

Econ 510a (second half)
Yale University
Fall 2005
Prof. Tony Smith

HOMEWORK #5

This homework assignment is due at the beginning of class on Wednesday, November 30.

1. Consider an exchange economy populated by identical consumers whose preferences exhibit “habit persistence”: a typical consumer’s lifetime utility is given by

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \frac{(c_t - \lambda c_{t-1})^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1-\sigma},$$

where $\sigma > 0$, $\beta \in (0, 1)$, and λ is positive and bounded. Each consumer has the same endowment ω_t in period t . Assume, for simplicity, that ω_t grows deterministically according to: $\omega_{t+1} = g\omega_t$, where $g > 1$. There is a single asset, a one-period riskless bond (i.e., a sure claim to one unit of the consumption good in the next period) whose price is q_t in period t . There is no restriction on borrowing except for a no-Ponzi-game condition. Assume that each consumer has zero bonds in period 0.

- (a) Carefully define a sequential competitive equilibrium for this economy.
 - (b) Formulate the consumer’s optimization problem as a dynamic programming problem under the conjecture that the price $q_t = q$ for all t . (You will verify below that this conjecture is correct in equilibrium.)
 - (c) Derive the Euler equation for the consumer’s problem.
 - (d) Use your answer from part (c) to find the equilibrium bond price in this model as an explicit function of the structural parameters (i.e., β , γ , g , and λ). Explain how changes in these parameters affect the bond price.
2. Consider a two-period exchange economy with identical consumers. Each consumer maximizes $u(c_0) + \beta E[u(c_1)]$, where c_t is consumption in period t . Each consumer is endowed in period 0 with one tree. Each tree yields one unit of the (nonstorable) consumption good in period 0 and a random amount of the consumption good in period 1. In particular, with probability π , each tree yields d_H units of the consumption good in period 1; with probability $1 - \pi$, each tree yields d_L units of the consumption good in period 1, where $d_H > d_L$. (The trees are identical, so they all yield the same number of units of the consumption good—either d_H or d_L —in period 1.) In period 0, consumers trade two assets in competitive markets: trees and riskfree bonds (i.e., sure claims to one unit of the consumption good in period 1).

- (a) Are markets complete in this economy? Explain why or why not.
- (b) Carefully define a competitive equilibrium for this economy. Find the equilibrium consumption allocation and the equilibrium prices of a tree and of the riskfree bond.
- (c) Now suppose that the market for trees is shut down so that consumers can trade only the riskfree bond. (Are markets complete in this case?) Carefully define a competitive equilibrium for this economy and show that the equilibrium consumption allocation and the equilibrium price of a riskfree bond are the same as in part (b). Explain intuitively why this result holds.
3. Consider a two-period exchange economy with two types of consumers of equal measure. Each consumer maximizes $u(c_0^i) + \beta E[u(c_1^i)]$, where c_t^i , $i = 1, 2$, is the consumption of a type- i consumer in period t . In period 0, type- i consumers are endowed with ω_0^i units of the (nonstorable) consumption good. Endowments in period 1 are random: with probability π_j , $j = 1, 2$, a type- i consumer receives ω_{1j}^i units of the consumption good in period 1. In period 0, consumers trade Arrow securities whose payoffs depend on the state of the world in period 1.
- (a) Carefully define a competitive equilibrium for this economy. Are markets complete? Explain why or why not.
- (b) Suppose that $\bar{\omega}_0 = \bar{\omega}_{11} = \bar{\omega}_{12}$, where $\bar{\omega}_0 \equiv \sum_{i=1}^2 \omega_0^i$ and $\bar{\omega}_{1j} \equiv \sum_{i=1}^2 \omega_{1j}^i$. Prove an aggregation theorem for this economy: that is, show that redistributions of the period-0 endowments do not affect the equilibrium prices of the Arrow securities. (Note that a redistribution leaves the aggregate endowment unchanged.) In addition, characterize the equilibrium consumption allocation as much as possible.
- (c) Now suppose that $\bar{\omega}_0 \neq \bar{\omega}_{11} \neq \bar{\omega}_{12}$. Prove an aggregation theorem for this economy under the assumption that u has a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to σ^{-1} . In addition, characterize the equilibrium consumption allocation as much as possible.
- (d) Now suppose that in period 0 consumers cannot trade Arrow securities but instead can trade only a riskfree bond (i.e., a sure claim to one unit of the consumption good in period 1). Carefully define a competitive equilibrium for this economy.
- (e) For the economy in part (d), set $\omega_0^1 = \omega_0^2$, $\omega_{11}^1 = \omega_{12}^2$, $\omega_{12}^1 = \omega_{11}^2$, and $\pi_1 = \pi_2 = 1/2$, but do not assume a functional form for u . Find the equilibrium consumption allocation and the equilibrium bond price. How does the bond price compare to the one in part (c)? Explain.