , governing the non-traders adjustment of their real balances. Note that for the three smallest values of θ , the impulse response converge to the same line, since the short run behavior is dominated by θ and the long run by φ_0 . Instead, for the case where θ is much larger, this effects completely dominates, and the impulse response is almost identical to the one where markets are not segmented.

To identify the effect of segmented markets on interest rates, Figure 3 displays the impulse response (to the same shocks) for the model with $\lambda = 1$, which has no liquidity effects. As shown in Section 5, in the model with $\lambda = 1$ interest rates move in the same direction than expected changes in money supply. When shocks are short lived, so that there are no movements in the expected growth rate of money, interest rates remain almost constant at the steady state level. Comparing Figures 2 and 3, it can be seen that when monetary shocks are very persistent the behavior of interest rates are similar for the model with segmented markets ($\lambda = 0.25$) and for the model with homogenous agents ($\lambda = 1$).

6.2.3 Short vs Long Run Money Demand Elasticities and the Liquidity Effect

We finish this section with a comment on the difference between the liquidity effect and the interest elasticity of the money demand. The thought experiment that reveals a liquidity effect on interest rate is an open market operation, i.e. an increase of the money supply. Instead, the slope of the money demand is a relationship between real money balances –or velocity– and interest rates. As explained, in this model the “long run” interest-elasticity of the money demand is $-1/(1 + \rho)$. The liquidity effect of an increase in the (nominal) money supply, too, depends on ρ , among other parameters.

As done in the literature –see e.g. [Christiano et al. \(1999\)](#)–, we define the “short-run money demand elasticity” as the ratio of the impact effect on real balances relative to the impact effect on interest rates following a monetary shock. We argue that there is no “constant” short-run elasticity of the money demand in the model. We emphasize that this is consistent with the unstable estimates of the interest-elasticity of money demand equations using high-frequency data.

To fix ideas consider the case where the growth rate of the money supply follows an AR(1) process with parameter θ . From our analysis of the aggregate model and the result on approximate aggregation of [Section 4](#) and [Section 5](#) we find that the decrease on impact of aggregate real balances after a shock to the money supply is given by [equation \(26\)](#)

$$\frac{1}{m} \frac{dm}{d\hat{\mu}} \Big|_{m=\bar{m}, \hat{\mu}=0} = \frac{\kappa}{\bar{m}} \equiv \frac{\alpha}{\bar{m}} \frac{\theta}{1 - \phi\theta},$$

where $\alpha < 0$ and $0 < \phi < 1$. Hence real balances decrease after an increase in money growth, the more so the more persistent is the increase in money growth. From our analysis of the impact on interest rates of a monetary shock, [equation \(36\)](#), we have that:

$$\frac{1}{r} \frac{dr}{d\hat{\mu}} \Big|_{m=\bar{m}, \hat{\mu}=0, n=\bar{n}} = \frac{(1 + \rho)}{\lambda} \left(\frac{(1 - \lambda)}{\bar{\pi}} \left[\frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}} \left(\frac{1}{y} - \frac{1}{\bar{m}} \right) \zeta + \frac{\bar{\pi}\varphi_1}{y} \right] - \frac{\kappa}{\bar{m}} \right)$$

where ζ is given in [\(27\)](#) and the expression for φ_1 is given in [Appendix A.7](#) by [\(A-11\)](#). Thus we define the short run elasticity of the money demand as the ratio:

$$\eta \equiv \frac{r}{m} \frac{dm}{dr} = \frac{\frac{1}{m} \frac{dm}{d\hat{\mu}}}{\frac{1}{r} \frac{dr}{d\hat{\mu}}} \Big|_{m=\bar{m}, \hat{\mu}=0, n=\bar{n}} .$$

To understand the sign of this expression, notice that $(1/m)(dm/d\mu) < 0$, so the sign of the elasticity η depends on whether there is a liquidity effect or not. If there is a liquidity effect, i.e. if interest rates decrease with increases in money, then the elasticity is positive on

impact! We consider two interesting special cases:

$$\eta \equiv \frac{r}{m} \frac{dm}{dr} = 0 \quad \text{if } \theta = 0 \quad , \quad \eta \equiv \frac{r}{m} \frac{dm}{dr} = -\frac{1}{1 + \rho} \quad \text{if } \lambda = 1,$$

In the case of an once-and-for-all increase in the money supply ($\theta = 0$) expected inflation is constant and thus aggregate real balances remain constant ($\kappa = 0$, and $\hat{m}_t = 0$). Thus the impulse response of a purely transitory shock on the growth rate of the money supply μ_t will display a short-run interest elasticity of the money demand equal to zero. Instead, in the case where $\lambda = 1$, i.e. when markets are not segmented, the short-run and long-run elasticities are the same since the standard interest elastic money demand equation holds at all frequencies. To illustrate the effect of other parameters' values on this elasticity, Table 2 reports the value of η using three values of θ used in Figure 2, denoted by the corresponding half-life of the shocks $\tau(\theta)$, two values of ρ , determining the long-run elasticity $-1/(1 + \rho)$, and two values of λ , determining the degree of market segmentation.

Table 2			
$\eta \equiv \frac{r}{m} \frac{dm}{dr}$			
	$\rho = 1$ $\lambda = 0.25$	$\rho = 1$ $\lambda = 0.1$	$\rho = 3$ $\lambda = 0.1$
$\tau(\theta)$ 1 months.	+ 0.34	+ 0.08	+ 0.19
$\tau(\theta)$ 4 months.	+ 0.93	+ 1.25	- 0.40
$\tau(\theta)$ 10 years	- 0.47	- 0.43	-0.23

As expected from our earlier analysis, the last row of Table 2 shows that when the monetary shock is persistent the short-run elasticity is closer to the long-run elasticity $-1/(1 + \rho)$, although the limit as $\theta \rightarrow 1$ depends on λ and does not converge exactly to $-1/(1 + \rho)$. Instead, when the monetary shock are short lived, the liquidity effect makes the sign of the short-run elasticity the opposite of the one on the long-run elasticity.

6.3 The effect of anticipated monetary policy shocks

The analysis until now focussed on the effect of an unanticipated shock to the money supply. This section uses the model to explore the effect of anticipated monetary injections.

For simplicity we focus on the case of a once and for all increase of the money supply. To be concrete suppose that agents learn at the beginning of period t that the money supply will jump in period $t + 1$, i.e. $\hat{\mu}_{t+1}$, and $\hat{\mu}_{t+1+j} = 0$, $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$

Using [equation \(22\)](#) and [equation \(24\)](#) shows that inflation and real money balances (i.e. the price level) adjust immediately upon the announcement at t , with

$$\hat{\pi}_t = -\alpha \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \hat{\mu}_{t+1} \quad , \quad \hat{m}_t = \alpha \hat{\mu}_{t+1} \quad .$$

Therefore, upon the announcement the price level increases reducing real money balances (remember that our assumption are such that $\alpha < 0$).

The adjustment process is completed in period $t + 1$ with

$$\hat{\pi}_{t+1} = \left(1 + \alpha \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\right) \hat{\mu}_{t+1} \quad , \quad \hat{m}_{t+1} = 0$$

TO BE COMPLETED....

7 Simulated Examples

In this section we compute the linearized equilibrium for numerical examples. As discussed in [Appendix AA-2](#), estimates of long run interest elasticities of money demand range between 1/4 and 1/2. In this section we use 1/2, the value estimated by [Lucas \(2000\)](#). We use the specification of $U(c, m) = [h(c, m)^{1-\gamma} - 1] / (1 - \gamma)$ where h is a CES function as in [\(12\)](#). The 1/2 elasticity corresponds to a value of $\rho = 1$. We use a monthly model, with an money to income ratio equal to 0.25 at annual frequencies. This correspond to a value of $\mathcal{A} = 33.33$ for the monthly model . We use a value of the intertemporal of substitution of 1/2, or $\gamma = 2$, which is a value commonly used in the literature and in the range of estimates by [Ogaki and Reinhart \(1998\)](#) and others. The values β and $\bar{\mu}$ are chosen so that the annual real interest rates and inflation rates are two percent (the values for our monthly model are $\beta = 0.9983$, and $\bar{\mu} = 1.0017$). We set the fraction of traders to $\lambda = 0.25$.

Figure 5 below shows the result of a simulation where the money supply growth $\hat{\mu}_t/\bar{\mu}$ is given by the sum of two AR(1) independent processes. One is very persistent, with a monthly autocorrelation equal to 0.995, which corresponds to a half-life of 10 years. The other is much less so, with a monthly autocorrelation 0.5, i.e. a half life of a month. The unconditional standard deviation of these processes are 0.0120 and 0.0054 respectively. We simulate the model and display a scatter plot of interest rate and velocity. The solid line displays the log-log money demand with elasticity 1/2 which corresponds to permanent changes in the growth rate of money. The figure below displays annual simulated data (by averaging twelve consecutive non-overlapping periods). These figures are meant to be compared with the scatter plot and time series graph from annual US data for the 20-th century in [Lucas \(2000\)](#).

Figure 5: Simulated model period data, annual averages, money demand
 "o" are simulated data, "-" is long run money demand





Figure 6: Simulated model period data, annual averages



The mechanics behind the figure is as follows. The effect of the persistent shock is quantitatively similar to the effect of a permanent change on the growth rate of money. The effect of the transitory shock is quantitatively similar to the one of an iid shock on money supply growth, which has no effect on real balances, and produces variations on interest rates. To better understand the mechanism that generates this time series recall the impulse response of Figure 2: an innovation to a persistent process does not cause a liquidity effect, i.e. interest rate and money growth move in the same direction. Instead, the response of an innovation to a transitory shock displays a liquidity effect.

8 Concluding remarks

In this paper we presented a theoretical mechanism that gives rise to a persistent liquidity effect, and characterized its relationship with a long-run interest rate-elastic money demand. Our interest in monetary models that feature liquidity effects based on segmented asset markets is to study monetary policy questions as in [Lahiri et al. \(2007\)](#), [Nakajima \(2006\)](#), [Lama and Medina \(2007\)](#), [Khan and Thomas \(2007\)](#), [King and Thomas \(2008\)](#), [Bilbiie \(2008\)](#), [Curdia and Woodford \(2008\)](#), [Gust and Lopez-Salido \(2009\)](#), and [Zervou \(2008\)](#). Comparing with this literature, we have deliberately kept the model as simple as possible. The simplicity allowed us to give a relatively sharp characterization of the theoretical results, such as the relationship between money and prices in the presence of segmentation, and the impact effect and persistence of the liquidity effect as a function of simple elasticities. The disadvantage of this simplicity is that this version of the model lacks many important features of so that many question of interest cannot be addressed. For instance, the model has exogenous endowment, and flexible prices. In this regards, we view the result of the model as applying to the aggregate nominal demand.

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A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.

The tilde allocation satisfies market clearing for cash balances and consumption, since they are satisfied in the original equilibrium. Market clearing of bonds is satisfied trivially by construction. The budget constraint of the government is satisfied by construction too, given that the budget constraint for the original equilibrium is satisfied. The tilde allocation solve the problem of the non-traders since their budget constraint is identical. Finally, for traders, at the tilde equilibrium prices and interest rates and chosen initial conditions, the allocation $\{c_t^T, m_t^T\}_{t=0}^\infty$ is budget feasible, and the f.o.c. for the bond holdings is satisfied. Hence, $\{c_t^T, m_t^T\}_{t=0}^\infty$ solve the trader's problem. *Q.E.D.*

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.

By adding the Euler equation of the traders times λ to the Euler equation of the non-traders times $(1 - \lambda)$ we obtain the following Euler equation for the aggregate real balances:

$$\bar{U}_{11}\hat{c}_t + \bar{U}_{12}\hat{m}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} [(\bar{U}_{11} + \bar{U}_{21})\hat{c}_{t+1} + (\bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{22})\hat{m}_{t+1}] - \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}^2} [\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2] \hat{\pi}_{t+1}.$$

Using feasibility $\hat{c}_t = 0$, thus the Euler equation becomes

$$\bar{U}_{12}\hat{m}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} [(\bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{22})\hat{m}_{t+1}] - \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}^2} [\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2] \hat{\pi}_{t+1}$$

Using the linearized identity (17) to replace $\hat{\pi}_{t+1}$ into the Euler equation we get

$$\bar{U}_{12}\hat{m}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} [(\bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{22})\hat{m}_{t+1}] - \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}^2} [\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2] \left(\hat{\mu}_{t+1} + \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\hat{m}_t - \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\hat{m}_{t+1} \right)$$

or

$$\bar{U}_{12}\hat{m}_t + \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}^2} [\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2] \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\hat{m}_t = \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} [(\bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{22})\hat{m}_{t+1}] - \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}^2} [\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2] \left(\hat{\mu}_{t+1} - \frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\hat{m}_{t+1} \right)$$

multiplying by \bar{m} and using that in the steady state $\bar{\pi} = \bar{\mu}$ and $\bar{U}_1 = \beta/\bar{\mu} (\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2)$:

$$[\bar{U}_{12}\bar{m} + \bar{U}_1] \hat{m}_t = -\mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\mu}^2} [\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2] \bar{m}\hat{\mu}_{t+1} + \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} [\bar{m} (\bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{22}) + \bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2] \hat{m}_{t+1} \quad (\text{A-1})$$

which is identical to the Euler Equation for the aggregate model that is obtained by linearizing (19) around the steady state. *Q.E.D.*

A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.

Linearizing (19) around the steady state gives equation (A-1). Using the definitions above we obtain (21). *Q.E.D.*

A.4 Sufficient conditions for $0 < \phi < 1$

LEMMA 1. Let the utility be given by equation (12). Then $\phi < 1$ and $\alpha < 0$ if

$$\gamma < 2 + \rho + \frac{1}{r(m/c)} \quad \text{and} \quad \rho > -1$$

If $\rho = -1$ then $\phi = 1$. Finally $\phi > 0$ if

$$\gamma < \frac{1}{1+r} \left(2 + \rho + \frac{1}{r(m/c)} + r - \frac{\rho}{(m/c)} \right) .$$

Proof. Using (12) we have that

$$\begin{aligned} U_2 &= \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}-1} \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho-1} \\ mU_{22} &= \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}-1} \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho-1} (1 - \gamma + \rho) \frac{\frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho}}{\left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]} \\ &\quad - \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}-1} \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho-1} (\rho + 1) \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} U_1 &= \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}-1} c^{-\rho-1} \\ mU_{12} &= \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}-1} c^{-\rho-1} (1 - \gamma + \rho) \frac{\frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho}}{\left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]} \end{aligned}$$

thus

$$\phi \equiv (\beta/\bar{\mu}) \left[1 + \frac{\bar{U}_2 + \bar{m}\bar{U}_{22}}{\bar{U}_1 + \bar{m}\bar{U}_{12}} \right] = \frac{1}{1+r} \left[1 + r \frac{(1-\gamma) r(m/c) - \rho}{(2-\gamma+\rho) r(m/c) + 1} \right] .$$

Sufficient conditions for $0 < \phi < 1$ are the following. For $\phi < 1$ we have:

$$\frac{(1-\gamma) r(m/c) - \rho}{(2-\gamma+\rho) r(m/c) + 1} < 1$$

If $(2-\gamma+\rho) r(m/c) + 1 > 0$, this implies:

$$0 < (1+\rho)(1+rm/c)$$

which holds if $\rho > -1$. If $\rho = -1$, then $\phi = 1$. This establishes the condition for $\phi < 1$:

$$\gamma < (2 + \rho) + \frac{1}{r(m/c)} \text{ and } \rho > -1 .$$

For $\phi > 0$ we have

$$-1 < r \frac{(1 - \gamma) r(m/c) - \rho}{(2 - \gamma + \rho) r(m/c) + 1}$$

Since the denominator is positive (whenever $\phi < 1$), this inequality implies

$$-(2 - \gamma + \rho) r(m/c) - 1 < r [(1 - \gamma) r(m/c) - \rho]$$

or

$$\gamma < \frac{2 + r}{1 + r} + \frac{1}{r(m/c)} \frac{1}{1 + r} + \frac{\rho}{1 + r} \left[1 - \frac{1}{(m/c)} \right].$$

Finally, $\alpha < 0$ iff $\bar{U}_1 + \bar{m}\bar{U}_{12} > 0$. Above we have computed

$$\frac{U_1 + mU_{12}}{[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{A}m^{-\rho}]^{-\frac{1-\gamma}{\rho}-1} c^{-\rho-1}} = \frac{(1 - \gamma + \rho) r(m/c) + 1 + r(m/c)}{[1 + r(m/c)]}$$

so $U_1 + mU_{12} > 0$ if $(1 - \gamma + \rho) r(m/c) + 1 + r(m/c) > 0$ or $\gamma r(m/c) < (2 + \rho) r(m/c) + 1$, or (23) holds. *QED*.

A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.

Under the stated conditions the value function V is strictly concave and differentiable. The f.o.c. for this problem is

$$U_1 \left(y + \tau^N + \frac{n}{\bar{\pi}} - g(n), \frac{n}{\bar{\pi}} + \tau^N \right) = \beta V' (g(n)) \quad (\text{A-2})$$

for all $n \geq 0$. Since V is concave, V' is decreasing and since $U_{11} + U_{12} < 0$ the LHS of the f.o.c. (A-2), for a fixed value $n' = g(n)$, is decreasing in n , and hence $g(\cdot)$ is increasing. The envelope gives:

$$V'(n) = \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} U_1 \left(y + \tau^N + \frac{n}{\bar{\pi}} - g(n), \frac{n}{\bar{\pi}} + \tau^N \right) + \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} U_2 \left(y + \tau^N + \frac{n}{\bar{\pi}} - g(n), \frac{n}{\bar{\pi}} + \tau^N \right).$$

Using the f.o.c. and the envelope evaluated at steady state we obtain:

$$U_1 \left(y + \tau^N - \bar{n} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} \right), \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}} + \tau^N \right) \left(1 - \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} \right) = \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} U_2 \left(y + \tau^N - \bar{n} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\bar{\pi}} \right), \frac{\bar{n}}{\bar{\pi}} + \tau^N \right)$$

Under the assumption that $U_{12} \geq 0$ and $\bar{\pi} > 1$ it is easy to see that there is a unique steady state \bar{n} satisfying this equation.

We now show that this steady state is globally stable. Suppose not, i.e. that $g'(n) > 1$,

and assume that $n_0 > \bar{n}$, then $\lim n_t = \infty$. But notice that V is bounded below, since $V(n) \geq V(0) \geq U(y + \tau^N, \tau^N) / (1 - \beta)$. Additionally we assume that U is bounded above. In this case, since V is concave,

$$V(n_t) \geq V(0) + V'(n_t) n_t$$

and hence as $n_t \rightarrow \infty$ it must be that

$$V'(n_t) = U_1(n_t/\bar{\pi} + y + \tau^N - n_{t+1}, n_t/\bar{\pi} + \tau^N) + U_2(n_t/\bar{\pi} + y + \tau^N - n_{t+1}, n_t/\bar{\pi} + \tau^N) \rightarrow 0.$$

and since $U_2 \geq 0$:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} U_1(n_t/\bar{\pi} + y + \tau^N - n_{t+1}, n_t/\bar{\pi} + \tau^N) = 0$$

Since $U_{12} \geq 0$ then

$$U_1(n_t/\bar{\pi} + y + \tau^N - n_{t+1}, n_t/\bar{\pi} + \tau^N) \geq U_1(n_t/\bar{\pi} + y + \tau^N - n_{t+1}, \tau^N)$$

but if $n_{t+1} > n_t$, for $\bar{\pi} > 1$

$$U_1(n_t/\bar{\pi} + y + \tau^N - n_{t+1}, \tau^N) \geq U_1(y + \tau^N, \tau^N) > 0$$

a contradiction. Hence $\lim_t n_t$ must be bounded, and thus $g'(\bar{n}) < 1$. *Q.E.D.*

A.6 Proof of Proposition 5.

-Part I. Using $\hat{n}_t = g' \cdot \hat{n}_{t-1}$ for the policy rule gives $\hat{m}_t = \hat{n}_{t-1}/\bar{\pi}$, $\hat{c}_t = (1/\bar{\pi} - g') \hat{n}_{t-1}$ and $\hat{m}_{t+1} = g' \hat{n}_{t-1}/\bar{\pi}$, $\hat{c}_{t+1} = (1/\bar{\pi} - g') g' \hat{n}_{t-1}$. Totally differentiating the Euler equation (6) and using the above policy functions gives a second order ODE with characteristic equation

$$0 = \beta (\varphi_0)^2 + b\varphi_0 + 1,$$

that has $\varphi_0 \equiv g'(\bar{n})$ as its smallest root, where the coefficient b is:

$$-b \equiv \frac{\bar{\pi} + \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}} \left(1 + 2 \frac{\bar{U}_{12}}{\bar{U}_{11}} + \frac{\bar{U}_{22}}{\bar{U}_{11}} \right)}{1 + \frac{\bar{U}_{12}}{\bar{U}_{11}}} > 0. \quad (\text{A-3})$$

Note that $-b > 0$ under the assumption $U_{11} + U_{12} < 0$ and $\pi > 1$. As an intermediate step for the proof, the next lemma gives the properties of φ_0 as a function of $-b$.

LEMMA 2. The expression for the root that is smaller in absolute value is:

$$\varphi_0 = \frac{-b - \sqrt{b^2 - 4\beta}}{2\beta} \quad (\text{A-4})$$

with $0 < \varphi_0 \leq 1$, provided that $-b \geq 1 + \beta$. Moreover, φ_0 is decreasing in $-b$.

Proof of Lemma 2. A real solution requires $b^2 - 4\beta \geq 0$. If $-b \geq 1 + \beta$, then $b^2 \geq (1 + \beta)^2 = 1 + \beta^2 + 2\beta$, and $b^2 - 4\beta \geq (1 - \beta)^2 > 0$. If $-b = 1 + \beta$ then $\varphi_0 = 1$. To see

that φ_0 is decreasing in $-b$:

$$\frac{\partial \varphi_0}{\partial (-b)} = \frac{\partial}{\partial (-b)} \left(\frac{-b - \sqrt{(-b)^2 - 4\beta}}{2\beta} \right) = \frac{1}{2\beta} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\sqrt{b^2 - 4\beta}} \right) \leq \frac{1}{2\beta} \left(1 - \frac{1}{1-\beta} \right) < 0.$$

Q.E.D.

- Part II. We show that the coefficients of the equation that defines $\varphi_0 \equiv g'(\bar{n})$ are a function of $\gamma/(1+\rho)$, β , π and m/c . Using $U(c, m) = (h(c, m)^{1-\gamma} - 1)/(1-\gamma)$ gives:

$$\frac{U_{22}}{U_{11}} = \frac{h_{22}/h_{11} + \gamma r^2 (h_1 h_1) / (-h h_{11})}{1 + \gamma (h_1 h_1) / (-h h_{11})}, \quad \frac{U_{12}}{U_{11}} = \frac{h_{12}/h_{11} + \gamma r (h_1 h_1) / (-h h_{11})}{1 + \gamma (h_1 h_1) / (-h h_{11})}.$$

Using that h is CES we have

$$\begin{aligned} h_{11} &= (1+\rho) \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-1} c^{-\rho-2} \left\{ \frac{c^{-\rho}}{[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho}]} - 1 \right\}, \\ h_{22} &= (1+\rho) \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-1} \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho-2} \left\{ \frac{\frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho}}{[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho}]} - 1 \right\}, \\ h_{12} &= (1+\rho) \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}} m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-2} c^{-\rho-1} m^{-\rho-1} / \mathcal{A}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus

$$\frac{h_{22}}{h_{11}} = \left(\frac{c}{m} \right)^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{h_{12}}{h_{11}} = - \left(\frac{c}{m} \right).$$

And using that, as from [equation \(13\)](#), $(\frac{m}{c})^{-\rho} / \mathcal{A} = r m/c$

$$\frac{h_1 h_1}{-h h_{11}} = \frac{1}{(1+\rho) r (m/c)}.$$

Plugging these expressions into the ones for U_{22}/U_{11} and U_{12}/U_{11} gives

$$\frac{U_{22}}{U_{11}} = \frac{\left(\frac{c}{m}\right)^2 + r \left(\frac{c}{m}\right) \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}\right)}{1 + \frac{1}{r} \left(\frac{c}{m}\right) \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}\right)}, \quad \frac{U_{12}}{U_{11}} = \frac{-\left(\frac{c}{m}\right) + \left(\frac{c}{m}\right) \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}\right)}{1 + \frac{1}{r} \left(\frac{c}{m}\right) \left(\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}\right)} \quad (\text{A-5})$$

which are functions of the ratio $\gamma/(1+\rho)$, the number r , and the ratio m/c .

Replacing [\(A-5\)](#) into [\(A-3\)](#) gives:

$$-b = \frac{\bar{\pi} + \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}}(1-x)^2 + x \frac{\tilde{\gamma}}{r} (\bar{\pi} + \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}}(1+r)^2)}{1-x + x \frac{\tilde{\gamma}}{r} (1+r)} \quad (\text{A-6})$$

where $x \equiv c/m \in (0, 1)$ and $\tilde{\gamma} \equiv \gamma/(1+\rho)$.

The partial derivative of (A-6) with respect to $\tilde{\gamma}$ gives

$$\frac{\partial(-b)}{\partial\tilde{\gamma}} = \frac{-\frac{x}{r}(x+r)}{(1-x+x\frac{\tilde{\gamma}}{r}(1+r))^2} \left(\bar{\pi} - \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}}(1+r)(1-x) \right) \quad (\text{A-7})$$

Noting that at the steady state $\frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}}(1+r) = 1$ (by equation (13)) establishes that $-b$ is decreasing in $\gamma/(1+\rho)$. This, by Lemma 2, implies that the root φ_0 is increasing in $\gamma/(1+\rho)$.

-Part III. We conclude the proof by showing that $0 < \varepsilon(\bar{m})$ for $\bar{\pi} > 1$ and $m/c > 1$. The proof is in two parts. We first analyze the case of $\gamma = 0$. Then we extend the results for the case of $\gamma > 0$.

Assume $\gamma = 0$. We show that the elasticity of $c(m)$ with respect to m , evaluated at $m = \bar{m}$, is smaller than one, which implies that $\varepsilon(\bar{m}) > 0$. Note by equation (33) that $\frac{m}{c} \frac{\partial c}{\partial m} < 1$ requires $(1 - \frac{c}{m}) \frac{1}{\pi} \leq \varphi_0$. Using equation (A-4) this inequality becomes

$$-b - 2\beta \left(1 - \frac{c}{m}\right) \frac{1}{\pi} - \sqrt{b^2 - 4\beta} \geq 0 \quad (\text{A-8})$$

Using equation (A-6) for $\gamma/(1+\rho) = 0$ gives

$$-b = \frac{\pi}{1-x} + \frac{\beta}{\pi}(1-x) \quad (\text{A-9})$$

where $x \equiv c/m$. We want to show that inequality (A-8) holds for $x \in (0, 1)$, i.e. that

$$a(x) \equiv -b(x) - 2\beta(1-x) \frac{1}{\pi} - \sqrt{b(x)^2 - 4\beta} > 0 \quad .$$

This follows because: $a(0) > 0$ and $a'(x) > 0$ for $x \in (0, 1)$. These two inequalities follow from:

$$a(0) = \pi - \frac{\beta}{\pi} - \sqrt{\pi^2 + \left(\frac{\beta}{\pi}\right)^2 + \frac{2\beta}{\pi} - 4\beta}$$

Using that $\pi > 1$, we have

$$a(0) > \pi - \frac{\beta}{\pi} - \sqrt{\pi^2 + \left(\frac{\beta}{\pi}\right)^2 + \frac{2\beta}{\pi} - 4\frac{\beta}{\pi}} = \pi - \frac{\beta}{\pi} - \sqrt{\left(\pi - \frac{\beta}{\pi}\right)^2} = 0 \quad .$$

Finally for $a'(x) > 0$ we have

$$a' = -b' \left[1 + \frac{b}{\sqrt{b(x)^2 - 4\beta}} \right] + 2\frac{\beta}{\pi} = \left(\frac{\pi}{(1-x)^2} - \frac{\beta}{\pi} \right) \left[1 + \frac{b}{\sqrt{b^2 - 4\beta}} \right] + 2\frac{\beta}{\pi} > 0 \quad .$$

We conclude the proof for the $\gamma = 0$ case by showing that $-b > 1 + \beta$ (an assumption in Lemma 2). From equation (A-6) with $\tilde{\gamma} = 0$, simple algebra shows that the inequality

$-b > 1 + \beta$ holds if $\pi > 1$ and $m/c > 1$.

These results extend to the case where $\gamma > 0$. As above, the inequality $0 < \varepsilon$ requires $(1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{m}) \frac{1}{\pi} \leq \varphi_0$. This inequality was shown to hold for $\gamma = 0$. Since φ_0 is increasing in $\tilde{\gamma}$, then it holds *a fortiori* for $\gamma > 0$. The inequality $-b \geq 1 + \beta$ holds, since $-b$ is decreasing in $\tilde{\gamma}$ and $\lim_{\tilde{\gamma} \rightarrow \infty} (-b) = 1 + \beta$.

A.7 Expressions for the linearized Non-Trader problem

Coefficients for the linearization of the Euler equation of the Non-Trader's problem.

$$\begin{aligned}\xi_0 &= \frac{[\bar{\pi}\bar{U}_{11} + \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}}(\bar{U}_{11} + \bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{21} + \bar{U}_{22})]}{\beta[\bar{U}_{11} + \bar{U}_{21}]} \\ \xi_1 &= \frac{\bar{n}}{\beta\bar{\pi}}, \\ \xi_2 &= -\left[\frac{\frac{\beta}{\bar{n}}(\bar{U}_1 + \bar{U}_2) + \frac{\beta}{\bar{\pi}}(\bar{U}_{11} + \bar{U}_{12} + \bar{U}_{21} + \bar{U}_{22})}{[\bar{U}_{11} + \bar{U}_{21}]} \right] \frac{\bar{n}}{\beta\bar{\pi}}.\end{aligned}\tag{A-10}$$

Coefficients for the equilibrium solution of the Non-Trader's problem:

$$\begin{aligned}(\varphi_0 - \xi_0)\varphi_0 + \frac{1}{\beta} &= 0, \\ (\varphi_0 - \xi_0)\varphi_2 &= \xi_1\left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}}\right), \\ (\varphi_0 - \xi_0)\varphi_1 + \varphi_1\Theta + \varphi_2\kappa &= \xi_1\zeta + \xi_2\bar{\Pi}\end{aligned}\tag{A-11}$$

A.8 Proof of Proposition 6.

We try a solution of the form

$$n_t = \varphi_0 \hat{n}_{t-1} + \varphi_1 z_t + \varphi_2 \hat{m}_{t-1}$$

with coefficients φ_0 , φ_1 and φ_2 to be determined. Replacing the hypothesis for inflation and expected inflation the EE:

$$\mathbb{E}_t[\hat{n}_{t+1}] = \xi_0 \hat{n}_t - \frac{1}{\beta} \hat{n}_{t-1} + \xi_1 \left[\left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{m}_{t-1} + \zeta z_t \right] + \xi_2 \bar{\Pi} z_t.$$

Taking expected values on the guess for the solution of the policy:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}_t[\hat{n}_{t+1}] &= \varphi_0 \hat{n}_t + \varphi_1 \mathbb{E}_t[z_{t+1}] + \varphi_2 \hat{m}_t \\ &= \varphi_0 \hat{n}_t + \varphi_1 \Theta z_t + \varphi_2 \kappa z_t\end{aligned}$$

Equating the two terms:

$$\begin{aligned} & \varphi_0 \hat{n}_t + \varphi_1 \Theta z_t + \varphi_2 \kappa z_t \\ = & \xi_0 \hat{n}_t - \frac{1}{\beta} \hat{n}_{t-1} + \xi_1 \left[\left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{m}_{t-1} + \zeta z_t \right] + \xi_2 \bar{\Pi} z_t \end{aligned}$$

rearranging

$$\begin{aligned} & (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) \hat{n}_t + \varphi_1 \Theta z_t + \varphi_2 \kappa z_t \\ = & -\frac{1}{\beta} \hat{n}_{t-1} + \xi_1 \left[\left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{m}_{t-1} + \zeta z_t \right] + \xi_2 \bar{\Pi} z_t \end{aligned}$$

Replacing again the guess for the optimal policy in \hat{n}_t :

$$\begin{aligned} & (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) [\varphi_0 \hat{n}_{t-1} + \varphi_1 z_t + \varphi_2 \hat{m}_{t-1}] + \varphi_1 \Theta z_t + \varphi_2 \kappa z_t \\ = & -\frac{1}{\beta} \hat{n}_{t-1} + \xi_1 \left[\left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{m}_{t-1} + \zeta z_t \right] + \xi_2 \bar{\Pi} z_t \end{aligned}$$

rearranging:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) \varphi_0 \hat{n}_{t-1} + (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) \varphi_1 z_t + (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) \varphi_2 \hat{m}_{t-1} + \varphi_1 \Theta z_t + \varphi_2 \kappa z_t \\ = & -\frac{1}{\beta} \hat{n}_{t-1} + \xi_1 \left[\left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \hat{m}_{t-1} + \zeta z_t \right] + \xi_2 \bar{\Pi} z_t \end{aligned}$$

matching coefficients:

$$\begin{aligned} (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) \varphi_0 + \frac{1}{\beta} &= 0 \\ (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) \varphi_2 &= \xi_1 \left(\frac{\bar{\mu}}{\bar{m}} \right) \\ (\varphi_0 - \xi_0) \varphi_1 + \varphi_1 \Theta + \varphi_2 \kappa &= \xi_1 \zeta + \xi_2 \bar{\Pi} \end{aligned}$$

That $\varphi_0 = g'(\bar{n})$ can be verified immediately by linearizing the f.o.c. of the problem for the non-trader with constant inflation $\bar{\pi}$. Then, using Proposition 4, we then have $0 < \varphi_0 = g'(\bar{n}) < 1$. Q.E.D.

Online Appendices

Persistent Liquidity Effect and Long Run Money Demand

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AA-1 The Non-Trader problem in continuous time

Since in our discrete time analysis, the speed of convergence and the elasticity of m/c depend on the value of a stock/flow, namely the steady state value of m/c , we analyze the continuous time version of the non-trader problem. The continuous time version has two advantages. One is that it deals more naturally with the stock/flow distinction. The other one is that it simplifies some expression, which are key for the impact of money on interest rate shocks.

Consider the problem of a non-trader maximizing

$$\max \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\delta t} U(c(t), m(t)) dt$$

subject to

$$\dot{m}(t) + c(t) = y + \tau - \pi m(t)$$

and $m(0) > 0$ given. Here π is the continuously compounded inflation rate and δ is the discount rate. The steady state of this problem is the same as the discrete time version, given by

$$\frac{U_m(\bar{c}, \bar{m})}{U_c(\bar{c}, \bar{m})} = \delta + \pi \equiv r.$$

In the case where U is given by (12), recall that \bar{c} and \bar{m} are independent of γ and depend only on the properties of h , in particular we obtain $\bar{m}/\bar{c} = (1/\mathcal{A}) r^{-1/(1+\rho)}$. We let $c = \psi(m)$ the optimal decision rule for consumption. From the budget constraint the dynamics of $m(t)$ for values close to the steady state \bar{m} , is governed by $\partial \dot{m}(t)/\partial m = -\pi - \psi'(\bar{m})$. In the next proposition we keep fixed the value of δ , π , and regard γ , ρ and the steady state value of \bar{m}/\bar{c} as parameters. The interpretation is that the value of the parameter \mathcal{A} is changed as a function of ρ and \bar{m}/\bar{c} .

PROPOSITION 8. Assume that $\pi \geq 0$, and that U is given by (12). Keeping the steady state value \bar{m}/\bar{c} fixed, the slope of the optimal consumption function evaluated at steady state is a function of $\gamma/(1+\rho)$ and satisfy

$$\frac{c}{m} \frac{\partial c(m)}{\partial m} \Big|_{m=\bar{m}} \equiv \frac{\bar{m}}{\bar{c}} \psi'(\bar{m}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{for } \gamma/(1+\rho) = 0 \\ < 1 & \text{for } \frac{\gamma}{1+\rho} > 0 \end{cases}$$

and $\frac{\bar{m}}{\bar{c}} \psi'(\bar{m})$ is decreasing in $\frac{\gamma}{1+\rho}$.

As anticipated in the continuous time limit the particular threshold value of $m/c = 1$ plays no role.

Proof of Proposition 8. Using λ for the co-state, the Hamiltonian H is

$$H(c, m) = U(c, m) + \lambda[-m\pi + y + \tau - c]$$

The f.o.c. are:

$$\dot{\lambda} = -\rho\lambda - H_m : \dot{\lambda} = \lambda(\delta + \pi) - U_m(c, m),$$

and

$$H_c = 0 : U_c(c, m) = \lambda.$$

The steady state is then:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{U_m}{U_c}(\bar{c}, \bar{m}) &= \delta + \pi, \\ \pi \bar{m} + \bar{c} &= y + \tau.\end{aligned}$$

From $U_c(c(t), m(t)) = \lambda(t)$ we obtain:

$$\dot{c}U_{cc} + \dot{m}U_{cm} = \dot{\lambda},$$

replacing into the $\dot{\lambda}$ expression:

$$\dot{c}U_{cc}(c, m) + \dot{m}U_{cm}(c, m) = U_c(c, m)(\pi + \delta) - U_m$$

and using the budget constraint for \dot{m} :

$$\dot{c}U_{cc}(c, m) = U_c(c, m)(\pi + \delta) - [y + \tau - m\pi - c]U_{cm}(c, m) - U_m(c, m)$$

Linearizing this ODE around $(\dot{c}, \dot{m}, c, m) = (0, 0, \bar{c}, \bar{m})$ we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{c} &= (\pi + \delta) \frac{U_{cc}}{U_{cc}}(c - \bar{c}) + (\pi + \delta) \frac{U_{cm}}{U_{cc}}(m - \bar{m}) + \frac{U_{cm}}{U_{cc}}(c - \bar{c}) \\ &\quad + \frac{\pi U_{cm}}{U_{cc}}(m - \bar{m}) - \frac{U_{mm}}{U_{cc}}(m - \bar{m}) - \frac{U_{mc}}{U_{cc}}(c - \bar{c})\end{aligned}$$

where all the second derivatives are evaluated at the steady state values. Summarizing we have the linear system:

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{c} &= a(c, m) \equiv [\pi + \delta](c - \bar{c}) + \left[\frac{U_{cm}(2\pi + \delta) - U_{mm}}{U_{cc}} \right] (m - \bar{m}) \\ \dot{m} &= b(c, m) \equiv y + \tau - m\pi - c\end{aligned}$$

We are looking for a solution of the form

$$c = \psi(m) = \bar{c} + \psi'(\bar{m})(m - \bar{m}).$$

We use the method of undetermined coefficients:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \psi(\bar{m})}{\partial m} &\equiv \psi'(\bar{m}) = \frac{dc/dt}{dm/dt} = \frac{a(\psi(\bar{m}), \bar{m})}{b(\psi(\bar{m}), \bar{m})} = \frac{0}{0} \\ &= \frac{(\pi + \delta)\psi'(\bar{m}) + \left[\frac{U_{cm}(2\pi + \delta) - U_{mm}}{U_{cc}} \right]}{-\pi - \psi'(\bar{m})},\end{aligned}$$

where the second line uses L'Hopital. The quadratic equation for ψ' is then

$$-\psi'(\pi + \psi') + (\pi + \delta)\psi' + \left[\frac{U_{cm}(2\pi + \delta) - U_{mm}}{-U_{cc}} \right] = 0.$$

The stable solution is given by

$$\psi' = \frac{-[r + \pi] + \sqrt{[r + \pi]^2 + 4 \frac{U_{cm}(r+\pi) - U_{mm}}{(-U_{cc})}}}{2}.$$

Now we specialize the utility function U to (12).

First we show that if $\gamma = 0$, then $\psi'(\bar{m}) = m/c$. Using that h is a CES we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{h_{22}}{h_{11}} &= \frac{1}{(m/c)^2} \\ h_{12}/h_{11} &= -\frac{1}{m/c} \end{aligned}$$

we have

$$\psi' = \frac{-[r + \pi] + \sqrt{[r + \pi]^2 + 4 \frac{h_{12}(r+\pi) - h_{22}}{-h_{11}}}}{2}$$

so

$$\frac{h_{12}(r + \pi) - h_{22}}{-h_{11}} = \frac{(\pi + r)}{m/c} + \left(\frac{1}{m/c}\right)^2$$

Thus

$$\begin{aligned} & [r + \pi]^2 + 4 \frac{h_{12}(r + \pi) - h_{22}}{-h_{11}} \\ &= [r + \pi]^2 + 2(\pi + r) \left(\frac{2}{m/c}\right) + \left(\frac{2}{m/c}\right)^2 \\ &= \left([r + \pi] + \left(\frac{2}{m/c}\right)\right)^2 \end{aligned}$$

and hence

$$\begin{aligned} \psi' &= \frac{-[r + \pi] + \sqrt{\left([r + \pi] + \left(\frac{2}{m/c}\right)\right)^2}}{2} \\ &= \frac{-[r + \pi] + [r + \pi] + \left(\frac{2}{m/c}\right)}{2} \\ &= \frac{1}{m/c}. \end{aligned}$$

In the case of $\gamma > 0$ we have $U = f(h)$:

$$\begin{aligned} U_{11} &= f'h_{11} + f''h_1h_1 = f' \left\{ h_{11} + \frac{f''}{f'}h_1h_1 \right\} \\ U_{22} &= f' \left\{ h_{22} + \frac{f''}{f'}h_2h_2 \right\} \\ U_{12} &= f'h_{12} + f''h_1h_2 = f' \left\{ h_{12} + \frac{f''}{f'}h_1h_2 \right\} \end{aligned}$$

so

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{U_{22}}{U_{11}} &= \frac{h_{22} + \frac{f''}{f'}h_2h_2}{h_{11} + \frac{f''}{f'}h_1h_1} = \frac{h_{22}/h_{11} + \frac{f''}{f'}h_2h_2/h_{11}}{1 + \frac{f''}{f'}h_1h_1/h_{11}} \\ &= \frac{h_{22}/h_{11} + \gamma r^2 (h_1h_1) / (-hh_{11})}{1 + \gamma (h_1h_1) / (-hh_{11})} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} h_1 &= \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-1} c^{-\rho-1} \\ h_{11} &= (1 + \rho) \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-1} c^{-\rho-2} \left\{ \frac{c^{-\rho}}{\left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]} - 1 \right\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{h_1h_1}{-hh_{11}} &= \frac{\left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-1} c^{-\rho-1} \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-1} c^{-\rho-1}}{(1 + \rho) \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho} \left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]^{-1/\rho-1} c^{-\rho-2} \left\{ \frac{c^{-\rho}}{\left[c^{-\rho} + \frac{1}{\mathcal{A}}m^{-\rho} \right]} - 1 \right\}} \\ &= \frac{1}{(1 + \rho) r (m/c)} \end{aligned}$$

Thus

$$\frac{U_{22}}{U_{11}} = \frac{h_{22}/h_{11} + \gamma r^2 (h_1h_1) / (-hh_{11})}{1 + \gamma (h_1h_1) / (-hh_{11})} = \frac{\left(\frac{1}{m/c} \right)^2 + \frac{\gamma r^2}{(1+\rho)r(m/c)}}{1 + \frac{\gamma}{(1+\rho)r(m/c)}}$$

and

$$\frac{U_{12}}{U_{11}} = \frac{h_{12}/h_{11} + \gamma r (h_1h_1) / (-hh_{11})}{1 + \gamma (h_1h_1) / (-hh_{11})}$$

so

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta(\gamma) &\equiv \frac{U_{cm}(2\pi + \delta) - U_{mm}}{(-U_{cc})} \\
&= \frac{\left(\frac{1}{m/c} - \frac{\gamma}{(1+\rho)(m/c)}\right) [\pi + r] + \left(\frac{1}{m/c}\right)^2 + \frac{\gamma r}{(1+\rho)(m/c)}}{1 + \frac{\gamma}{(1+\rho)r(m/c)}} \\
&= \frac{\frac{1}{m/c} [\pi + r] - \frac{\gamma}{(1+\rho)(m/c)} \pi + \left(\frac{1}{m/c}\right)^2}{1 + \frac{\gamma}{(1+\rho)r(m/c)}} \\
&= \frac{\frac{1}{m/c} [\pi + r] + \left(\frac{1}{m/c}\right)^2}{1 + \frac{\gamma}{1+\rho} \frac{1}{r(m/c)}} - \frac{\frac{\pi}{(m/c)}}{\frac{(1+\rho)}{\gamma} + \frac{1}{r(m/c)}}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus $\Delta(\gamma/(1+\rho))$ is decreasing in γ provided that $\pi > 0$.

Since

$$\psi'(\bar{m}, \gamma) = \frac{-[r + \pi] + \sqrt{[r + \pi]^2 + 4\Delta(\gamma)}}{2}$$

then $\psi'(\gamma)$ is decreasing in γ . *Q.E.D.*

AA-2 Literature Review: interest elasticity, Liquidity Effects and the Price Puzzle

Here we give a brief account of estimates of parameters that quantify two key experiments for the model: the long run interest rate elasticity of the money demand, and the size and persistence of the liquidity effect.

There are many estimates of the interest rate elasticity of money demand. In our model, the parameter $1/(1+\rho)$ correspond to the long run elasticity of the money demand, so we refer to the studies that better much this concept. [Lucas \(2000\)](#) and [Stock and Watson \(1993\)](#) identify this elasticity using the long-run behavior of interest rates and velocity using almost a century of annual data. Lucas preferred estimate is 0.5 for the elasticity of M1 velocity with respect to interest rates, or equivalently a semi-elasticity of velocity with respect to interest rates of 0.8, while Stock and Watson's estimate of the M1 semi-elasticity is 1.0. [Hoffman et al. \(1995\)](#) find long run elasticities similar to the ones estimated by Lucas for five industrialized countries.⁹ There is a widespread view that the short run money demand elasticity is substantially smaller than the long run elasticity, see, for instance, [Goodfriend 1991](#)). [Lucas \(2000\)](#) and [Stock and Watson \(1993\)](#) interpret the lack of stability as evidence that it takes a very long-span on data to have enough low frequency variation to uncover the elasticities.

⁹The difference between the interest rate elasticities around 0.5 found by [Lucas \(2000\)](#) and [Hoffman et al. \(1995\)](#), and the one in [Stock and Watson \(1993\)](#) around 0.1 is due to the treatment of the income elasticity of money demand. In [Lucas \(2000\)](#) and [Hoffman et al. \(1995\)](#) a unitary elasticity is imposed, while in [Stock and Watson \(1993\)](#) income elasticities are estimated.

Papers that incorporate more recent data, such as [Ball \(2001\)](#) and [Ireland \(2009\)](#), find evidence of instability on the long-run money demand using M1, and also evidence of smaller elasticities. [Ireland \(2009\)](#) finds evidence of a downward shift on money demand after 1980. Ireland estimates elasticities of M1 velocity with respect to interest rates of about 0.05 and semi-elasticities about 1.5 using data after 1980. Ireland, as well as others, interpret the shift on money demand as due to financial innovation and deregulation. One approach suggested by this finding is to use a different monetary aggregate constructed to better reflect the changes in regulatory environment, such as MZM, or “money of zero maturity”, or M1S (M1 plus balances “swept”, see [Dutkowsky et al. \(2006\)](#) for details). Studies using MZM, such as [Teles and Zhou \(2005\)](#) and [Carlson et al. \(2000\)](#), find a more stable money demand. [Teles and Zhou \(2005\)](#) report elasticities of the MZM velocity with respect to interest rates of about 0.25, and [Carlson and Keen \(1996\)](#) find a interest rate semi-elasticity of around 4.0 (See table 10).

Summarizing, estimates of long run interest rate elasticities for money demand range between 0.25 and 0.5, depending on the time periods and monetary aggregates. These estimates are based on low frequency, decade to decade, changes on velocity and interest rates.

While the liquidity effect is present in most description of how monetary shocks affect interest rates, innovations on interest rates and monetary growth do not display the negative correlation suggested by the liquidity effect –see, for instance, [Leeper and Gordon \(1992\)](#). The most common interpretation of this feature of the data is that there are lots of changes in the money supply that are accommodating high frequency changes on money demand. Following this interpretation the literature has used a variety of identifying assumptions to isolate the changes in money supply that accommodate high frequency money demand shocks.

There is a large literature on the effect of “monetary policy shocks” using VARs. The estimates in this literature differ according to the assumptions used to identify the monetary policy shock, the time period and the variables included in the VARs. Yet, almost all of the estimates are based on the assumption that there is a liquidity effect. While the focus of this literature is on the effect of monetary shocks on output, the estimated impulse responses can be used to quantify the size of the impact effect, as well as the persistence of interest rates and monetary aggregates after a monetary shock.

Estimates using VARs typically display persistent effects on interest rates of an innovation on monetary policy, or a monetary policy shock. See for instance the survey of [Christiano et al. \(1999\)](#) where the impulse response of interest rates seem to be well described as an AR process, with a half life of about half a year. The VARs also estimate the path of monetary aggregates that will follow a monetary shock. For the purpose of the theory developed in this paper, the persistence of the liquidity effect, as well as its magnitude depends on the persistence of the path of the relevant monetary aggregate that follows a monetary shock. Depending on the assumption on identification of a “monetary shock”, and the choices of monetary aggregate, different behavior of monetary aggregates is found.

For instance, one of the identification schemes used in the literature focuses on the behavior of Non-borrowed reserves (or the ratio of borrowed to non-borrowed reserves), as opposed to a broader monetary aggregate such as M1 or M2. This assumption is meant to reflect the operating procedure of the Fed, which accommodates high frequency shocks to reserves. While this assumption may be a good description of the Fed operating procedures, it is not

part of the theoretical model, which complicates the mapping between the estimated impulse response and the theoretical path described in the models. In the survey by [Christiano et al. \(1999\)](#) they compare different identification schemes, and in particular the behavior of Non-Borrowed reserves and broader monetary aggregates. Indeed the patterns of adjustment seem to differ across monetary aggregates. Non-borrowed reserves, M0, and M1 seem to display “u” shaped patterns after a contractionary shock, while M2 seem to display a persistent decrease.

Another statistic of interest that appears in the literature is the difference between the long and short run elasticities of the money demand. For instance [Christiano et al. \(1999\)](#) compute the short run money demand elasticity, by the ratio of the impact effects on interest rates and money on the impulse response of the estimated VAR. They find that the semi-elasticity of the money demand is smaller than what other estimate based on long run data, say -1.0, to be compared with values between -4.0 and -8.0 discussed above.

Finally, we comment briefly on the behavior of the price level in the model and in the estimated impulse responses. A common specification in the literature is that, by construction, the price level cannot jump contemporaneously with the monetary contraction. The estimated subsequent behavior of the price level after a monetary contraction, depends on the variables included in the system, and to a lesser extent, the period considered. Indeed, the simpler system tend to find an increase in the price level after a contractionary shock, a feature that is called “the price puzzle”, since it is against the hypothesis of nominal rigidities.¹⁰ Specifications where the price puzzle is not observed, which typically consist on including variables such as the price of commodities, display a slow decrease in the price level after a contractionary shock. This pattern is consistent with model with nominal rigidities.

The model in this paper has no rigidities on the price adjustment, so the price level can jump on impact after a monetary shock. The importance of nominal rigidities is not a central topic of this paper, indeed one can consider the same model with sticky prices. In the current version with flexible prices, the reaction of inflation diminishes the strength of the liquidity effect. Recall that in the case of i.i.d. shocks to the growth rate of money μ_t , interest rates decrease after an open market operation because the price level increase proportionally with the amount of money, but traders receive a more than proportional amount. Instead, in a sticky price version of the model, the increase on traders’ real balances will be even higher.

[Christiano et al. \(1999\)](#) use M2 as a monetary aggregate, and in a quarterly model find that after a monetary expansion, interest rates decrease in a persistent fashion. The point estimates indicate that the response of interest rates is a bit more persistent than the response of M2, which can be well approximated by an AR(2) with autocorrelation 0.5 and hence a half-life of 3 months. Their estimates display the “price puzzle”, i.e. inflation has a small protracted initial decrease. The estimates in [Christiano et al. \(2005\)](#) also show similar patterns, where the point estimates of the interest rate impulse response is more persistent than the one for money growth. [Altig et al. \(2005\)](#) estimate the effect of a monetary policy shock, using MZM as a measure of money. The result are roughly similar to those in [Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans \(2001, 2005\)](#) but they also feature velocity. They estimate that the impulse response of velocity and interest rates comoves, as if were generated by a

¹⁰Notice that an alternative explanation of this puzzle is that the shock identify the economy behaves according to the Fisherian fundamentals, i.e. higher interest rates are associated with higher inflation.

money demand with a small interest rate semi-elasticity.

In summary, the literature present plenty of estimates of the liquidity effect after a monetary shock, but the emphasis and interest of the papers is not on measuring monetary aggregates or the relative persistence. As a consequence, future version of this paper will include estimated VARs that are tailored to estimate the relative persistence of interest rates and velocity of monetary aggregates. In particular the monetary aggregates will be chosen to be consistent with the ones that produce stable long run money demands.

AA-3 Estimating a two components for money growth

Here we set up a simple two unobservable components process for money growth. Let $\{\mu_t\}_{t=1,\dots,T}$ be the sample of observed money growth rates, i.e. the log of the consecutive levels of the nominal money stock. We assume that it is the sum of two unobserved, independent processes, each of them of the form:

$$\mu_{i,t+1} - \bar{\mu} = \rho_i (\mu_{i,t} - \bar{\mu}) + \epsilon_{i,t+1}$$

where the innovations $\{\epsilon_{i,t}\}$ are i.i.d., through time and independent of each other, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ_i^2 . We have then $\mu_t = \mu_{1,t} + \mu_{2,t}$ for $t = 1, \dots, T$. We conjecture that the process was in place for a long time before the beginning of our sample, so that we assume that the initial observation was drawn out of the invariant distribution, which is normal with mean μ and variance $\sum_{i=1,2} \sigma_i^2 / (1 - \rho_i^2)$.