Nonparametric Identification of Differentiated
Products Demand Using Micro Data*

Steven T. Berry  Philip A. Haile
Yale University  Yale University

August 6, 2020

Abstract
A recent literature considers the identification of heterogeneous demand and supply models via “quasi-experimental” variation, as from instrumental variables. In this paper we establish nonparametric identification of differentiated products demand when one has “micro data” linking characteristics of individual consumers to their choices. Micro data provide a panel structure allowing one to exploit variation across consumers within each market, where latent demand shocks are fixed. This facilitates richer demand specifications while substantially softening the reliance on instrumental variables, reducing both the number and types of instruments required. Our results require neither the structure of a “special regressor” nor a “full support” assumption on consumer-level observables.

*Early versions of this work were presented in the working paper “Nonparametric Identification of Multinomial Choice Demand Models with Heterogeneous Consumers,” first circulated in 2007 and superseded by the present paper. We thank Suk Joon Son and numerous seminar participants for helpful comments. Jaewon Lee provided capable research assistance.
1 Introduction

Empirical models of differentiated products demand are an important part of the applied econometrics toolkit, underlying influential empirical work in many fields of economics. Indeed, quantifying counterfactual demand responses is essential for answering positive and normative questions in almost any market setting, and most markets involve differentiated products. Although practical considerations typically dictate reliance on parsimonious functional forms for estimation of demand, an important question concerns the nonparametric foundation for demand estimation. Researchers focused on program evaluation have declared a “credibility revolution,” as in Angrist and Pischke (2010), reflecting redoubled attention to identification obtained through quasi-experimental variation such as that arising from instrumental variables, geographic boundaries, or repeated observations within a single economic unit.

A critical question is whether these same types of variation identify counterfactuals in the more complex but ubiquitous context of market demand and supply with richly heterogeneous consumers and firms.

The answer turns out to be yes. In Berry and Haile (2014), we demonstrated identification of demand and supply in the case of “market level” data. In this paper we consider the identification of nonparametric differentiated products demand models, focusing on the case in which one has access to “micro data” matching attributes of individual consumers to their purchase decisions. We show that the availability of micro data not only allows a more richly specified model, but also can substantially relax the both the number and types of instrumental variables relied upon for identification.

Many empirical applications offer micro data. A classic example is McFadden’s study of transportation demand (McFadden, Talvitie and Associates (1977)), where each consumer’s preferences over different modes of transport are affected by the distance from her location to each mode. This example illustrates the defining characteristic of the type of micro data considered here: consumer-specific observables that alter the relative attractiveness of different options. Consumers’ distances to different options have been used in a number of other applications as well, including those involving demand for hospitals, retail outlets, residential locations, or schools, as in the examples of Capps, Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003), Burda, Harding and Hausman (2015), Bayer, Keohane and Timmins (2009), and Neilson (2019). More broadly, observable consumer-level attributes that shift tastes for products might include a household’s income or other sociodemographic measures. For example, income and family size have been modeled as shifting preferences for cars (Goldberg (1995), Petrin (2002)); race, education, and birth state have been modeled as shifting preferences for residential location (Diamond (2016)).
Other examples of consumer-level observables include product-specific advertising exposure (Ackerberg (2003)), consumer-newspaper ideological match (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)), the match between household demographics and those of a school or neighborhood (Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007), Hom (2018)), and the match between voter demographics and candidate characteristics (Kawai, Toyama and Watanabe (2020)).

It is unsurprising that micro data can allow richer empirical specifications of demand. Our main insight, however, is that such data can also substantially reduce the reliance on instrumental variables for identification. A fundamental challenge to identification of demand arises from the elementary observation that the quantity demanded of any one good depends on all characteristics of that good and all related goods (complements or substitutes). Such characteristics include not only prices and other observables, but also unobserved characteristics (more generally, the latent “demand shocks”) associated with all goods in the market. Likewise, the equilibrium price of each good typically depends on the observed characteristics and demand shocks associated with all related goods. Thus, in a market with $J$ goods, prices and quantities are determined in system of $2J$ fully simultaneous equations. Absent strong functional form restrictions, identification cannot be obtained in such systems using strategies (e.g., control functions) familiar from triangular models. However, Berry and Haile (2014) showed that nonparametric identification of demand can be established under standard instrumental variables (IV) conditions, given instruments for all prices and quantities. The need to instrument for quantities—indeed, to contemplate a system of equations for both supply and demand to identify demand alone—may be surprising. But this need is tightly connected to identification results for other simultaneous models, and is easily recognized in the IV requirements of parametric demand models used in practice. Intuitively, to measure any own- or cross-price elasticity one must isolate the (counterfactual) change in quantity demanded that results from shifting one price while holding fixed $J-1$ other prices and $J$ latent demand shocks; $2J$ excluded instruments can provide the independent variation needed to isolate this response. One important finding in Berry and Haile (2014) is

---

1Here we cite only a small representative handful of papers out of a selection that spans many topics and many years. See also the examples in section 3.

2We emphasize prices as the leading case of endogenous product characteristics. Our results generalize directly to cases with additional endogenous product characteristics, although additional instruments will be required.

3See Blundell and Matzkin (2014) and the discussion in Blundell, Kristensen and Matzkin (2013, 2014), Matzkin (2015), and Berry and Haile (2016, 2018).

4See, e.g., Matzkin (2015) and Berry and Haile (2014, 2018), and the discussion of nested- and mixed-logit models in Berry (1994) and Berry and Haile (2016).
the essential role of competing goods’ exogenous characteristics—sometimes called “BLP instruments”—in providing instruments for quantities.

In this paper, we develop conditions under which the availability of micro data cuts the number of required instruments in half. In particular, variation in micro data can eliminate the need to instrument for quantities and, therefore, the necessary reliance on BLP instruments. The use of micro data also makes it possible to specify a more flexible demand model and can make new kinds of instruments available. The reduction in IV requirements is obtained because micro data provide a form of observable variation in the choice problems faced by different consumers in the same market. This creates a panel structure, where one can exploit both within-market and between-market variation. Critically, within a single market the latent market-level demand shocks are fixed; thus, the observed responses to variation in choice problems within a given market cannot be confounded by variation in these shocks. Of course, prices are also typically fixed within a market. But “clean” within-market variation can make it possible to pin down the latent demand shocks by instrumenting only for prices in the cross-section of markets. Once the latent demand shocks are known, identification of demand becomes trivial.

Our model of demand is nonparametric and, although we focus on discrete choice, our results generalize to continuous demand systems with representations satisfying the “connected substitutes” condition of Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2013) or other conditions ensuring “invertibility” of demand. We allow all consumer attributes to shift preferences for all products, avoiding any \textit{a priori} exclusivity assumptions on these observables.\footnote{This contrasts with the frequent reliance on exclusion restrictions in the nonparametric simultaneous equations literature, as in Matzkin (2015) and Berry and Haile (2018).} However, in addition to standard IV conditions, our results rely on three important assumptions. First, we require a nonparametric index restriction—formally a weak separability assumption—on the way the market-level demand shocks and some observed consumer attributes enter the model.\footnote{Despite some superficial similarity, both the form and role of this index restriction differ from those in our earlier work (Berry and Haile (2014, 2018)). In each case the index restriction helps to deal with the issue of a large vector of unobservables that nonlinearly affect the demand for each product. But the indices in this paper are tied to consumer attributes rather than product characteristics, and this index structure is employed in a different way to obtain identification.} Second, we require injectivity of the mappings that link observed consumer attributes to choice probabilities.

Finally, we require sufficient variation in the consumer observables to satisfy a “common choice probability” condition that we believe is new to the literature. Given a set of available products, this condition requires that there be some point $s^*$ in the probability simplex such that in every market one can...
obtain \( s^* \) as the conditional choice probability vector by conditioning on the “right” set of consumer observables for that market. Implicit in this condition is a requirement that the number of observed consumer attributes be at least as large as the number of products. However, our assumption contrasts with a standard “full support” condition, which would imply that every every point \( s \) within the simplex is a common choice probability. Our condition allows for a broad range of cases where choice probabilities are never close to one or zero. It is also verifiable.

Our insights build on strategies used in the parametric applied literature by, e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004) and Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007), who pointed out the potential for certain types of panel data to pin down “substitution patterns” without instruments beyond those for prices. We also connect to a substantial econometrics literature on the use of micro data to identify discrete choice models. Indeed, the traditional individual-level discrete choice literature exploits micro data almost by definition. However, our approach generalizes earlier work in several directions. As in the large empirical literature building on Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), we emphasize the role of latent market-level demand shocks that result in the econometric endogeneity of prices. Fully accounting for the effects of these shocks is essential to the identification of policy-relevant demand elasticities. This drives our focus on market-level endogeneity, which differentiates our work from much of the classic work on identification of discrete choice models. In addition, many existing nonparametric and semiparametric identification results for discrete choice models require an observable attribute for each choice with at least some features of a “special regressor.” Such variables are typically specified as entering conditional indirect utilities linearly, with each such attribute restricted to affect the utility of only one choice. These functional form and exclusion restrictions are then typically combined with a “full support” assumption. We relax the functional form restrictions of this approach, avoid the full support assumption, and drop the exclusion restrictions.

Although we focus on demand for differentiated products, our results also apply to other choice settings. One example is a discrete choice model of voting in a two-party election (e.g., Gordon and Hartmann (2013)) applied to data matching individual votes to voter demographics, along with data on candidate characteristics and market-level (e.g., metro area level) variation in campaign advertising. Here, market-level unobservables capture the effects of unmeasured candidate characteristics and local political preferences. Although there are no prices, advertising plays the role of the endogenous choice char-

\[ \text{\cite{Lewbel(2014)}} \]

\[ \text{\cite{Berry and Haile(2010)}} \]
acteristic. Observed demographic characteristics, say education and income, create variation in voter preferences for the two candidates within a given market. If we treat the discrete choices as $D$, $R$ and “Not Voting,” our common choice probability condition requires existence of a vote share (choice probability) vector—say 0.4 for $D$ and 0.4 for $R$—such that in each market there is a combination of education and income that generates that conditional vote share. The level of education required to match the given vote share might be higher (and income lower) in a conservative as opposed to a liberal area. Note that there is no exclusion restriction here: a voter’s utility from voting for a given candidate can be affected by both of her demographic measures.

Throughout the paper, we maintain an exclusive focus on identification. Nonparametric identification results do not eliminate concerns about the impact of parametric assumptions relied on in practice. But they address the important question of whether such assumptions can be viewed properly as finite-sample approximations rather than essential maintained hypotheses. Formal identification results can also clarify which maintained assumptions may be most difficult to relax, can reveal the essential sources of exogenous variation in the data, can offer assurance that robustness analysis is possible, and can lead to new (parametric or nonparametric) estimation approaches.

In what follows, section 2 sets up the model we consider. Section 3 connects the model to parametric examples from the empirical literature. Section 4 then establishes identification in two steps, reflecting the panel structure of the micro data setting. We first demonstrate identification of the index function using within-market variation in consumer attributes and consumer choice probabilities. Intuitively, up to normalizations, the variation in within-market behavior reveals the effects of consumer attributes on choices. It also reveals the vector of consumer characteristics for each market that generates the common choice probability. Plugging this vector into the index function, we obtain for each product and market an index that is a nonparametric function of observable product characteristics (including prices) and a single additively separable demand shock. These nonparametric functions are then identified following standard results for nonparametric IV regression, with prices as the only endogenous variables. Identification of these functions reveals the values of the demand shocks, and identification of demand follows directly. We conclude in section 5 with a discussion implications and extensions, including the case of continuous demand.

---

8 See, e.g., Gerber (1998) and Gordon and Hartmann (2013). Instruments from the literature include candidate wealth, market-specific measures of advertising cost, and combinations of statewide characteristic and features of the electoral college system.

9 We also focus exclusively on demand. With demand identified, identification (and falsifiability) of standard models of supply follows results in Berry and Haile (2014).
2 Multinomial Choice Model

2.1 Setup

We consider multinomial choice among $J$ goods (or “products”) and an outside option (“good 0”) by consumers $i$ in “markets” $t$. A market is defined formally by:

- a set $X_t$ of exogenous observables common to all consumers;\(^{11}\)
- a price vector (or other endogenous characteristics common to all consumers), $P_t = (P_{1t}, \ldots, P_{Jt})$;
- a vector $\Xi_t = (\Xi_{1t}, \ldots, \Xi_{Jt})$ of unobservables common to all consumers;\(^{12}\)
- a distribution $F_{YZ}(\cdot; t)$ of consumer observables $(Y_{it}, Z_{it}) \in \mathbb{R}^H \times \mathbb{R}^J$, $H \geq 0$, with support $\Omega (X_t)$;

Although $X_t$ will typically include observable product characteristics, it may also include any number of factors defining markets. For example, the population of consumers may be partitioned into “markets” based on a combination of geography, time, product availability, and average demographics included in $X_t$. In contrast, observables varying across consumers within a market are represented by $Y_{it}$ and $Z_{it}$. We make a distinction between $Y_{it}$ and $Z_{it}$ in order to isolate our requirements on consumer-level data. Key conditions, made precise below, are that consumer observables have dimension of at least $J$ (hence, $Z_{it} \in \mathbb{R}^J$) and that changes in $Z_{it}$ alter the relative attractiveness of different goods. We do not require the additional consumer observables $Y_{it}$; however, we can accommodate them in an unrestricted way, and conditioning on an appropriate value of $Y_{it}$ can weaken some assumptions. Although our requirements on $Z_{it}$ will permit the case in which each of its components $Z_{ijt}$

---

\(^{10}\)More generally, the definition of a market could also include the number of goods available, $J_t$. We condition on a fixed number of products $J$ without loss.

\(^{11}\)Although we describe $X_t$ as exogenous and this is the standard assumption in the literature, we will not formally require this. The assumptions and results below are stated conditional on $X_t$, and identification of demand conditional on $X_t$ suffices for many purposes (e.g., identification of own- and cross-price elasticities) regardless of any dependence between $X_t$ and $\Xi_t$. We caution, however, that excluded variables that are valid instruments conditional on exogenous variables are often not valid conditional on endogenous variables. And identification of counterfactual quantities involving changes in $X_t$ would typically require either exogeneity of $X_t$ or additional instruments.

\(^{12}\)For clarity we write random variables in uppercase and their realizations lowercase. Note that $\Xi$ is the uppercase form of the standard notation $\xi$ for product $\times$ market unobservables.
is a consumer-specific factor assumed to alter only the attractiveness of good \( j \), we will not require this. Nor do we require independence (full, conditional, or mean independence) between \((Y_{it}, Z_{it})\) and the demand shocks \( \Xi_t \).

The choice environment of consumer \( i \) in market \( t \) is then represented by

\[
C_{it} = (Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, P_t, \Xi_t).
\]

Let \( C \) denote the support of \( C_{it} \). The most basic primitive characterizing consumer behavior in this setting is a distribution of decision rules for each \( c_{it} \in C \). As usual, heterogeneity in decision rules (i.e., nondegeneracy of the distribution) within a given choice environment may reflect latent preference heterogeneity, stochastic elements of individual preferences, or stochastic elements of choice (e.g., optimization error).

The choice made by consumer \( i \) is represented by \( Q_{it} = (Q_{i1t}, \ldots, Q_{iJt}) \), where \( Q_{ijt} \) denotes the quantity (here, 0 or 1) of good \( j \) purchased. A distribution of decision rules is characterized by the conditional cumulative distribution functions \( F_{Q}(q|C_{it}) = E[1\{Q_{it} \leq q\}|C_{it}] \). In the case of discrete choice, this joint distribution can be represented without loss by the structural choice probability functions

\[
\sigma(C_{it}) = (\sigma_1(C_{it}), \ldots, \sigma_J(C_{it})) = E[Q_{it}|C_{it}].
\]

Given the total measure of consumers in each choice environment, the mapping \( \sigma \) fully characterizes consumer demand. Thus, our goal is to demonstrate identification of \( \sigma \) on \( C \).

So far we have implicitly made two significant assumptions: (i) unobservables at the market level can be represented by a \( J \)-vector \( \Xi_t \); (ii) conditional on \( X_t \), the support of \((Y_{it}, Z_{it})\) is the same in all markets. The first is standard but important. The second seems mild for many applications and can be relaxed at the cost of more cumbersome exposition. Our results will also rely on the following key structure.

---

13 As is well known, under additional conditions a distribution of decision rules can be represented as the result of utility maximization. See, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Block and Marschak (1960), Falmagne (1978), and McFadden (2005). We do not require such conditions and will not consider a utility-based representation of choice behavior. A related issue is identification of welfare effects. Standard results allow construction of valid measures of aggregate welfare changes from a known demand system in the absence of income effects. Bhattacharya (2018) provides results on identification of welfare effects for counterfactuals of interest from the distribution of decision rules for discrete choice settings when income effects are present. Bhattacharya (2018) suggests the use of control function methods for identification/estimation of demand. As noted in the introduction, such methods are valid only under strong functional form restrictions, which are violated even in standard parametric specifications.

14 For example, a sufficient condition for what follows is that conditional on \( X_t \) there exist
Assumption 1 (Index). \( \sigma(C_{it}) = \sigma(\gamma(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, \Xi_t), Y_{it}, X_t, P_t) \), with \( \gamma(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, \Xi_t) \in \mathbb{R}^J \).

Assumption 2 (Invertible Demand). \( \sigma(\cdot, Y_{it}, X_t, P_t) \) is injective on the support of \( \gamma(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, \Xi_t)|(Y_{it}, X_t, P_t) \).

Assumption 3 (Injective Index). \( \gamma(\cdot, Y_{it}, X_t, \Xi_t) \) is injective on the support of \( Z_{it}|(Y_{it}, X_t) \).

Assumption 1 requires that, given \( (Y_{it}, X_t, P_t) \), \( Z_{it} \) and \( \Xi_t \) affect choices only through indices \( \gamma_1(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, \Xi_t), \ldots, \gamma_J(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, \Xi_t) \) that exclude \( P_t \). This is a type of weak separability assumption. Observe that \( X_t \) and \( Y_{it} \) can affect demand both directly (in fully flexible form) and through the indices. As we illustrate below, this index structure generalizes standard specifications used in practice. Assumption 2 further requires that the choice probability function be “invertible” with respect to the index vector—that, holding \( (X_t, P_t) \) fixed, distinct index vectors map to distinct choice probabilities. This is not without loss, and in general injectivity requires that \( \sigma \) map to interior values, i.e., that \( \sigma_j(C_{it}) > 0 \) for all \( j \). Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2013) provide sufficient conditions for invertibility and point out that these are natural in discrete choice settings when each \( \gamma_j(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, \Xi_t) \) can be interpreted as a (here, consumer-specific) quality index for good \( j \). Assumption 3 requires injectivity of the index function \( \gamma \) with respect to the vector \( Z_{it} \). This generalizes common utility-based specifications in which each \( Z_{ijt} \) is assumed to affect only the conditional indirect utility of good \( j \) and to do so monotonically. For example, if each index were a linear function of the \( J \) components of \( Z_{it} \), Assumption 3 would require the matrix of coefficients to be full rank.

We henceforth condition on an arbitrary value of \( X_t \) and suppress it in the notation. The remaining assumptions and results should be interpreted to hold conditional on \( X_t \). As usual, this treats \( X_t \) fully flexibly, implicitly applying the same identification argument at every value of \( X_t \). We let \( \mathcal{Y} \) then denote the support of \( Y_{it} \) and \( Z(y) \) the support of \( Z_{it}|\{Y_{it} = y\} \). We also focus on the case in which the indices \( \gamma_j(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, \Xi_t) \) are additively separable in \( \Xi_t \) (Assumption 4). In Assumption 5 we assume sufficient smoothness (as well as openness of \( Z(y) \)) to permit our applications of calculus below.\(^{15}\)

---

\(^{15}\) Although we state Assumption 5 with the quantifier “for all \( y \in \mathcal{Y} \),” we require only that these properties hold at the arbitrary point \( y^0 \) selected below. Observe that, given parts (i) and (ii) of Assumption 5, the injectivity of \( g \) required by Assumption 3 implies (by invariance of domain) that the image \( g(\mathcal{O}, y) \) of any open set \( \mathcal{O} \subseteq Z(y) \) is open.
Assumption 5 also strengthens the injectivity requirements of Assumptions 2 and 3 by requiring that the Jacobian matrices $\partial g(z,y)/\partial z$ and $\partial \sigma(\gamma,y,p)/\partial \gamma$ be nonsingular almost surely.\footnote{Even without part (iv) there could be no non-empty open set $O \in \mathcal{Z}(y)$ on which $\partial g(z,y)/\partial z$ was singular, as (see footnote 15) $g(O,y)$ would then be a nonempty open subset of $\mathbb{R}^J$, contradicting Sard’s theorem. A similar observation applies to $\partial \sigma(\gamma,y,p)/\partial \gamma$. Thus, part (iv) rules out injective continuously differentiable functions $g(\cdot,y)$ or $\sigma(\cdot,y,p)$ with (uncountably many) critical points forming a set $\chi$ containing no non-empty open subset of $\mathbb{R}^J$ but having positive measure nonetheless—e.g., for $J = 1$, a fat Cantor set.}

**Assumption 4** (Separable Index). $\gamma_j(Z_{it},Y_{it},\Xi_{it}) = g_j(Z_{it},Y_{it}) + \Xi_{jt}$ for all $j$.

**Assumption 5** (Regularity). For all $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, (i) $\mathcal{Z}(y)$ is open and connected; (ii) $g(z,y)$ is continuously differentiable with respect to $z$ on $\mathcal{Z}(y)$; (iii) $\sigma(\gamma,y,p)$ is continuously differentiable with respect to $\gamma$ for all $(\gamma,p) \in \text{supp} (\gamma(Z_{it},Y_{it},\Xi_{it}),P_t)|\{Y_{it} = y\}$; and (iv) $\partial g(z,y)/\partial z$ and $\partial \sigma(\gamma,y,p)/\partial \gamma$ are nonsingular almost surely on $\mathcal{Z}(y)$ and $\text{supp}(\gamma(Z_{it},Y_{it},\Xi_{it}),P_t)|\{Y_{it} = y\}$, respectively.

### 2.2 Normalization

The model requires two types of normalizations for the identification question to be properly posed.\footnote{We emphasize that, like the choice of location and scale for utility functions, our normalizations place no restriction on demand.} The first requirement reflects the fact that the unobservables have no natural location; therefore, adding a constant vector to $\Xi_t$ and subtracting the same vector from $g$ yields the same distribution of consumer choice at every $(z_{it},y_{it},\xi_t,p_t)$. Thus, we take an arbitrary point $(y^0,z^0) \in \Omega$ and set

$$g(z^0,y^0) = 0, \quad (1)$$

where the right-hand side is the zero $J$-vector.

The second normalization requirement arises from the fact that any injective transformation of the index vector $\gamma(Z_{it},Y_{it},\Xi_{it})$ can be reversed by a modification of the function $\sigma$. For example, let $A$ be any $J$-vector of constants, let $B$ be any nonsingular $J \times J$ matrix, and define

$$\tilde{\gamma}(Z_{it},Y_{it},\Xi_{it}) = A + B\gamma(Z_{it},Y_{it},\Xi_{it}). \quad (2)$$

If we then define $\tilde{\sigma}$ by

$$\tilde{\sigma}(\tilde{\gamma},P_t) = \sigma(B^{-1}(\tilde{\gamma} - A),P_t), \quad (3)$$
then \((\sigma, \gamma)\) and \((\tilde{\sigma}, \tilde{\gamma})\) are two representations of the same distribution of decision rules, the latter satisfying our assumptions whenever the former does.\(^{18}\) We must choose a single representation before exploring whether the observables allow identification. We do this by taking the representation in which the index \(\gamma(z^0, y^0, \Xi_t) = g(z^0, y^0) + \Xi_t\) has expectation zero, i.e.,

\[
E[\Xi_t] = 0,
\]

and is such that

\[
\left[ \frac{\partial g(z^0, y^0)}{\partial z} \right] = I. \tag{4}
\]

For example, this representation is obtained from (2) and (3) by letting

\[
B = \left[ \frac{\partial g(z^0, y^0)}{\partial z} \right]^{-1},
\]

\[
A = -B E[\Xi_t],
\]

and then dropping the tildes from the notation for the transformed model. Note that this normalization does not specify the value of \(\frac{\partial g(z, y)}{\partial z}\) at any point other than \((z^0, y^0)\).

### 3 Parametric Examples from the Literature

The empirical literature in economics includes many examples of parametric specifications that are special cases of our model. Discrete choice demand models are frequently formulated using a random utility specification of the form

\[
u_{ijt} = x_{jt} \beta_{it} - \alpha_{it} p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijt}, \tag{5}\]

where \(u_{ijt}\) represents individual \(i\)'s conditional indirect utility from choice \(j\) in market \(t\). As in our model, \(x_{jt}, p_{jt}\) and \(\xi_{jt}\) are, respectively, observed product/market characteristics, prices, and latent demand shocks such as unobserved product characteristics.

The additive \(\epsilon_{ijt}\) is typically specified as a draw from a type-1 extreme value distribution or a normal distribution, yielding a mixed multinomial logit

---

\(^{18}\)This illustrates an inherent ambiguity in the interpretation of how variation in a given variable alters preferences. For example, in terms of consumer behavior, there is no difference between a change in \(Z_{ijt}\) (all else fixed) that makes good \(j\) more desirable and a change in \(Z_{ijt}\) that makes all other goods (including the outside good) less desirable. In practice, this ambiguity is often resolved with \textit{a priori} exclusion assumptions—e.g., an assumption that \(Z_{ijt}\) affects only the utility obtained from good \(j\) (globally). Some of the examples discussed below utilize this additional structure. Such assumptions could only aid identification, and our choice of normalization remains valid under these restrictions.
or probit model. Components $k$ of the random coefficient vector $\beta_{it}$ are often specified as

$$\beta_{it}^{(k)} = \beta_0^{(k)} + \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} \beta_z^{(k,\ell)} z_{it\ell} + \beta_\nu^{(k)} \nu_{it}^{(k)},$$

where each $z_{it\ell}$ represents an observable characteristic of individual $i$, and each $\nu_{it}^{(k)}$ is a random variable with a pre-specified distribution. Often, the coefficient on price is also specified as varying with some observed consumer characteristics $y_{it}$, such as income. A typical specification of $\alpha_{it}$ takes the form

$$\ln(\alpha_{it}) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_y y_{it} + \alpha_\nu \nu_{it}^{(0)}.$$

We can then rewrite (5) as

$$u_{ijt} = g_j (z_{it}, x_t) + \xi_{jt} + \mu_{ijt}, \quad (6)$$

where

$$g_j (z_{it}, x_t) = \sum_k x_{jt}^{(k)} \sum_{\ell=1}^{L} \beta_z^{(k,\ell)} z_{it\ell}$$

and

$$\mu_{ijt} = \sum_k x_{jt}^{(k)} \left( \beta_0^{(k)} + \beta_\nu^{(k)} \nu_{it}^{(k)} \right) - p_{jt} \exp(\alpha_0 + \alpha_y y_{it} + \alpha_\nu \nu_{it}^{(0)}) + \epsilon_{ijt}. \quad (7)$$

Fixing $x_t$ now (and dropping it from the notation), observe that all effects of $z_{it}$ and $\xi_{it}$ operate through indices

$$\gamma_j (z_{it}, \xi_{it}) = g_j (z_{it}) + \xi_{jt} \quad j = 1, \ldots, J,$$

satisfying our Assumptions 1 and 4. It is easy to show that the resulting choice probabilities satisfy Berry, Gandhi and Haile’s (2013) “connected substitutes” condition with respect to the vector of indices $(\gamma_1 (z_{it}, \xi_{it}), \ldots, \gamma_J (z_{it}, \xi_{it}))$; therefore, the injectivity of demand required by Assumption 2 holds. Our assumptions require $L \geq J$.\textsuperscript{19} Injectivity of $g(z_{it}) = (g_1(z_{it}), \ldots, g_J(z_{it}))$ (Assumption 3) might be assumed as a primitive condition of the model or else derived from other conditions, as in the example we discuss below.

Of course, our model does not rely on the linear structure of this example, nor on any parametric distributional assumptions. But this example connects our model to a large number of applications and shows one way that

\textsuperscript{19}If $L > J$, we can combine the “extra” components of $Z_{it}$ with income to redefine the partition of consumer observables as $(Y_{it}, Z_{it})$ with $Z_{it} \in \mathbb{R}^J$. More generally, income and any extra components of $Z_{it}$ may affect both the index (reintroducing $Y_{it}$ as an argument of $g$) and the coefficients on $(X_t, P_t)$. 

11
the individual-level observables $z_{ijt}$ can interact with product characteristics to generate preference heterogeneity across consumers facing the same choice set (i.e., where all $x_{jt}, p_{jt}$ and $\xi_{jt}$ are fixed). Note that this standard specification lacks features sometimes relied on in results showing identification of discrete choice models: in addition to the absence of individual characteristics that exclusively affect the utility from one choice $j$, this model does not exhibit independence between the “error term” $\mu_{ijt}$ and any of the observables $z_{ijt}, x_{jt}, p_{jt}$.

To see another way that our index structure arises in practice, consider Ho’s (2009) model of demand for health insurance. Each consumer $i$ in market $t$ considers $J$ insurance plans as well as the outside option of remaining uninsured. Each consumer has a vector of observable characteristics $d_{it}$.\(^{21}\) Let $n_{jt}$ denote the set of hospitals in plan $j$’s network, along with their characteristics (e.g., location and the availability of speciality services like cardiac care). Each insurance plan is associated with its network $n_{jt}$, an annual premium $p_{jt}$, additional observed plan characteristics $x_{jt}$ (e.g., the size of its physician network), and an unobservable $\xi_{jt}$.

A consumer’s insurance plan demand depends on her particular likelihood of having of each type of hospital need (diagnosis), as well as how her preferences over hospital characteristics will vary with the type of need. This gives each consumer $i$ an expected utility $EU(n_{jt}, d_{it})$ for the option to use plan $j$’s hospital network. Ho derives this expected utility from auxiliary data on hospital choice,\(^{22}\) which yields, from the perspective of identification, a known functional form for the consumer/choice measures

$$z_{ijt} \equiv EU(n_{jt}, d_{it}).$$

Similar to (5), consumer $i$’s conditional indirect utility for plan $j$ then takes the form\(^{23}\)

$$u_{ijt} = \lambda z_{ijt} + x_{jt} \beta - \alpha(y_{it})p_{jt} + \xi_{jt} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

\(^{20}\)The individual “taste shock” vectors $\nu_{it}$ and $\epsilon_{it}$ are typically assumed independent across $i$ and $t$; however, $x_{jt}$ and $p_{jt}$ enter the composite error $\mu_{ijt}$. The variables $x_{jt}$ and $p_{jt}$ are also typically correlated and, in our framework, are allowed to be correlated with changes in the distribution of $z_{it}$ across markets.

\(^{21}\)Ho’s data include measures of individual age, gender, income, home location, employment status, and industry of employment.

\(^{22}\)See also Ho (2006). Here $d_{it}$ affects both diagnosis probabilities and preferences over hospitals condition on diagnosis. Ho and Lee (2016) extend the model to treat insurance choice at the household level, with households anticipating diagnosis probabilities for each household member.

\(^{23}\)Ho (2009) uses excluded plan-level cost shifters as instruments for premiums.
where \( y_{it} \in d_{it} \) represents the consumer’s income. Ho assumes each \( \epsilon_{ijt} \) is an independent draw from a type-1 extreme value distribution, yielding a multinomial logit model.

Observe that in this example Ho combines data on the characteristics of consumers and choices with additional modeling to derive a scalar \( z_{ijt} \) that exclusively affects only the utility of choice \( j \). In this case, the injectivity of the index vector \( \gamma (z_{it}, \xi_{it}) \), as required by our Assumption 3, holds under an assumption that \( \lambda \neq 0 \). Given this condition, Assumption 5 is also satisfied as long as the support of \( Z_{it} \) conditional on income is an open and connected subset of \( \mathbb{R}^J \). Satisfaction of our remaining assumptions follows as in the previous example.

4 Identification

We consider identification of the demand system

\[
\sigma(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, P_t, \Xi_t)
\]

from observation of the choice decisions of the population of consumers \( i \) in a population of markets \( t \). In addition to the suppressed \( X_t \), the observables consist of \( P_t, Z_{it}, Y_{it}, Q_{it} \), and a vector of instruments \( W_t \) discussed further below. Our broad strategy is to demonstrate identification of the realized demand shocks \( \xi_t = (\xi_{1t}, \ldots, \xi_{Jt}) \) in all markets \( t \). Once these demand shocks are known, identification of demand follows immediately from the equations

\[
\sigma_j (z_{it}, y_{it}, p_t, \xi_t) = E [Q_{ijt} | Z_{it} = z_{it}, Y_{it} = y_{it}, P_t = p_t, \Xi_t = \xi_t] \quad j = 1, \ldots, J.
\]

We demonstrate identification of the demand shocks through four lemmas, developed in sections 4.1 and 4.2. Because our results do not require variation \( Y_{it} \), in most of what follows we simplify notation by fixing \( Y_{it} \) at the arbitrary value \( y^0 \) and dropping \( Y_{it} \) from the notation. All remaining assumptions are to be interpreted to hold conditional on \( Y_{it} = y^0 \). We reintroduce \( Y_{it} \) only when stating our main result in section 4.3.

To document a key observation for what follows, for \( (\xi, p) \in \text{supp} (\Xi_t, P_t) \) let

\[
\mathcal{S} (\xi, p) = \sigma (g (Z) + \xi, p) .
\]

Thus, \( \mathcal{S} (\xi, p) \) denotes the support of choice probabilities in markets \( t \) for which \( \Xi_t = \xi \) and \( P_t = p \).\(^{25}\) Observe that, by Assumptions 2 and 3, for each \( s \in \]

\(^{24}\)We emphasize that, unlike our conditioning on \( X_t \), identification of demand will not implicitly require repeating the argument at other values of \( Y_{it} \).

\(^{25}\)Because \( Z \) is open, continuity and injectivity of \( \sigma \) with respect to the index and of the index with respect to \( Z_{it} \) imply (by invariance of domain) that \( \mathcal{S} (\xi, p) \) is open.
$S(\xi, p)$ there must be a unique $z^* \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\sigma(g(z^*) + \xi, p) = s$. So for $(\xi, p) \in \text{supp } (\Xi_t, P_t)$ and $s \in S(\xi, p)$, we define the function $z^*(s; \xi, p)$ implicitly by

$$\sigma(g(z^*(s; \xi, p)) + \xi, p) = s.$$  

(10)

By the invertibility of $\sigma$ (Assumption 2), we then have

$$g(z^*(s; \xi, p)) + \xi = \sigma^{-1}(s; p)$$  

(11)

for all $(\xi, p) \in \text{supp } (\Xi_t, P_t)$ and $s \in S(\xi, p)$. Note that in each market $t$, the set $S(\xi_t, p_t)$ and the values of $z^*(s; \xi_t, p_t)$ for all $s \in S(\xi_t, p_t)$ are observed, even though the value of the argument $\xi_t$ is unknown.

### 4.1 Identification of the Index Function

Let $|| \cdot ||$ denote the Euclidean norm and let $B(b, \Delta)$ denote an open ball in $\mathbb{R}^J$ of radius $\Delta > 0$, centered at $b$. We demonstrate identification of the index function $g = (g_1, \ldots, g_J)$ under the following condition.

**Assumption 6 (Nondegeneracy).** For some $\Delta > 0$ and some $p \in \text{supp } P_t$, $\text{supp } \Xi_t|\{P_t = p\}$ contains an open ball of radius $\Delta$.

Assumption 6 requires continuously distributed $\Xi_t$ but is otherwise mild. It can be derived as an implication of standard models of supply in which cost shifters (which need not be observed) allow the same equilibrium price vector $p$ to arise under different demand conditions (different $\xi_t$). The key implication, exploited in the following result, is that there exist $p \in \text{supp } P_t$ and $\Delta > 0$ such that for any $d \in \mathbb{R}^J$ satisfying $||d|| < \Delta$, $\text{supp } \Xi_t|\{P_t = p\}$ contains points $\xi$ and $\xi'$ satisfying $\xi - \xi' = d$.

**Lemma 1.** Let Assumptions 1–6 hold and take $(p, \Delta)$ as defined by Assumption 6. Then for every $z$ and $z'$ in $\mathcal{Z}$ such that $||g(z') - g(z)|| < \Delta$ there exist a choice probability vector $s$ and values of $\xi$ and $\xi'$ in $\text{supp } \Xi_t|\{P_t = p\}$ such that $z = z^*(s; \xi, p)$ and $z' = z^*(s; \xi', p)$.

**Proof.** Take any $z$ and $z'$ in $\mathcal{Z}$ such that $||g(z') - g(z)|| < \Delta$. By Assumption 6 and the choice of $(p, \Delta)$, there exist $\xi$ and $\xi'$ in $\text{supp } \Xi_t|\{P_t = p\}$ such that $\xi - \xi' = g(z') - g(z)$, i.e., $\gamma(z', \xi') = \gamma(z, \xi)$. Taking $s = \sigma(\gamma(z', \xi'), p) = \sigma(\gamma(z, \xi), p)$, the result follows from the definition (10).

With this result in hand, we can use equation (11) to relate the derivatives of $g$ at any point $z$ to those at nearby points $z'$ by examining the change in consumer characteristics required to create a given change in the vector of choice probabilities.
Lemma 2. Let Assumptions 1–6 hold. Then there exists $\Delta > 0$ such that for almost all $z, z' \in \mathcal{Z}$ satisfying $\|g(z') - g(z)\| < \Delta$ the matrix $\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial g(z)}{\partial z} \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial g(z')}{\partial z} \end{pmatrix}$ is identified.

Proof. Take $p$ and $\Delta$ as in Assumption 6. Consider markets $t$ and $t'$ in which $P_t = P_{t'} = p$ but, for some choice probability vector $s$, $z = z^*(s; \xi_t, p) \neq z' = z^*(s; \xi_{t'}, p)$, (12) revealing that $\xi_t \neq \xi_{t'}$. Lemma 1 ensures that such $t, t'$, and $s$ exist for all $z, z' \in \mathcal{Z}$ satisfying $\|g(z') - g(z)\| < \Delta$. And although $\xi_t$ and $\xi_{t'}$ are latent, the identities of markets $t$ and $t'$ satisfying (12) are observed. Differentiating (11) with respect to the vector $s$ within these two markets, we obtain

$$\frac{\partial g(z)}{\partial z} \frac{\partial z^*(s; \xi_t, p)}{\partial s} = \frac{\partial \sigma^{-1}(s; p)}{\partial s}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial g(z')}{\partial z} \frac{\partial z^*(s; \xi_{t'}, p)}{\partial s} = \frac{\partial \sigma^{-1}(s; p)}{\partial s}.$$

Thus, recalling Assumption 5, for almost all such $z, z'$ we have

$$\left[\frac{\partial g(z')}{\partial z}\right]^{-1} \frac{\partial g(z)}{\partial z} \frac{\partial z^*(s; \xi_{t'}, p)}{\partial s} \left[\frac{\partial z^*(s; \xi_t, p)}{\partial s}\right]^{-1}.$$

The matrices on the right-hand side are observed. \[\square\]

This leads us to the main result of this section, obtained by connecting the matrix products $\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial g(z)}{\partial z} \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial g(z')}{\partial z} \end{pmatrix}$ identified in Lemma 2 to the known (normalized) value of the matrix $\begin{pmatrix} \frac{\partial g(z)}{\partial z} \end{pmatrix}$ at $z = z^0$.

Lemma 3. Under Assumptions 1–6, $g$ is identified on $\mathcal{Z}$.

Proof. Take $\Delta > 0$ as in Lemma 2. For each vector of integers $\tau \in \mathcal{Z}^J$, define the set

$$\mathcal{B}_\tau = g(\mathcal{Z}) \cap \mathcal{B}(g(z^0) + \tau \Delta/2, \Delta/2),$$

and let $\mathcal{I}_\tau$ denote the pre-image of $\mathcal{B}_\tau$ under $g$. By construction, all $z$ and $z'$ in any given set $\mathcal{I}_\tau$ satisfy $\|g(z') - g(z)\| < \Delta$. So by Lemma 2,

$$[\partial g(z)/\partial z]^{-1} [\partial g(z')/\partial z]$$

is known for almost all $z$ and $z'$ in any set $\mathcal{I}_\tau$. Because $\cup_{\tau \in \mathcal{Z}^J} \mathcal{B}_\tau$ forms an open cover of $g(\mathcal{Z})$, $\cup_{\tau \in \mathcal{Z}^J} \mathcal{I}_\tau$ forms an open cover of $\mathcal{Z}$. Thus, given any
$z \in \mathcal{Z}$ there exists a simple chain of open sets $\mathcal{L}$ in $\mathcal{Z}$ linking the point $z^0$ to $z$.\footnote{See, e.g., van Mill (2002, Lemma 1.5.21).} Thus, $[\partial g(z^0)/\partial z]^{-1}[\partial g(z)/\partial z]$ is known for almost all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$. With the normalization (4) and the continuity of $\partial g(z)/\partial z$, the result then follows from the fundamental theorem of calculus for line integrals and the boundary condition (1).

Before moving to identification of the demand shocks, we pause to point out that our constructive identification of $g(\cdot)$ used only a single price vector $p$—that required by Assumption 6. In typical models of supply this condition would hold for almost all price vectors in the support of $P_t$. In addition to providing falsifiable restrictions, this indicates a form of redundancy that would typically be exploited by estimators used in practice. Similarly, our proof of Lemma 3 used, for each $z \in \mathcal{Z}$, only one of infinitely many paths between $z^0$ and $z$; integrating along any such path must yield the same function $g(\cdot)$.\footnote{Alternatively, the need for identification of the derivatives of $g$ along only one such path illustrates further potential for softening of our requirements on the support of $Z_{it}$.}

### 4.2 Identification of the Demand Shocks

We demonstrate identification of the demand shocks under the following additional conditions.

**Assumption 7** (Common Choice Probability). There exists a choice probability vector $s^*$ such that $s^* \in \mathcal{S}(\xi, p)$ for all $(\xi, p) \in \text{supp}(\Xi_t, P_t)$.

**Assumption 8** (Instruments for Prices). (i) For all $j = 1, \ldots, J$, $E[\Xi_{jt}|W_t] = 0$ almost surely; (ii) In the class of functions $\Psi(P_t)$ with finite expectation, $E[\Psi(P_t)|W_t] = 0$ almost surely implies $\Psi(P_t) = 0$ almost surely.

Assumption 7 requires that there exist some choice probability vector $s^*$ that is common to all markets—that $\cap_{(\xi, p) \in \text{supp}(\Xi_t, P_t)} \mathcal{S}(\xi, p)$ be nonempty. The nondegeneracy of each set $\mathcal{S}(\xi_t, p_t)$ (recall (9)) reflects variation in $Z_{it}$ across its support. Assumption 7 requires sufficient variation in $Z_{it}$ that for some $s^*$ we have $s^* \in \mathcal{S}(\xi_t, p_t)$ for all $(\xi_t, p_t)$. The strength of this assumption depends on the joint support of $(\Xi_t, P_t)$ and the relative impacts of $(Z_{it}, \Xi_t, P_t)$ on choice behavior. Observe that $P_{jt}$ and $\Xi_{jt}$ typically will have opposing impacts and will be positively correlated under equilibrium pricing behavior; thus, large support for $g(Z_{it})$ may not be required even if $\Xi_t$ were to have large support. Indeed, we can contrast our assumption of a single common choice probability vector with a requirement of a special regressor with large support: the latter
would imply that every interior choice probability vector \( s \) is a common choice probability.\(^{28}\) Note also that, because choice probabilities conditional on \( Z_{it} \) are observable in all markets (i.e., for all realizations of \( (\Xi_t, P_t) \)), Assumption 7 is verifiable—i.e., its satisfaction or failure is identified.\(^{29}\) Thus, because the choice of \( y^0 \) is arbitrary, we require only existence of one such \( y^0 \in Y \) such that Assumption 7 holds.\(^{30}\) Finally, note that the value of any common choice probability vector \( s^* \) may be treated as known.

Assumption 8 requires instruments for prices satisfying standard nonparametric IV conditions. Part (i) is the exclusion restriction, ensuring that variation in \( W_t \) not alter the mean of the unobservables \( \Xi_t \). Part (ii) is a standard completeness condition—the nonparametric analog of the classic rank condition for linear regression. For example, Newey and Powell (2003) have shown that under mean independence, completeness is necessary and sufficient for identification in separable nonparametric regression. The following result demonstrates that, given knowledge of the index function \( g \) and existence of a common choice probability vector \( s^* \), the same instrumental variables conditions suffice here to allow identification of the demand shocks.

**Lemma 4.** Under Assumptions 1–8, \( \xi_{jt} \) is identified for all \( j \) and \( t \).

**Proof.** Taking \( s = s^* \) in equation (11) we have

\[
g (z^* (s^*; \xi_t, p_t)) = \sigma^{-1} (s^*; p_t) - \xi_t
\]

for all \( t \); i.e., for all \( t \) and each \( j = 1, \ldots, J \),

\[
g_j (z^* (s^*; \xi_t, p_t)) = \sigma^{-1}_j (s^*; p_t) - \xi_{jt}.
\]

(14)

By Lemma 3 the left side of (14) is known (recall that the values of each \( z^* (s^*; \xi_t, p_t) \) are observable, even though the value of each \( \xi_t \) is not). Thus, for each \( j \) this equation takes the form of a separable nonparametric regression model. Identification of each function \( \sigma^{-1}_j (s^*; \cdot) \) follows immediately from the identification result of Newey and Powell (2003). This implies identification of each \( \xi_{jt} \) as well. \( \square \)

\(^{28}\)Identification arguments exploiting special regressors also commonly rely on linearity, exclusion, and independence conditions that we have not required.

\(^{29}\)See Berry and Haile (2018) for a formal definition of verifiability.

\(^{30}\)When more than one such value \( y^0 \) exists, or when there is more than one common choice probability vector \( s^* \), this introduces additional falsifiable restrictions.
4.3 Identification of Demand

We now drop the conditioning on $Y_{it} = y^0$ in each market. With the identification of the demand shocks guaranteed by Lemma 4, identification of demand follows immediately from the definition

$$\sigma_j(C_{it}) = \sigma_j(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, \Xi_t, P_t) = E[Q_{ijt}|Z_{it}, Y_{it}, \Xi_t, P_t],$$

since the realizations of $Q_{ijt}$ and all conditioning variables are known. Thus, we have our main result.

Theorem. Under Assumptions 1–8, $\sigma$ is identified on $\mathcal{C}$.

5 Discussion

Although our identification proof required several steps, in hindsight the logic is straightforward. Within-market variation directly reveals how choice probabilities respond to variation in the consumer-level measures $Z_{it}$, holding all else fixed. With the index structure, this variation also pins down how choice probabilities respond (all else fixed) to variation in the vector of demand shocks $\Xi_t$. The latter can be of direct interest as a feature of the demand system $\sigma(Z_{it}, Y_{it}, X_t, P_t, \Xi_t)$; but it also provides a way to hold the effects of the demand shocks fixed when examining how choice probabilities respond to the cross-market price variation associated with market-level instrumental variables. More precisely—following the second half of our proof more closely—it allows us to infer the demand shocks by observing the vectors of consumer measures $Z_{it}$ required to match the common choice probability vector $s^*$ in each market, while controlling for the variation in prices with instruments. As we’ve noted already, once demand shocks are known, identification of demand is trivial.

Thus, our results yield two primary messages. First, identification of demand for differentiated products follows using the same sorts of quasi-experimental variation relied upon in simpler settings. Indeed, the exploitation of within-unit variation and instrumental variables is arguably the bread and butter of empirical economics. Given the relevance of demand (and choice more generally) to a broad range of economic questions, it should be encouraging that these standard types of variation suffice to allow identification here. Second, the availability of micro data not only permits demand specifications that condition on consumer-level observables, but also can substantially reduce the reliance on instrumental variables to address the key challenge to identification of demand: the presence of unobserved product characteristics or other latent demand shocks that affect the prices and quantities of all goods.
in the demand system. The softening of instrumental variables requirements is achieved because consumer-level observables create within-market variation in consumers’ choice problems. Such variation is similar in some ways to that which can be generated by instruments for quantities; however, the exogeneity of the micro-data variation arises not from an exclusion restriction in the cross-section of markets but from the fact that within a single market the market-level demand shocks simply do not vary. Thus, our insights also have some connection to those underlying “within estimation” of slope parameters in panel data models with fixed effects.

Our results do lead to several natural questions, which we discuss in the remainder of this concluding section. For notational simplicity we suppress the variables $Y_{it}$ in what follows.

5.1 What Are Appropriate Instruments?

The fact that reliance on instruments is standard does not imply that instruments will always be available. Rather, this merely shifts discussion of identification largely to standard questions concerning the availability of suitable instruments. What are likely instruments in practice?

Candidate instruments for prices include most of those typically relied upon in the case of market-level data (see, e.g., Berry and Haile (2016) for a more complete discussion). Classic instruments for prices are cost shifters that are excluded from the demand system and (mean-) independent of the demand shocks $\Xi_t$. When cost shifters are not observed, proxies for cost shifters may be available and can satisfy the required mean independence.\footnote{An example, plausibly exogenous in some applications, are so-called “Hausman instruments”: prices of the same good in other markets (e.g., Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), Hausman (1996), or Nevo (2000, 2001)).}

Exogenous shifters of market structure (e.g., firm ownership) that affect prices through equilibrium markups can also serve as instruments. Micro data can also result in availability of a related category of candidate instruments: market-level demographics such as the distribution of age, income, education, and ethnicity that alter equilibrium markups. Berry and Haile (2014, 2016) refer to these as “Waldfogel” instruments, after Waldfogel (2003).\footnote{See also Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and Fan (2013).}

When micro-data are available, we can directly account for the impacts of individual-specific demographics, so it may be reasonable to assume that market-level demographics are excluded from the conditional demands we seek to identify. The requirement that these market-level measures be mean independent of the market-level demand shocks is a significant assumption, ruling out certain kinds of geographic

Our results do lead to several natural questions, which we discuss in the remainder of this concluding section. For notational simplicity we suppress the variables $Y_{it}$ in what follows.

5.1 What Are Appropriate Instruments?

The fact that reliance on instruments is standard does not imply that instruments will always be available. Rather, this merely shifts discussion of identification largely to standard questions concerning the availability of suitable instruments. What are likely instruments in practice?

Candidate instruments for prices include most of those typically relied upon in the case of market-level data (see, e.g., Berry and Haile (2016) for a more complete discussion). Classic instruments for prices are cost shifters that are excluded from the demand system and (mean-) independent of the demand shocks $\Xi_t$. When cost shifters are not observed, proxies for cost shifters may be available and can satisfy the required mean independence.\footnote{An example, plausibly exogenous in some applications, are so-called “Hausman instruments”: prices of the same good in other markets (e.g., Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994), Hausman (1996), or Nevo (2000, 2001)).}

Exogenous shifters of market structure (e.g., firm ownership) that affect prices through equilibrium markups can also serve as instruments. Micro data can also result in availability of a related category of candidate instruments: market-level demographics such as the distribution of age, income, education, and ethnicity that alter equilibrium markups. Berry and Haile (2014, 2016) refer to these as “Waldfogel” instruments, after Waldfogel (2003).\footnote{See also Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) and Fan (2013).}
sorting or peer effects. But in many applications such an assumption may be
natural.

5.2 What About Stronger Functional Forms?

In practice, estimation is almost always influenced by functional form assump-
tions—e.g., the choice of parametric structure, kernel functions, or sieve basis.
Such functional forms enable interpolation, extrapolation, and bridging of gaps
between the exogenous variation present in the sample and that needed for non-
parametric identification. A study of nonparametric identification can reveal
whether functional form assumptions play a more essential role in one precise
sense. One interpretation of our results is that only limited nonparametric
structure is essential: for our nonparametric model, the main requirement
for identification is adequate exogenous variation of dimension equal to the
dimension of the endogenous variables.

But one can also ask how imposing additional structure on the demand
model might allow relaxation of our identification requirements. Answers to
this question may be of direct interest and can also suggest the sensitivity of
identification to particular conditions. For example, we may feel more comfort-
able when we know that relaxation of one condition for identification can be
offset by strengthening another. A full exploration of these potential trade-offs
describes an entire research agenda. But some examples can illustrate three
directions one might go to enlarge the set of potential instruments, further
reduce the number of required instruments, or reduce the required dimension-
ality of the micro data.

5.2.1 Strengthening the Index Structure

Our model made no assumption on the way the characteristics $X_t$ enter de-
mand. For example, we have not assumed that there are certain elements
$X_{jt}$ of $X_t$ that in some sense only affect good $j$. With such a restriction,
however, another class of instruments—the exogenous characteristics of com-
peting goods (i.e., BLP instruments)—can become available.\footnote{The “relevance” of these instruments reflects the fact that in standard oligopoly models each good’s markup depends on the characteristics of related goods.} One way to re-introduce the BLP instruments is to assume that for at least some compo-

tent $X^{(1)}_t$ of $X_t$, choice probabilities can be written as (now conditioning out
and suppressing only $x_t \backslash x^{(1)}_t$)

$$\sigma(z_{it}, x^{(1)}_t, \xi_t, p_t) = \sigma(\gamma_{it}, p_t),$$
with
\[ \gamma_{ijt} = g_j(z_{jt}) + \xi_{jt} + h_j\left(x^{(1)}_{jt}\right). \]

Here we have strengthened our index structure by including \( X^{(1)}_{jt} \) in the index for good \( j \) and assuming that \( Z_{jt} \) is also exclusive to the index for good \( j \). Many specifications in the empirical literature satisfy these additional restrictions.

In this case, the IV regression equation (14) becomes
\[ g_j\left(z^*_j(s^*;\xi_t,p_t)\right) = \sigma^{-1}_j(s^*,p_t) - h_j\left(x^{(1)}_{jt}\right) - \xi_{jt}. \]

Identification of \( \sigma^{-1}_j(s^*,\cdot) \) and \( h_j(\cdot) \) then follows with instruments for \( P_t \) when \( X^{(1)}_{jt} \) is mean independent of \( \Xi_{jt} \). When \( X^{(1)}_{-jt} \) is assumed mean independent of \( \Xi_{jt} \), \( X^{(1)}_{-jt} \) are available as instruments for \( P_{jt} \).

### 5.2.2 A Special Regressor

Following Berry and Haile (2010), a different approach is to assume that the demand system of interest is generated by a random utility model with conditional indirect utilities of the form
\[ u_{ijt} = g_j(z_{ijt}) + \xi_{jt} + e_{ijt}, \]
where \( e_{ijt} \) is a scalar random term whose nonparametric distribution depends on \( x_{jt} \) and \( p_{jt} \) (equation (7) gives a parametric example). In this case, our Lemma 3 demonstrates identification of each function \( g_j(\cdot) \) up to a units normalization on the utility associated with product \( j \).

If one is willing to make the assumption of independence between \( Z_{ijt} \) and \( E_{ijt} \), this turns \( g_j(Z_{ijt}) \) into a known special regressor. Under an additional (typically very restrictive) full support assumption on \( g_j(Z_j) \), a standard argument demonstrates identification of the marginal distribution of \((\Xi_{jt} + E_{ijt})|X_{jt},P_{jt})\) for all \( j,t \). Berry and Haile (2010) show that one can use this marginal distribution to define a nonparametric IV regression equation for each choice \( j \), where \( \xi_{jt} \) is the additive error term. In each equation the prices and characteristics of goods \( k \neq j \) are excluded. Thus, in this framework one needs only one instrument for price, and exogenous characteristics of competing goods (BLP instruments) are again available under the assumption that \( X^{(1)}_{-jt} \) is mean independent of \( \Xi_{jt} \).

### 5.2.3 A Semiparametric Model

Another way to add structure is to consider semiparametric models. As one example, consider a semiparametric nested logit model where inverse demand,
given \( z_t \), is\(^{34} \)

\[
g_j(z_t) + \xi_{jt} = \ln(s_{jt}(z_t)/s_{0t}(z_t)) - \theta \ln(s_{j/g,t}(z_t)) + \alpha p_{jt}. \tag{15}\]

Here \( s_{j/g,t}(z_t) \) denotes the within-group share and \( \theta \) denotes the usual “nesting parameter.”

Take any market \( t \) and any \( z \in \mathcal{Z} \). Differentiating (15) with respect to one (possibly, the only) element of \( z_t \)—say \( z_{1t} \)—at the point \( z \) yields

\[
\frac{\partial g_j(z)}{\partial z_1} = \frac{\partial \ln s_{jt}(z)}{\partial z_1} - \frac{\partial \ln s_{0t}(z)}{\partial z_1} - \theta \frac{\partial \ln s_{j/gt}(z)}{\partial z_1}. \tag{16}\]

In this equation, \( \frac{\partial g_j(z)}{\partial z_1} \) and \( \theta \) are the only unknowns. Moving to another market \( t' \), we can obtain a second equation of the same form in which the left-hand side is identical to that in (16). Equating the right-hand sides yields

\[
\frac{\partial \ln s_{jt}(z)}{\partial z_1} - \frac{\partial \ln s_{0t}(z)}{\partial z_1} - \theta \frac{\partial \ln s_{j/gt}(z)}{\partial z_1} = \frac{\partial \ln s_{jt'}(z)}{\partial z_1} - \frac{\partial \ln s_{0t'}(z)}{\partial z_1} - \theta \frac{\partial \ln s_{j/gt'}(z)}{\partial z_1}.
\]

Thus, we can solve for \( \theta \) as long as

\[
\frac{\partial \ln s_{j/gt}(z)}{\partial z_1} \neq \frac{\partial \ln s_{j/gt'}(z)}{\partial z_1},
\]

a condition that will typically hold when \( \xi_{t'} \neq \xi_t \) or \( p_{t'} \neq p_t \), and which is directly observed. With \( \theta \) known, we then identify (indeed, over-identify) all derivatives of \( g_j(z) \) from (16). Identification of the remaining parameter \( \alpha \) can then be obtained from (15) with a single excluded instrument—e.g., an excluded exogenous market-level cost shifter or markup shifter that affects all prices.

Although this example involves a model that is more flexible than nested logit models typically estimated in practice, it moves a considerable distance from our fully nonparametric model. But this example makes clear that additional structure can further reduce the dimension of the required exogenous variation. Indeed, here we can obtain identification with a single instrument (vs. the usual requirement of two instruments for the fully parametric nested

\(^{34}\)As before, we have conditioned on \( x_t \), permitting it to enter the model flexibly. For example, conditional indirect utilities might take the form

\[
u_{ijt} = h(x_t, g_j(z_t, x_t) + \xi_{jt} - \alpha (x_t) p_{jt} + \mu_{ijt}(x_t)),
\]

where \( h \) is strictly increasing in its second argument, \( \alpha (x_t) \) is arbitrary, and \( \mu_{ijt}(x_t) \) is a stochastic component taking the standard composite nested-logit form at each \( x_t \).
logit (see Berry (1994))) and a scalar individual level observable $z_{it}$. Other semiparametric models may offer more intermediate points in the set of feasible trade-offs between the flexibility of the model and the dimension of exogenous variation needed for identification.

5.3 What about Continuous Demand Systems?

Although we have focused on the case in which the consumer-level quantities $Q_{ijt}$ are binary outcomes arising from a discrete choice model, there is nothing in our proofs requiring this. Applying our results to continuous demand is therefore just a matter of verifying the suitability of our assumptions.

As an example, consider a “mixed CES” model of continuous choice, similar to the model in Adao, Costinot and Donaldson (2017), with $J + 1$ products. Each consumer $i$ has utility over consumption vectors $q \in \mathbb{R}^{J+1}$ given by

$$u(q; z_{it}, x_t, p_t, \xi_t) = \left( \sum_{j=0}^{J} \phi_{ijt} q_j^\rho \right)^{1/\rho},$$

where $\rho \in (0, 1)$ is a parameter and each $\phi_{ijt}$ represents idiosyncratic preferences of consumer $i$ for the product characteristics $x$. We set $\phi_{i0t} = 1$ and let

$$\phi_{ijt} = \exp \left[ (1 - \rho) \left( g_j (z_{it}) + \xi_j + x_j \beta_{it} \right) \right], \ j = 1, \ldots, J,$$

where $\beta_{it}$ is a random vector with distribution $F$ representing consumer-level preferences for product characteristics. With $p_{0t} = 1$ and consumer income of $y_{it}$, familiar CES algebra shows that Marshallian demands are

$$q_{ijt} = \frac{y_{it} \exp (g_j (z_{it}) + \xi_j + x_j \beta_{it} - \alpha \ln(p_{jt}))}{1 + \left( \sum_{k=1}^{J} \exp (g_k (z_{it}) + \xi_k + x_k \beta_{it} - \alpha \rho \ln(p_{kt})) \right)} \cdot$$

where $\alpha = 1/1 - \rho$. Equation (17) resembles a choice probability for a random coefficients logit model, although the quantities $q_{it}$ here take on continuous values and do not sum to one. Conditioning on $y_{it}$ (formally, using income level as one factor defining markets), it is easy to show that our Assumptions 1–4 are satisfied for the expected CES demand functions, which take the form

$$\sigma_t(g(z_{it}) + \xi_t, x_t, p_t) = E [Q_{it}|z_{it}, x_t, p_t, \xi_t],$$

where the $j$th component of $E[Q_{it}|z_{it}, x_t, p_t, \xi_t]$ is

$$\int \frac{y_{it} \exp (g_j (z_{it}) + \xi_j + x_j \beta_{it} - \alpha \ln(p_{jt}))}{1 + \left( \sum_{k=1}^{J} \exp (g_k (z_{it}) + \xi_k + x_k \beta_{it} - \alpha \rho \ln(p_{kt})) \right)} dF(\beta_{it}).$$
Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2013) also describe a broad class of continuous choice models that can satisfy the key injectivity property of Assumption 2. These models can include mixed continuous/discrete settings, where individual consumers may purchase zero or any positive quantity of each good.
References


