Modern Mechanism Design:

Dynamics and Robustness

May  2010,    DIW

Dirk Bergemann
Department of Economics
Yale University


Topic:  This mini-course covers selected topics in auction theory and mechanism design. The aim of this course is to provide the students with the necessary tools to analyze dynamic incentive problems and evaluate the robustness of the mechanisms to private, and importantly to strategic information. The topics below will be addressed in some detail. The lectures will be supported by slides which will be posted prior to the course. The lectures will be based on the papers/publications in the following bibliography.

1. Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency

2. Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization

  • Courty, P., and H. Li (2000): “Sequential Screening,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 697-–717.

3. Robust Mechanism Design

4. Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games


Syllabus: The complete syllabus.


Schedule for Part II

Monday, December 14:
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Efficiency:

 The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism Econometrica, forthcoming

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism: Slides

A recent, useful and easy to read survey for application in macroeconomics and public economics.

Problem Set 1

Problem Set 1 Solution



 Tuesday, December 15:
Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue:

Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relationship” is a two-period generalization of the earlier and seminal paper “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost

Sequential Screening

Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers

Dynamic Mechanism Design  Dynamic Mechanism Design: Slides

Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction


Problem Set 2

Problem Set 2 Solution


Wednesday, December 16:
Robust Mechanism Design

Robust Mechanism Design

The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design

Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Lecture Slides

Problem Set 3

Problem Set 3 Solution

Thursday, December 17:
Incomplete Information and Robustness: Equilibrium Concepts

Robust  Implementation:

·         Jackson (2001)  

Problem Set 4

Problem Set 4 Solution


Friday, December 18:
Robust Predictions in Incomplete Information Games