Economics 521b
Advanced Microeconomic Theory:
Selected Topics

Spring 2008
10:30-11:50 T TH, 28 Hillhouse, Room 106

Part 1:  Information Economics and Repeated Games

Dino Gerardi
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #22A
432-6519
Email
Office hours 3:00-5:00  F

Part 2:  Information, Types and Dynamic Mechanism Design

Dirk Bergemann
30 Hillhouse Avenue, #24
432-3592
Email
Office hours 2:00-4:00 T

Topic:  This course covers selected topics in the economics of information and uncertainty.

Course Requirements:  This course has three basic requirements. They are: (i) reading the assigned papers before the presentation in class, (ii) solving the problem sets, (iii) and a term paper. The assignments will be given biweekly. Class participation, assignments, and the term paper will jointly determine the final grade.

Readings: The current reading list will be completed as the class proceeds.

Outline — Part I

  1. Mechanism Design
    1. Implementation via dominant strategies and Bayesian Nash equilibrium
    2. The revelation principle
    3. Implementation of efficient outcomes
  2. Auction Theory
    1. First and second price auctions
    2. Design of optimal auctions
  3. Bilateral Trading
    1. Two person double auctions
    2. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
  4. Implementation Theory: Unique implementation in Nash and subgame perfect equilibria
  5. Moral Hazard: The principal-agent model with moral hazard
  6. Games with Communication: Correlated and communication equilibria
  7. Repeated Games with Perfect and Imperfect Public Monitoring
    1. The one-shot deviation principle
    2. Decomposability and self-generation
    3. Folk theorems.
  8. Repeated Games with Private Monitoring (Johannes Hörner — 2 lectures)

Outline — Part II

   The following lecture notes cover the material presented in the lectures.