Publications

Uniform Topologies on Types, with Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio and Siyang Xiong, Theoretical Economics, 5, 445-478 (2010).

Reputation in Continuous-Time Games, with Yuliy Sannikov, Econometrica, 79(3), 773-876 (2011). (Supplemental appendix.) Peer review at NAJ Economics.

Papers under review

The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs, with Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio and Siyang Xiong, conditionally accepted by The Review of Economic Studies. (Supplemental Appendix.)

Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games, revision requested by Econometrica.

Ongoing work

“The Value of a Reputation under Imperfect Monitoring,” with Martin W. Cripps

“Filtering and Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring,” with Jonathan Hauenstein, Johannes Hörner and Yuliy Sannikov, abstract.

“Real Options, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability” with Suvi Vasama.

“Bad Reputation and Limited Memory” with Yoshifumi Hino and Yasusyuki Miyahara.

“Maintaining a Reputation in Continuous Time,” abstract.

“The Flow of Information in Repeated Games with Frequent Interactions,” abstract.

“Bargaining and Learning: the Role of Commitment,” with Qingmin Liu and Xianwen Shi, abstract.

Early Papers Incorporated in Later Work

Building a Reputation under Frequent Decisions, incorporated in “Reputation and the Flow of Information” and “Maintaining a Reputation in Continuous Time.”

Genericity of Critical Types, with Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio and Siyang Xiong, incorporated in “The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs.”

How Common are Common-Prior Types?, with Yi-Chun Chen, Alfredo Di Tillio and Siyang Xiong, incorporated in “The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs.”